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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis presents a critical analysis of the property rights in terms of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the 
property conflict in Cyprus. The theme that runs through the paper is whether property 
disputes in Cyprus have had an impact on the established case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR). Also addressed is the extent to which Cypriot property claims 
caused the Court to depart from its traditional approach concerning property rights under 
the ECHR and whether these cases before the Court have introduced a new aspect to the 
understanding and interpretation of the protection of property rights in the Convention 
system, specifically the application of the P1-1 to the Convention. The Court’s approach, 
in its various precedents, in examining property rights within the remit of P1-1 will be 
compared with the property claims from Cyprus in order to determine the unique and 
significant character of the Cypriot property cases and to analyse their relationship with 
the right to property under P1-1 to the ECHR. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying This is 
mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. 
From how many crimes, wars and murderers, from how many horrors and misfortunes might 
not anyone have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying 
to his fellows, “Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that 
the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself belongs to nobody.” Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. 
 
 
Property Disputes in a Divided Country: A Conflict in Need of Resolve to Achieve 
Peace and Stability in Cyprus  
 
Coming from the northern part of an island that is not internationally recognised by any 
states other than Turkey, I have first-hand experience of being treated as ‘the one from an 
occupied area of Cyprus’, in any country that I have visited, even in the southern part of 
my own country of origin and in every country in which I have spent some part of my life 
living. My country has been divided into two, and because of this situation, its people 
have not had the opportunity to visit their homes and the land where they grew up and 
spent most of their lives. Moreover, in Cyprus, although these people have been ‘allowed’ 
to visit their homeland since 2003, they have to present their identity cards in order to 
travel from the south to the north or vice versa, at the border checkpoints that divide the 
island.  
 
Having grown up as a citizen of an unrecognised ‘state’ and coming from a community 
which has been regarded as an ‘occupier’, with the majority of its population having been 
displaced and victims of the war, I know what it is like to come from a country whose 
people have experienced displacement and resettlement. I also know what it is like to be 
a witness of the social memory of those experiences that have been passed on to future 
generations. I believe that, although the passage of time does not heal the bleeding 
wounds of the past injustices that both Greek Cypriots (hereinafter G/Cypriots) and 
Turkish Cypriots (hereinafter T/Cypriots) have experienced, these injuries can be 
ameliorated through effective, sustainable and mutually agreed remedies. I am deeply 
aware that the property issue is the biggest obstacle on the path towards peace on the 
island. The resolution of the property dispute is achievable through efforts and 
compromises and by promoting a comprehensive settlement for the Cyprus problem. 
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The history of Cyprus has witnessed one of the most sorrowful fates in any state: the 
displacement of people. As a result of the political disputes between the two communities 
living in Cyprus, a significant number of Cypriots had to flee from their homes and 
become refugees. The political and legal consequences of displacement are still 
continuing both in the domestic and international arenas. 
 
This thesis contains a detailed examination of understandings of property rights within 
the context of domestic regulation and the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). While the thesis does not attempt to explain in detail the political and 
interventionist role of the ECtHR in conflict and post-conflict situations (and indeed this 
is well documented elsewhere)1, the originality of the thesis lies in its critical reflection 
upon the case law of the Court around property ownership in Cyprus. Inevitably, the 
political situation in which these cases occur presents the opportunity to engage with the 
broader context of the conflict which has existed in Cyprus since 1974. 
 
The great majority of existing publications about the Cyprus problem provide a 
background of extensive information, placing the dispute in its historical, social and 
ethno-political context. In this respect, the pre-independence period (1571-1960) of the 
Republic of Cyprus (RoC); the evolution of the inter-communal conflict and the division 
of the island have always been the key subjects of the studies, discussions and research. 
Additionally, the failure of the Annan Plan inspired significant amounts of literature about 
Cyprus, its accession to the European Union, as well as the role of Turkey in political 
matters in Cyprus. Because of the unresolved status of the Cyprus conflict which has 
become a major international conflict, the aforementioned issues still demand further 
research.  Having said that, there are some readings (noted throughout the thesis) which 
provide a critical analysis of the ECtHR judgments concerning the issues deriving from 
the Cyprus problem. The works of Coban, Erhurman, Ozersay, Gürel, Sermet, Loucaides 
and Buyse have been particularly insightful for this research.2  
1 For further development of the role of the ECtHR in a political environment see: Brice Dickson, The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland, New York: Oxford 
University Press, (2012); Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet. A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR 
on National Legal Systems, New York: Oxford University Press, (2008). 
2 Ali R. Coban, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human Rights, Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd (2004); Tufan Erhurman, Kibris’ta Akil Tutulmasi, Lefkosa, Isik Kitapevi Yayinlari 
(2007); Gürel A & Ozersay K, ‘Property and Human Rights in Cyprus: The European Court of Human 
Rights as a Platform of Political Struggle’, Middle Eastern Studies, 44 (2008) 290; Laurent Sermet, ‘The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights’, Human Rights Files, vol. 11 (revised 
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In pursuing the question of the legal resolution of the Cyprus problem, this thesis will 
make an important contribution to the literature by integrating the examination of the 
issue of property and property rights in terms of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights with the ECtHR’s approach to the cases 
concerning property claims from Cyprus. Therefore, the thesis not only concentrates on 
the property disputes between Cypriots but also examines the ECtHR’s attitude in its 
Cyprus rulings. A great number of applications have been brought before the ECtHR by 
Cypriots, which thus established an interaction between the case law of the ECtHR and 
the property rules of both Cypriot communities. This thesis derives from dissatisfaction 
with the way property, as a human right, is deliberately being distorted in political 
disputes and turned into a political tool to negotiate a bargain among the parties in order 
to create a political settlement in Cyprus. Moreover, when this issue was taken to the 
international arena, the ECtHR became involved in this political debate and became the 
key legal actor in the property war in Cyprus. 
 
The property dispute between G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots is the most contentious and 
enduring issue within the well-known Cyprus problem. It is not only Cypriots who have 
suffered from property disputes: it has also been carried to the international level by 
foreign buyers of disputed lands located in the northern part of the Country. The issue of 
property is the crux of the unresolved Cyprus problem and represents one of the major 
reasons for the longstanding political deadlock on the island. In order to understand the 
reason for the property problems which still remain unresolved, this thesis will examine 
the legal, political and historical reasons that caused these disputes on the island. The 
purpose of the thesis is to examine the property disputes between G/Cypriots and 
T/Cypriots in the light of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (P1-1 of the ECHR). 
 
Soon after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter RoC), a constitutional 
crisis launched the inter-communal violence which resulted in the collapse of the bi-
edition), Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing (1990); Loukis G. Loucaides, ‘Current Legal 
Developments: Is the European Court of Human Rights Still a Principled Court of Human Rights After the 
Demopoulos Case?’ Legal Journal of International Law, vol. 24 (2011) pp.435–465; Antoine Christian 
Buyse, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The European Human Rights Perspective, With a Case Study in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, School of Human Rights Research, vol. 25, Intersentia Uitgevers N.V (2008). 
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communal power sharing of the Republic. During the years 1963 and 1964, one-quarter 
of the T/Cypriot population of the time and 700 G/Cypriots were displaced. These 
numbers dramatically increased after the war in 1974, which led to the present de facto 
division of the island.3 An attempt will be made to provide the number of displaced 
Cypriots and the percentages of the privately owned lands affected by the property dispute 
in order to illustrate the significance of the property problem on the island. The T/Cypriot 
administration is in the north, and not recognised by any other state apart from Turkey 
and the G/Cypriot administration, which is the de jure government for the entire island, 
presents in the south.  
 
An examination will be made of the two contradictory property mechanisms of the two 
communities in handling the property rights of the people who have been displaced as a 
result of the war and division of the island. The ECtHR mechanism for the protection of 
the right of property will be analysed in order to illustrate the interaction between the 
domestic property regulations and the Court’s case law regarding property rights settled 
under the ECtHR. In this regard, an attempt will be made to diagnose the significance of 
Cyprus property cases in terms of understanding property rights within the meaning of 
the ECtHR mechanism. The departure of the Court from its traditional approach in its 
Cyprus ruling will be examined in order to arrive at an understanding of the substantiality 
of these property cases by taking a view as to how they bring a new dimension to the 
system of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the Convention). 
 
The property question is the Gordian knot of the Cyprus problem, which has been the 
most ancient unsolvable political dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle 
East. The thesis will provide a historical introduction to the disputed issues that led to a 
separation of viewpoints of the two communities. An outline will also be given on how 
the two opposing perspectives of the G/Cypriot and T/Cypriot authorities on the Cyprus 
conflict guided the said authorities into establishing formulas which are considerably 
differentiated from each other in the search for the settlement of the property debate. 
Where appropriate, a detailed examination will be made of these standpoints and the 
3 Ayla Gürel & Kudret Ozersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ 
and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) 
Cyprus Centre Report (3/2006) pp. 1-5. 
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underlying reasons for having contradictory perspectives will be determined. In light of 
the differences in approaches between the two communities, the thesis will outline how 
these opposing stands have influenced the formation of the domestic property regulations 
concerning the displaced persons on the island. 
 
The thesis will take a detailed look at the concept of property and property rights in terms 
of P1-1. In this regard, there will be a focus on the examination of the right to property in 
various precedent cases of the ECtHR. The Court’s approach to these cases will be 
contrasted with each other and will also be compared with property claims from Cyprus 
in order to arrive at an understanding of the Court’s differentiated attitude in its Cyprus 
ruling. The implementation of the provisions under P1-1 to the cases at issue will be 
analysed in detail in order to determine the applicability of the standards set under P1-1 
to the sui generis cases of Cypriots.  
 
The thesis will also outline how the fundamental components of P1-1 have applied to the 
‘taking’ of properties in Cyprus; how the acts of the respondent state (Turkey) concerning 
the alleged violation of property rights were placed under P1-1 in comparison with the 
Court’s ruling in similar cases against other contracting states; and how the Court assessed 
the factual circumstances of the cases from Cyprus with the burden of political and 
historical complexities. Predictions will be made, where appropriate, of underlying 
justifications of the Court’s differentiating approach among these cases. 
 
An examination will be made of the ECtHR’s Cyprus ruling by analysing four landmark 
cases:4 Loizidou v. Turkey, Cyprus v. Turkey, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey and Demopoulos 
v. Turkey. The reason for examining these particular cases is the roles they play in the 
progress of property disputes in Cyprus within the context of legal and political aspects. 
The thesis will also go on to consider how the judgment of these cases represented a 
further step within the issue of property rights on the island. From the key findings that 
will be elucidated through the case analysis, from both the perspectives of the Court and 
the parties of these cases, a view will be taken of the determination to diagnose the Court’s 
4 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731;  
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 
306. 
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amended approach towards its Cyprus ruling, the developments of the legal remedies and 
impact of the ECtHR case law on the dynamics of the political and social context in 
Cyprus.  
 
The first case concerning property disputes in Cyprus was examined by the ECtHR in 
1996. From 1996 to 2010, the ECtHR was the primary Court to which the displaced 
G/Cypriots applied in respect of their property claims. During the fourteen-year time-line, 
the Court gradually changed its approach towards the legal regulations of disputed 
G/Cypriot properties that were settled by T/Cypriot administration. The thesis will take a 
look at and attempt to illustrate the considerable impact of the Court’s amended stance 
over the negotiations between the two communities. Additionally, an analysis will be 
made to determine the factors which influenced the Court’s traditional pattern in its 
Cyprus judgments that followed until the year 2010. Some reference will also be made to 
how time-varying policy effects, laws, social and cultural elements internationalised the 
political saga of the Cyprus property problem through the cases of the Cypriots in their 
pursuit of their property rights before the ECtHR. All of these cases have been burdened 
with highly intense political, legal and historical complexities that were taken before the 
Court. In this regard, an attempt will be made to diagnose to what extent the ECtHR has 
refrained from becoming an actor in this political deadlock. 
 
An examination will be made of the process of the developments of domestic regulations 
regarding the property rights of displaced people. The cases concerning the property 
rights at issue have spread through the fourteen-year time-line and, within this period, the 
T/Cypriot administration has settled laws and regulations that were subject to various 
amendments in order to gain legal recognition at the international level. An outline will 
also be given of the influence of the Court’s assessments and decisions in its Cyprus 
ruling over the local remedies. There will be a focus on the impact of the ECtHR ruling 
over the remedies of the T/Cypriot administration that restrained the Court from being 
the primary solution producer for the property conflict. 
 
The thesis will take a detailed look at the interaction between the mechanism for the 
protection of property rights within the meaning of P1-1 and the local laws of the disputed 
properties in Cyprus. In this regard, an attempt will be made to diagnose how the sui 
generis nature of the Cyprus property cases brought a different angle to the understanding 
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of the right to the property within the ambit of the Convention system. It will be 
instructive here to determine which factual circumstances of these cases have become 
determinant factors in the Court’s traditional approach with respect to the property rights 
of displaced people in Cyprus. 
 
Once an analysis of the cases has been provided, the thesis will then take a look at the 
new era for the property conflict in Cyprus, which began with the failure of a United 
Nations (hereinafter UN) proposal, known as the Annan plan, to resolve the Cyprus 
problem. It will attempt to emphasise the impact of this plan over the developments of 
the domestic property system and the ruling of the Court regarding the Cyprus property 
claims. This will be provided by comparing the Court’s judgments held before and after 
the failure of the Annan plan. In light of these considerations, it will attempt to determine 
the previous findings from which the Strasbourg Court departed and on which grounds it 
rationalised its new stance towards Cyprus property matters. Once an outline of these 
differentiations has been provided, an attempt will be made to predict whether the Court’s 
decisions were politically motivated or whether the decisions at issue were reached in 
accordance with the effective protection of property rights within the Convention 
mechanism. 
 
The conclusion will attempt to provide recommendations for achieving mutually 
acceptable domestic remedies to property disputes in accordance with the protection of 
property rights under the Convention mechanism. It will also focus on the responsibilities 
of the parties and the approaches that need to be revised in order to achieve the 
comprehensive settlement of the property conflict within the Cyprus problem on a 
political level. In light of these conclusions, an attempt will be made to state the conditions 
under which the two communities can create a legal framework for assistance in order for 
property matters to succeed at domestic level. 
 
Collecting ‘Cyprus Property Cases Before the ECtHR’ for this Research Project: 
Research Methodology 
 
This case study has been conducted through researching primary sources, case studies 
and secondary sources, all of which have the potential to reveal how the Cyprus property 
cases have an impact on the protection mechanism of the right to property in the 
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Convention system and which demonstrate the necessity of considering these cases within 
the framework of ECtHR case law and the right to property. The secondary sources 
provided the raw material, by witnessing the actors and factors in this debate, for 
examining in detail how property is protected under the ECHR and how the property issue 
became the crux of the Cyprus problem. It also provided an opportunity to scrutinise the 
underlying reasons for the property conflict which has remained unresolved for more than 
five decades, the application of the P1-1 to the Cyprus property cases, the impact of the 
ECtHR ruling on the domestic regulations and politics and finally the progress of the 
Court’s departure from its established approach in these cases.  
 
The materials I have used in the research are human rights texts and the cases before the 
ECtHR, in the sense that they are documents of legal character. Two kinds of documents 
have been used: domestic and international. The domestic documents are the property 
regulations established within the G/Cypriot and T/Cypriot legal frameworks, the UN 
Comprehensive Settlement Plan for Cyprus, and official documents of inter-communal 
talks between the authorities of the communities and articles. The international 
documents mainly include the ECHR, the cases regarding the right to property before the 
ECtHR, and the UN reports and resolutions. To my knowledge, this material has not 
hitherto been used to research the interaction between the Cyprus property cases and the 
ECtHR mechanism for the protection of property rights. 
 
The precedent cases regarding the violation of property rights within the ambit of P1-1 to 
the Convention and published articles of case analysis are relevant to my research project. 
This is because the meaning, scope and method of applying P1-1 were identified and 
established through particular cases and validated with subsequent cases. The comparison 
of the ECtHR judgments and articles on these cases involve human rights information to 
a great extent and they also offer me, as a researcher, the opportunity to investigate the 
impact of the ECtHR case law on the politics of the Cyprus problem and vice versa. 
 
Because the research deals with cases and events burdened with a political, historical and 
factual complexity stemming from a problem that has not been resolved since the 1960s, 
updated legal and political developments have been considered through the thesis in order 
to provide the most recent developments. Additionally, the inseparable character of 
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property disputes and politics in Cyprus impelled me to determine political developments 
and the impact of these developments on the property case law of the island. 
 
I have undertaken more than six months of archival research in the Supreme Court of 
Cyprus (in the south) and the Supreme Court of the TRNC (in the north), the Cyprus 
Library, the University of Cyprus, the Near East University, the Eastern Mediterranean 
University of Cyprus, the Immovable Property Commission, and the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies in London. An integral part of the premises on which this project 
was initially conceived was formed on the ground of some underlying assumptions of this 
research. Accordingly, I address three primary questions: (1) whether property disputes 
in Cyprus have had an impact on the Court’s established case law and to what extent those 
cases caused the ECtHR to depart from its traditional approach concerning property 
rights; (2) whether Cyprus property claims before the ECtHR have brought a new aspect 
to the understanding of the protection of property rights in respect of the Convention 
system and the application of the P1-1 to the Convention; (3) whether a mutually agreed, 
effective and sustainable property mechanism is achievable at the domestic level within 
the context of resolving the Cyprus property dispute.  
 
The human rights texts and cases on property rights I have collected reflect criticism, 
ideas and practices concerning the application of the P1-1 to the Convention and to the 
precedent cases by the ECtHR. I have adopted a broad disclosure approach for comparing 
and examining them, which led me to explore the various ways in which the ECtHR’s 
approach to applying the regulation of the protection of this right in its rulings were 
discussed, criticised and written about. As indicated above, four particular cases 
concerning property claims in Cyprus represent a source of inspiration for my project:5 
Loizidou v. Turkey, Cyprus v. Turkey, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey and Demopoulos v. 
Turkey. Two reasons encouraged me to focus on these cases: first, the judgment of each 
case generates considerable key changes and developments within the process of the 
property issue at a domestic level. Second, because the Court held decisions in these 
particular cases that deviated from its earlier case law on Cyprus, the judgments of these 
5 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731;  
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 
306.  
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cases illustrate the gradual departure of the Court from its traditional approach in its 
Cyprus rulings. 
 
By critically comparing the impact of the Court’s ruling over the domestic regulations 
and officials on the island, the Court’s manoeuvre in its adopted approach towards Cyprus 
property issues helped me to interrogate the interaction between Cyprus property claims 
and the Court’s case law concerning the protection of property rights. The legislative and 
political debates were analysed, as well as assumptions about whether the Court’s recent 
decisions in these cases, particularly in Demopoulos, were politically and strategically 
held in order to refrain from the backlog of clone cases from Cyprus. 
 
Finally, the employment of one method of analysing and comparing the property cases 
before the ECtHR as well as its attitude, which has changed in parallel with the political 
developments on the island, has enabled the research to be carried out by engaging, on 
the one hand, with the interface between the theory and the application of the provision 
of the protection of property rights. On the other hand, the research followed an approach 
which investigated the political, legal and historical circumstances which have caused the 
property issue to become the crux of the unresolved Cyprus problem. My main purpose 
for choosing this discourse approach in analysing cases on property claims from both 
Cyprus and other states, is to draw attention to the changes of the Court’s approach to P1-
1 in these cases with the passage of time and to determine the differentiated application 
of this provision to these cases.  
 
The standards and requirements for the restriction of property rights are set under P1-1 to 
the ECHR. In choosing one method of comparing judgments concerning the property 
claims of applicants from various contracting states, I attempted to illuminate the extent 
to which the ECtHR complied with those standards and followed the same approach in 
the application of P1-1 to the ‘same line’ of property cases. I critically examined and 
focused on the variations of the application of P1-1 and attempted to determine the major 
factors that generate inconsistencies in the case law of the ECtHR regarding the protection 
mechanism of property rights in P1-1. For instance, in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth 
v. Sweden6 the Court asserted that it ‘must look behind the appearances and investigate 
6 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63; Brumarescu v. Romania (2001) 33 EHRR 36 
GC, para. 76. 
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the realities of the situation’ to determine whether there has been a de facto expropriation. 
However, in its judgment on the case of Loizidou,7 the ECtHR mainly took into account 
the division of the island into two, which denied the applicant access to her property and 
led to her losing all control over it as land. The Court also considered this as interference 
with the substance of property without examining whether there was de facto 
expropriation nor examining the grounds of its judgment.  
 
It is proposed that the Court should examine the factual realities of the situation in Cyprus 
such as the historical and legal circumstances and should explain in great detail its 
reasoning for not considering the interference as de facto expropriation. The authoritative 
interpretation of the requirements for justifiable interference with property rights in P1-1 
and the method of applying this Article have been established in its case law.8 In this 
regard, it is suggested that differences in the applications of P1-1 and the extent of the 
compliance of the standards in P1-1with the Court’s case law may be considered a result 
of an indefinite interpretation and absence of a strict criterion on the meaning and scope 
of P1-1. For instance, the term de facto expropriation was used for the first time in the 
Papamichalopoulos case,9 twenty-eight years after P1-1 came into force, and neither its 
concept nor requirements are explicitly defined under P1-1.  
 
By engaging critically with the application of P1-1 through the case analysis and the 
theory of property rights, possible future complexities in terms of the protection 
mechanism of these rights are attempted to be envisaged. In light of this discourse 
approach, it is presumed that the case law of the ECtHR concerning P1-1 is likely to grow 
consistently in accordance with two major factors: the passage of time and the backlog of 
cases. In this regard, the main concern here is that the Court may deviate from the 
measures set out under P1-1 in its case law in the event of an increase in the number of 
applications from such member states in which a gross violation of property rights has 
taken place. For instance, a large group of people from former Communist states have 
lost their properties without compensation. Accordingly, many applications were lodged 
by these people concerning the violation of property rights with the dissolution of these 
7 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
8 Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, paras. 61-63. 
9 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, para.43. 
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states.10 In choosing the method for analysing and comparing the Court’s judgments on 
the cases concerning property matters, I draw attention to the inconsistency in the case 
law of the Court regarding the application of P1-1, which may have stemmed from legal, 
political and temporal factors.  
 
By engaging critically with the Court’s changing approach and the increase in the number 
of cases concerning P1-1, striking perceptions of a growing cautiousness to the ECtHR 
were analysed. For instance, the legal issues and debates regarding property matters that 
were raised in the Cyprus cases are very close to those of the former Communist states.11 
It was argued that the application of the European standards became difficult with the 
accession of these states.12 This approach also helped me to explore the question of the 
extent to which the absence of the Court’s explanation of the rationale of its judgments 
has affected the interpretation of P1-1 and has caused the Court to depart from its 
traditional case law regarding this provision.  
 
Taking the former socialist states who are party to the Convention as an example, since 
an overwhelming number of people from these countries had to leave their territory and 
lost their properties,13 it is likely that the Court will be faced with thousands of cases close 
to those repetitive property claims in Cyprus. In the long run, this possible scenario may 
have a considerable impact on the interpretation, application and the Court’s case law 
concerning P1-1, and may result in the weakening of the standards established under it. 
In the case of Broniowski v. Poland,14 which deals with the violation of P1-1, the Court 
highlighted the number of 80,000 people whose property rights were subject to P1-1 and 
determined this situation as a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention 
mechanism.15 
 
10 Vojtech Cepl, ‘A Note on the Restitution of Property in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia’, Journal of 
Communist Studies, vol. 7 (1991) p. 365; Jonathan Sharpe, The Conscience of Europe: 50 Years of 
European Court of Human Rights, UK: Third Millennium Publishing Ltd. (2011) p. 176. 
11 See: the dissenting Opinion of Judge Baka in Loizidou v. Turkey, (1996) 23 EHRR 513.  
12 Frédéric Sudre, ‘La ‘perméabilité’ de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme aux droits 
sociaux’, in Mélanges J. Mourgeon, Bruxelles : Bruylant (1998) pp. 467-478. 
13 Aeyal M. Gross. ‘Reinforcing the New Democracies: The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Former Communist Countries – a Study of the Case Law’, European Journal of International Law vol. 
7, no. 1 (1996) pp. 89–102. 
14 Broniowski v. Poland (2004) 40 EHRR 21. 
15 ibid., para. 193; Markus Fyrnys, ‘Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment 
Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights’, German Law Journal, vol.12, pp. 1241–1252.  
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By looking specifically at the Court’s changing stance in respect of P1-1, mainly focusing 
on the ‘Cyprus property line of cases’,16 possible consequences that may emerge from its 
inconsistent attitude are attempted to be envisaged. By following this comparative 
approach, I also draw attention to the debates considering the impact of politics that 
overshadowed the Court’s decision-making mechanism with respect to its most recent 
Cyprus ruling in the case of Demopoulos. To illustrate these arguments, discussions from 
scholars, judges and governmental officials were analysed. The concern here is not simply 
that the Court’s decision in Demopoulos was regarded as highly political and thus 
‘wrong’,17 but this perception preponderated the fundamental principle of subsidiarity 
that is the cornerstone to the functioning of the Convention mechanism.18 Although the 
ruling had fostered enthusiasm to tighten up the domestic remedies, it raised divergent 
opinions among parties in Cyprus. According to one group, the Court did not provide a 
legal decision but rather a political one, and this was because the decision makers were 
influenced by a political approach to the issue.19 By contrast, the opponents justified the 
decision on the grounds of the pilot judgment procedure in order to deal with clone 
cases.20 The underlying assumptions about the decision are also analysed through both 
contextual and textual data which allowed me to explore the various ways in which the 
most recent decision on the Cyprus property problem was discussed.  
 
By using this discourse approach in analysing debates on the Court’s major shift in the 
Cyprus ruling, which had occurred with Demopoulos, I draw attention to the way in which 
this switch in the Court’s position may not be without consequences within the context 
of its mechanism for the protection of property rights. This approach also helped to 
evaluate differences of opinion, the diversity of perceptions and the shared perceptions 
within this context. Additionally, this method also helped me to illuminate two areas of 
difficulties that the ECtHR is facing, which stemmed from its Demopoulos21 ruling. In 
this regard, the Court’s most recent approach in Cyprus case law established a set of 
16 The ECtHR’s wider rulings on property disputes in Europe.   
17 Loucaides (n 2) p. 440. 
18 See: Interlaken Follow-up, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ Note by the Jurisconsult, p.2 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D932C687-6805-4C0B-8828 
EE7862873D0D/0/Interlaken_followup__Subsidiarity.pdf> accessed: 27 August 2013. 
19 Loucaides (n 2) pp. 440; Alexia Solomou, ‘Case Report on Demopoulos & Others v. Turkey’, The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 104, no.4 (2010). 
20 Rhodri C. Williams and Ayla Gürel, The European Court Of Human Rights and the Cyprus Property 
Issue: Charting a Way Forward, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2011) p.10 
21Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306.  
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arguments among Cypriots. As indicated above, the Court was implicated in its changed 
attitude, which caused two contentions to stand against each other: first, the decision was 
mainly political and, second, it was the consequence created by the principle of 
subsidiarity. The concern here is two-fold. On the one hand, the decision was welcomed 
by mainly T/Cypriot officials and was evaluated as a requirement of the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity. According to this perspective, the efficiency of the Court 
mechanism was under threat from the large number of repetitive cases concerning not 
only property claims from Cyprus, but also from other states in which property issues 
were very close to those in Cyprus. On the other hand, the decision was considered as 
political or ‘wrong’22and this method of dealing with repetitive cases was regarded as 
‘purely logistic’ mainly by G/Cypriot authorities.23 
 
Consequently, in choosing one method of analysing the aforementioned differences of 
opinions and case law in property rights over another, I have attempted to illustrate the 
significance of the Demopoulos case within the context of property rights in the 
Convention mechanism. It is through case analysis that the final Cyprus ruling may invite 
various numbers of cases from citizens, particularly whose properties were expropriated 
by the Communist regimes.24 In line with the scope of two contradictory perspectives in 
Demopoulos, it is proposed that if the Court had not applied the so-called pilot judgment 
procedure, it might have been faced with a backlog of ‘Cyprus-line cases’ from other 
contracting states. This would threaten the entire ECtHR system, which was already 
struggling under a vast backlog of cases.25 However, adoption of this method by the Court 
in its Demopoulos ruling to deal with clone cases was considered a ‘purely logistical 
decision’.26 
 
Both the contradictory standpoints are in opposition to the Court’s efficiency, where the 
principle of subsidiarity is not applied, as well as to its reliability by considering its 
22 Loucaides (n 2) p. 440.  
23 Crises Group Europe Report, Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide, No. 210, 9 December 2010. 
24 Gross (n 13) pp. 89–102. 
25 At the time of the Demopoulos decision, the number of applications lodged to a judicial formation was 
61,300. As of December 31st, 2012, the number of applications lodged with the ECtHR was approximately 
128,100 and more than half of these applications had been lodged against one of four countries: Russia, 
Turkey, Italy and Ukraine; See ECtHR, Annual Report 2010, Strasbourg: Registry of the ECtHR 2011; 
ECtHR Overview 1959-2012 (February 2012). 
26 Crises Group Europe Report (n 23) p.12. 
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decisions as political. By engaging critically with the case law and debates on this issue, 
I have attempted to provide an in-depth explanation and interpretation of the rationale to 
the Cyprus property disputes that were carried into the international arena. It is through 
the thesis that, in case of further shifts in the Court’s attitude towards the property rights 
issue, the users of the Court’s mechanism may lose confidence in the reliability and 
confidence of its system in the long run. Additionally, the possibility that its decisions as 
politically motivated by parties which determined themselves as adversely affected by its 
ruling may cause applicants to lose confidence in the reliability of the ECtHR as an 
external but major actor within the protection mechanism of property rights. 
 
It may be true to state that the Cyprus property cases and legislative debates embedded 
within them may serve as important precedents for future judgments in the ECtHR. Due 
to the increase in number of applications before the Court, and the variety of legal, 
political and historical complexities that exist within these applications, an enrichment in 
the meaning and scope of P1-1may be generated.  
 
Furthermore, the property issue has been the Gordian knot of the Cyprus problem since 
the early 1960s. Both T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots became victims of a massive 
displacement and lost their land, properties, houses and working places as a result of inter-
communal attacks. Accordingly, the issue of property turned into an open wound and 
became a political problem on the island. Various negotiations, inter-communal talks and 
intensive efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem have 
failed. In line with the legal, political and social changes with the passage of time, this 
issue became the most complex and controversial debate of the Cyprus problem. With the 
loss of hope for a resolution of the property issue, the Cypriots started to seek new 
approaches to it. In the search for a remedy for their property rights, the ECtHR became 
the main actor when various claims concerning property debates were brought before it. 
In addition to property matters, other issues involving highly political and historical 
complexities were carried through these claims to the international arena. Consequently, 
the property issue became a major obstacle to the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus 
question and urgent measures through mutually agreed mechanisms needed to be 
produced. 
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It is for this reason that I addressed this research gap in my thesis by analysing the Cyprus 
property claims and the ECtHR’s mechanism regarding P1-1. It is through this analysis 
that an attempt to unearth the ambiguities in the interpretation and the application of the 
P1-1 to the Convention will be made. Finally, I attempted to provide both a substantial 
and original contribution to the field of property rights as a human right within the context 
of the unresolved Cyprus problem. 
 
Outline of Chapter Development  
 
Chapter 1 outlines the historical and legal background of the property conflict between 
G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots with a special emphasis on the very roots of the Cyprus 
problem which has led to the arousal of the property conflict which still remains 
unresolved today. This chapter will state the historical and legal developments from the 
British period on the island until the time of writing this thesis, 2013. The consideration 
of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) will be followed with the period 
involving the division of the island. There will be a focus on the underlying reasons of 
the unsolvable Cyprus problem within the context of the property crux. This chapter will 
also attempt to explain the rationale of how contradictory perspectives of G/Cypriots and 
T/Cypriots have led to the adoption of the two opposing property mechanisms dealing 
with disputed properties, which were abandoned after the division of the island. A special 
look will be taken at the extent to which the complexity of the property issue stems from 
these opposite sides and how regulations at a domestic level concerning disputed 
properties were affected by these notably different aspects of the parties. 
 
Chapter Two covers the birth of the property issue and the protection of this right within 
the meaning of the ECHR. A historical introduction will be given of the process of the 
right to property. Since Cypriot property cases have been examined under the P1-1 of the 
Convention, this chapter will state the creation of the property issue, property rights 
within the context of P1-1 to the ECHR and the structure of P1-1 by considering related 
cases which develop a general approach to the Court regarding P1-1.  
 
Once an examination of the protection mechanism of the right to property has been 
provided in this chapter, it will then outline the rules for this right and the traditional 
approach of the ECtHR on the right at issue, by examining its judgments concerning 
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property claims against other contracting states. The consideration of the Court’s ruling 
of this right, in particular states, will be of paramount interest in analysing its established 
approach in order to compare its attitude in the Cyprus rulings. The application of 
provisions in P1-1 to the Cyprus property cases will be investigated and the acts of the 
responding state that were regarded as a violation of property rights falling within the 
ambit of the rules in P1-1 will be examined. An analysis will be performed of the Court’s 
amended stance in those cases at issue and an attempt will be made to determine the 
rationale of this departure from its traditional approach. 
 
Chapter Three will examine the four landmark cases27 which have established the 
ECtHR’s approach towards the legal regulations of the TRNC. These cases evidence the 
developments of Cyprus case law and illustrate their significant impact on the progress 
of local property regulations throughout the fourteen-year time-line. In light of these 
conclusions, an attempt will be made to determine the critical issues that arose during the 
judgments of those cases which constitute grounds for the significance of property cases 
from Cyprus.  
 
The purpose of considering these cases in particular is their determinative role in the 
progress of Cyprus property case law in accordance with the Court’s decisions. An 
attempt will be made to enlighten how the Court’s assessment in each of these cases made 
a major contribution to the progress of local remedies of the disputed G/Cypriot 
properties. An examination will be made of various efforts of the respondent government, 
Turkey, in accordance with those cases, to achieve property regulation which is regarded 
as an adequate and effective remedy within the context of the Convention system. In 
parallel with the Court’s assessments and decisions in each of the cases at issue, 
significant debates such as the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the legitimacy of 
certain legal arrangements of an unrecognised state/entity were raised by commentators. 
In this regard, this chapter will also look at different views on debates from legal and 
political perspectives. 
 
27 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731; Xenides-Arestis v. 
Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306.  
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This chapter is also an attempt to diagnose the impact of factual circumstances, both legal 
and political, that have changed in parallel with the passage of time and are related to the 
property conflict. In the latest decision of the Court, Demopoulos v. Turkey, concern was 
attributed to the passage of time. Accordingly, this chapter will state how legal and 
political progress, with the lapse of time, launched a new era for the interpretation of 
property claims in Cyprus. This chapter will also focus on the contributing elements that 
allow the property mechanism to take a further step and that triggered the amendments 
within the Strasbourg Cyprus ruling.  
 
An attempt will be made to outline the establishment of the new property laws and to 
consider the property mechanism that was settled in the Annan Plan. A special look will 
be taken at whether the failure of this plan had a role in the ECtHR’s Cyprus judgments. 
It will outline how changing components of the property issue in Cyprus, including 
reforms to domestic regulations, have formed the views of academics and national 
authorities. The final stage of the property progress will be highlighted together with the 
Court’s departure from its traditional attitude in its Cyprus ruling which attracted criticism 
maintaining the ‘politicalisation’ of its decisions, particularly in the latest cases. 
Accordingly, in this thesis, contrary remarks which advocate the decisions as a 
consequence of the Convention system in order to provide effective protection of the 
fundamental rights were made.  
 
A view is also taken of the role of the Annan Plan, especially of the consideration of the 
property mechanism in the Annan Plan in the most recent case of Demopoulos. A major 
shift in the Court’s stance had occurred in this case, which was not without political and 
legal consequences. In light of these conclusions, an attempt will be made to predict 
whether the current domestic remedies of the respondent state will assist the development 
of the property dispute in Cyprus. 
 
Chapter Four is an outline of the requirements of the right to property within the meaning 
of the ECtHR Cyprus rulings. This chapter will examine state obligations that arise in 
accordance with P1-1, the stability of the ECtHR assessment regarding interference with 
property rights and the application of the provisions provided in P1-1 to the Cyprus 
property cases. It will also focus on the continuing nature of the alleged violations and 
the ‘fair balance’ test in those cases at issue, which constituted the most controversial 
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debates within the property cases from Cyprus. The concept, scope and the 
implementation of these two principles in the ECtHR rulings will be compared in various 
cases, where appropriate, in order to arrive at an understanding of the differentiation of 
the application of these principles within the ambit of the Court’s Cyprus ruling. In light 
of these considerations, an attempt will be made to determine the legal interaction 
between the protection of the property rights under the Convention system and the cases 
concerning property disputes in Cyprus.  
 
Conclusions  
 
The final part of the thesis will outline the conclusions reached through the investigation 
carried out in this thesis. In this part, an attempt will be made at summarising the essential 
features of domestic remedies that seem to enjoy broad support at both the national and 
international level which may be used as a ground for the mutually agreed property 
mechanism for G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots. A view will be taken of previous and existing 
property proposals in order to determine how far these meet the conditions that are 
identified for a sustainable future property system that will be successfully applied by 
both the communities. 
 
A summary will be made of the history and development of the property regulations, 
owing to the difficulties in seeking achievable remedies for the violation of property 
rights. Following the analysis of the applications of the requirements provided in P1-1 to 
the Cyprus cases, a view will be taken of whether the recommendations for an effective 
property mechanism fulfil the conditions for a mutually agreed system. Finally, the thesis 
will summarise the political and legal responsibilities of the parties of the property dispute 
in Cyprus in order to achieve a settlement to this crux. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 The Cyprus Property Dispute in a Historical Perspective 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
Since the early 1960s, more than 230,000 Cypriots have been displaced, lost their homes, 
lands and left their motherland as a result of inter-communal strife. A fundamental 
constant, which has remained unchanged over the past fifty-three years in the history of 
Cyprus, is the hope of a return to those abandoned homes and lands.1 One of the major 
changes within this history, stemming from inter-communal events, is the 
‘internationalisation’ of the property conflict. With the passage of time, the property 
debate has become the crux of the Cyprus question and the major obstacle blocking 
progress and attempts to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem as a 
whole. It is notable that the initial cause of this conflict is Cyprus’ own turbulent history, 
which has both witnessed and led to this massive displacement of its people.  
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to review the history of Cyprus. As the property 
conflict between Turkish Cypriots (hereinafter T/Cypriots) and Greek Cypriots 
(G/Cypriots) is directly related to the history of Cyprus, it forms part of the narrative of 
the Cyprus question as it has played out. The ambition here is to place the property 
problem within a historical context and to provide a starting point for the determination 
of the relevant factors that have led to the property conflict between the two communities 
on the island. 
 
The first section of this chapter (1.1) reviews the Ottoman and British period in Cyprus 
and explains the significance of Cyprus being under the controlling power of those 
regimes. It also explains how foreign administration gradually weakened on the island 
and paved the way for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC).The second 
section (1.2) focuses on the period between the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 
and the division of Cyprus. It looks at the structure of the Republic, which was based on 
the co-founding partnership of T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots. This section highlights the 
1Ayla Gürel, Mete Hatay, ChristellaYakinthou, Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil Strife and 
Military Strife, Turkish Cypriot Legal Framework, An Overview of Events and Perceptions, International 
Peace Research Institute (PRIO) Cyprus Centre, Report 5 (2012) p. 12.  
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conflicting issues between the two sides, which prepared the ground for the division of 
the island. Moreover, it discusses the roles of the external actors in the inter-communal 
relations during this period. In particular, the political relationship between Greece-
G/Cypriots and Turkey-T/Cypriots as well as the impact of these relations on the failure 
of bi-communality is also examined.  
 
The third section (1.3) examines how the issue of property has become the Gordian knot 
of the Cyprus problem following the division of the island. The underlying reasons behind 
the establishing of the property war between the two communities is analysed. The 
contradictory understanding of the property debate and the regulations that were settled 
in accordance with these greatly opposing perspectives (1.3.1–1.3.2) have been 
examined. Consideration of the underlying reasons behind the property conflict is 
significant on two grounds: to prevent the recurrence of the same detrimental disputes; 
and to comprehend the rationale of the problem in order to enlighten the way forward for 
a feasible and durable solution. Finally, the concluding part of this chapter recapitulates 
the idea that the property issue is a major deadlock for the Cyprus question and that its 
resolution may depend on a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. It also 
asserts that both parties should prepare compromises in various areas to achieve a 
mutually agreeable settlement on the island.  
 
 
1.1 The Ottoman Period and the British Colony 
 
 
It has been stated that ‘the Cypriots know that they cannot become a World Power; but 
they have succeeded in becoming a World Nuisance, which is almost as good’.2 Cyprus 
is a small island, which, with its grievous history, has always been on the agenda of the 
international community. Its geopolitical position turned this small island into a desired 
place for various civilisations all through its history. Cyprus is the third largest island in 
the Mediterranean, and is located to the south of Turkey, west of Syria, north of Egypt 
and east of Greece. It functions as a bridge between East and West, being at a crossroads 
of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. Its strategic position accounted for it being 
taken over and controlled by numerous civilisations. The vital importance of Cyprus arose 
2 George Mikes, Eureka! Rummaging in Greece, London: Andre Deutsch (1965) p. 1. 
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when the Venetian maritime navy extended its boundaries of commerce to the Levant in 
the 15th century. The Byzantines’ sovereignty over the island was followed by that of the 
Ottomans for more than 300 years. Following British power, which lasted for 40 years, 
the RoC was finally founded in 1960 by the Cypriots.3 
 
After the opening of the Suez Canal, Cyprus became the stepping stone to it. At the 
crossroads of British and French interests en route to India, the island gained renewed 
importance.4 This turned the ‘perfectly useless island’5in to a captivating place and its 
occupation became worthy of British rule at that time. In 1878, with the rise of the 
Crimean War, a golden opportunity for taking part in the ruling of the island had arisen. 
During this war, when the Russian army reached Istanbul, the fear that Istanbul might fall 
carried Cyprus to the bargaining table. It was agreed that Britain would provide military 
support to the Ottomans in return for the administration of Cyprus. Following 
negotiations between the British Ambassador, Henry Layard, and the Ottoman Sultan, a 
secret agreement called the ‘Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and 
Turkey’ was signed in Istanbul, on June 4, 1878. As a result, the control of Cyprus was 
granted to Great Britain in exchange for its support for the Ottoman Empire.6 
 
Although there was no discretion for Britain to decide the annexation of Cyprus under the 
aforementioned Convention, the island was annexed unilaterally from Turkey by the 
written command of Britain on November 5, 1914 with the adoption of an Order in 
Council on the grounds that the Ottoman Empire had decided to enter the First World 
War on the side of Germany.7 At the same time, the government of Greece, under the 
leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos, known as the ‘maker of Modern Greece’,8 
maintained good relations with Britain. Joining the war on the side of Britain was 
 
3 Clement Dodd, Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A Briefing, Cambridgeshire: Eothen (2001) p.1; Ahmet C. 
Gazioglu, “Bi-Communality in Cyprus”, Perceptions, vol.10, no.4 (2005) pp.89–113. 
4 Rıfat Uçarol, 1878 Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Osmanlı-İngiliz Anlaşması, Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi 
(1978); Eyup Ozveren, “Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends & Prospects”, Journal 
of International Affairs,vol. VII, No.4 (December 2002–February 2003) p. 39.  
5 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper & Row (1942) p. 275. 
6 Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, with respect to the Asiatic Provinces 
of Turkey. Signed at Constantinople, 4th June, 1878; Ahmet Aydogdu, Kibris Sorunu Cozum Arayislari 
‘Annan Plani ve Referandum Sureci’ 1stedn, Ankara, AsinYayin Dagitim Ltd. Sti (2005) p.5. 
7 UK Parliament SIs 1786-1949/1914/1601-1650/[R] Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council 1914 (SI  
 1914/1629). 
8 John W. Duffield, The New York Times, Sunday 30 October 1921. 
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considered as a way through to achieve the Greek ideology of Μεγάλη Ιδέα (the Great 
Idea). The fundamental objective of this ideology was that the Greek nation would 
encompass all ethnic Greeks who had lived in the Mediterranean area. Accordingly, the 
unification of Cyprus with Greece for Greeks and G/Cypriots would be achieved by the 
Allies’ support and with the annexation of Cyprus.9 
 
With the ending of the First World War, a new period started on the island. The defeat of 
the Ottomans by the Allied powers resulted in the loss of its control power over Cyprus. 
Finally, the Treaty of Lausanne, which finalised the war, was signed between the British 
Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Turkey 
on July 24, 1923, effectively partitioning the Ottoman Empire. Two of its articles 
determined the new power holder on the island. According to Articles 16 and 20 of this 
treaty, Turkey relinquished, de jure, its rights to Cyprus and the island became a Crown 
Colony of Britain in 1925.10 
 
Indeed, there is strong evidence that the Treaty of Lausanne not only led to the annexation 
of Cyprus but also empowered Britain to make a decision over the nationality of 
T/Cypriots living there. This was contained in the provision concerning the acquisition of 
nationality in Article 21. According to this article:  
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire 
British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon 
lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish 
nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that 
they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.  
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present 
Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality 
in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon 
lose their Turkish nationality.11 
 
9 Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece, London: Hurst & 
Company (2002) p.28; Zenon Stavrinides, Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood, Nicosia: 
Stavrinides Press (1999) p. 12. 
10 Renée Hirschon, “‘Unmixing Peoples’ in the Aegean Region” in Hirschon, R. Crossing the Aegean, 
vol.12, Chapter 2, New York, Berghahn Books (2004) p.9. 
11 Article 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne; Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Eighth Session, in UN, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II, Part 2, 
(emphasis added) p. 132. 
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According to this provision, T/Cypriots had to choose between British or Turkish 
citizenship within two years after having opted for it. It is worthwhile emphasising that 
the T/Cypriots were allowed to choose between repatriation to Turkey or settlement in 
Cyprus in return for relinquishing their nationality. Not surprisingly, this situation was 
not without consequences. Approximately 4,000 to 8,500 T/Cypriots left the island and 
moved to Turkey between the years of 1921 and 1925.12 In essence, it can be stated that 
the indirect approach of Article 21 was the compulsory movement of Turkish people from 
Cyprus.  
 
At this juncture, it is reasonable to state that, although the issue of displacement occurred 
in Cyprus in the 1960s, as a ‘temporary’ remedy in order to stop violence among Cypriots 
as a consequence of civil strife, repercussions appeared at a global level. The act of 
forcing people to choose between their nationality and their motherland has not received 
same level of reaction from other states. Even without taking into account, the mass 
movement of T/Cypriots, a new era was launched with the British rule on the island.  
 
The British colonial administration, which lasted for forty-six years, established the basis 
for a rise in the nationalism of both G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots with the ‘divide and rule’ 
British policy. The pursuance and encouragement of this policy diminished the 
emergence of a Cypriot nationality.13 The cooperation of the two communities on 
significant aspects of social and political life interfered with this policy. The religious-
based division, through the ethnic dimension, was disseminated among Cypriots in 
accordance with this ‘divide and rule’ policy.14 Indeed, there is strong evidence of this 
situation in that ‘Muslims’ became ‘Turks’ and ‘Christians’ were determined as ‘Greeks’, 
which paved the way for a politicisation of differences. The educational systems of the 
12 Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus: Volume IV: The Ottoman Province, the British Colony, 1571–1948, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1952), pp. 412–413; Sabahattin Ismail & ErginBirinci Ataturk 
Doneminde Turkiye-Kibris Iliskileri, Akdeniz Haber Ajansi Yayinlar (1989) p.79; Vergi Bedevi Tarih 
Boyunca Kibris-AnadoluIliskilerineBirBakis, Lefkosa (1978) p.37 
13 Georgios Kyris, “An ‘Unrecognised’ Case of Europeanisation: European Union Enlargement and the 
Turkish-Cypriot Community” (DPhil Thesis, University of Manchester, 2011) p. 77. 
14 Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, London: Verso, 
(1997); Stavrinides (n9) p.12; Hubert Faustmann, ‘Cypriotness in Historical Perspective, in: German-
Cypriot Forum (Deutsch Zyprisches Forum) (ed.): ‘Culture in Common-Living Cultures in the Cypriot  
Communities’ Proceedings of German-Cypriot Forum Conference, in Berlin/Üdersee (22–24 May 2003), 
pp.11–12; Dan Lindley, ‘Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus’, 
International Studies Perspectives, vol. 8 (2007) pp. 224–241; James Ker-Lindsay & Hubert Faustmann, 
‘The Government and Politics of Cyprus’, Bern et al: Peter Lang, (2008), p.46.  
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Muslim and Orthodox populations were differentiated and the representation of the two 
communities in various advisory bodies was separated.15 The underlying reason for 
promoting the ethnic polarisation was to prevent combined action against colonial rule.16 
In light of this, the policy had a remarkable impact on the rise of nationalism on the island, 
which ultimately invited Greece and Turkey to become involved in the politics of Cyprus, 
which in turn sowed the seeds of the Cyprus question.   
 
The rise of Greek nationalism under British rule provoked an ambition for the political 
union of Greece and Cyprus, called enosis (Ένωσις in Greek). The demand for the union 
with Greece was presented by the G/Cypriot members of the Legislative Council, and 
soon after, with the launch of widespread riots, the Council was abolished.17 Not 
surprisingly, this campaign was not without consequences and, as a response to the idea 
of union with Greece, Turkish nationalism emerged. The reaction to the Greek campaign 
was embodied by the promotion of awareness and by the identification with the 
‘motherland’ of Turkey.   
 
After joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with Greece, Turkey 
maintained the right to join the decision-making process, like Greece, in accordance with 
the Treaty of Lausanne in case of any changes in the colonial status of Cyprus.18 
Meanwhile, Greece also applied to the United Nations (UN) in order to discuss the denial 
of the right of self-determination to Cypriots under the UN Charter by Britain. However, 
this was refused by the UN since the discussion of the Cyprus debate was inadmissible 
under the terms of Article 2(7) of the Charter.19 This refusal triggered violent attacks by 
Greek demonstrators in Greece and then was taken to Cyprus by enosis supporters.20 
 
According to T/Cypriots, the attainment of the right of self-determination would have 
rendered the achievement of enosis possible since large numbers of G/Cypriots would 
vote for it. As a reaction, the T/Cypriots subsequently raised the ideology of partition 
(taksim in Turkish). At the heart of this ideology was the belief that the assimilation of 
15 Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, New York: Quarted Books (1982) p.192. 
16 Vassillis Foukas & Heinz A. Richter, Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back, Bibliopolis, (2003), 
pp.77–81–164; Kyris (n13) pp.77–80. 
17 Stavrinides (n9) p.19. 
18 Aydogdu, (n6) pp.18–19.  
19 Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, London, George Allen & Unwin (1978) p.83. 
20 ibid.p.89. 
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T/Cypriots, due to the G/Cypriot majority, should be prevented and the Turkish presence 
on the island should be guaranteed. With the idea of achieving enosis, a clandestine 
organisation called the National Organization of Cypriots Fighters (EOKA) was formed 
by the G/Cypriot army officer, George Grivas.21 It was an instrument to respond to the 
requirements of right-wing political extremism. In 1955, EOKA launched a campaign. 
For the British, this action constituted a terrorist movement against British rule;22 
however, for Greeks, it was an armed insurrection.23 
 
In order to resolve the Cyprus crises, Sir John Harding was sent to Cyprus as the governor 
for negotiations with the G/Cypriots. A constitutional plan, based on the self-government 
of the Cypriots, was proposed, and subsequently rejected by the Greek leader due to the 
fact that the right of self-determination was not included under this plan.24 This rejection 
was followed with violent demonstrations and gradually increased to assassination level. 
As a response to these developments, the T/Cypriots formed an organisation called ‘Turk 
Mukavemet Teskilati’ (TMT) in order to take action against these attacks. The TMT 
supported the ideology of taksim.25 Taksim constituted the partition of Cyprus between 
G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots in order to prevent the assimilation of the latter due to the 
Greek majority and aimed to guarantee a Turkish presence on the island. Grievous clashes 
and violent attacks were engaged by these organisations and formed an unforgettable 
wound in the memory of Cypriots. As a result, this period was finalised with the launch 
of negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Britain, which paved the way for the 
independence of Cyprus.   
 
 
 
21 Kyris (n13) pp. 79–82. 
22 Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies –US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, (1992), p.25. 
23 Andreas Neocleous and others, Neocleous’s Introduction to Cyprus Law, 3rd edn, Andreas Neocleous 
& Co LLC, (2011), p.8 
24 Aydogdu (n6) pp. 25–26. 
25 On 21 March1956, an assassination attempted by EOKA on Harding’s life took place, but which failed 
as the time bomb was found before its activation by Guard Commander, Michael Buckley, who “…took 
the time bomb outside and placed it in a sandbagged dugout. Ten minutes later its gelignite charge 
exploded with a force that would have demolished half of the Government House itself.” Therefore, 
Makarios was exiled to the Seychelles for a year. See: Time Magazine “Cyprus: The Field Marshal’s 
Pea”, vol. LXVII, No. 14, 2 April 1956, 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601560402,00.html>accessed 29 November 2013.  
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1.2 Towards the Republic of Cyprus and the Division of the Island 
 
The shared violence of the Cyprus conflict during the 1950s was followed by negotiations 
and finally resulted in the independence of the island. The significance of international 
policies became more apparent by Cyprus receiving support for the solution of its conflict, 
particularly support from the United States (US).26 The main incentive for this support 
was the role of Greece and Turkey within the US foreign policy, they being the southern 
flank of NATO. Cyprus, under the British rule, ‘presented fewer strategic uncertainties 
for NATO than a Greek or independent Cyprus’.27 The Suez campaign in 1956 was a 
turning point for Britain in respect of its role on the island. Although Cyprus had 
maintained its strategic importance for airborne operations in the Middle East, Britain 
was at the time not strong enough to keep the canal open and protect its power in the 
Middle East. Accordingly, the reason for keeping the island as British had ceased and 
Cyprus could no longer be seen as a British colonial problem.28 
 
The changed status of Britain was embodied with an announcement in the House of 
Commons concerning the right of self-determination, which must be exercised for both 
T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots. It was maintained that the Turkish community should have 
equal rights with the Greek community without considering the majority/minority factor 
among them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Harold Macmillan, proposed a plan to 
establish a partnership scheme between the two communities. Although it was accepted 
by Turkey, with the condition of giving equal rights to the T/Cypriots in government with 
the G/Cypriots, the Greek government rejected it as it did not want Turkey to take part in 
the Cyprus problem and thus the conflict remained unresolved.29 
 
The rationale for keeping Cyprus as a British colony was that to have military bases there 
constituted a station in the Middle East. This led Britain to announce her intention to leave 
the administration of Cyprus to Cypriots in return for keeping military bases on the 
island.30 Accordingly, negotiations concerning the independence of Cyprus took place 
26 Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the 
Threshold of the European Union, Basingstoke: Macmillan (1999) p.19. 
27 Stearns (n22) pp. 26–27. 
28 ibid. 
29 Aydogdu (n6) pp.30–31. 
30 Aydogdu (n6) pp.34–35. 
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between the representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey in Zurich. Finally, the 
establishment of an independent RoC was agreed on February 10, 1959. Following the 
Zurich Agreement, the leaders of Britain, Greece and Turkey, together with G/Cypriots 
and T/Cypriots, met in London to confirm the final agreement, the London Agreement, 
establishing the RoC on February 19, 1959.  
 
The Zurich–London agreements comprised three treaties: first, the ‘Treaty of 
Establishment’ established the RoC and provided two military bases for Britain and the 
cooperation of common defence for Cyprus by the parties of this agreement; secondly, 
the ‘Treaty of Guarantee’ guaranteed the territorial integrity of Cyprus by prohibiting the 
union of Cyprus with another state and also the division of the island; thirdly, the ‘Treaty 
of Alliance’ provided military bases for Greek and Turkish soldiers. The Constitution of 
Cyprus established a bi-communal federation, and its settlement was guaranteed by the 
Guarantor States (Turkey, Greece and Britain).The representation was based on a 7:3 
ratio: 30% of T/Cypriots and 70% of G/Cypriots participated in the Republic’s structure. 
The direct or indirect unification or division of the island was banned and the Treaty 
highlighted that if any action against the security and territorial integrity of the island took 
place, the High Contracting parties would cooperate for defence. Finally, the constitution 
was signed and the RoC was established on August 16, 1960. 
 
Three years after independence, the two Cypriot communities once again faced inter-
communal conflict. However, this time, the fundamental cause of the conflict was the 
framework of the constitution of the RoC. Although the constitution was agreed by both 
of the communities, in essence, its true character held the separation of the two 
communities within itself. Here, there is strong evidence that the first article of the 
constitution stated that the G/Cypriot president would be elected by the G/Cypriot 
community, and the T/Cypriot vice president would be elected by the T/Cypriot 
community.31 In addition to the disagreement over this article, other significant issues 
such as civil service, taxation, army units and municipalities have also been raised and 
created the grounds for controversial debates. Put another way, although the constitution 
was mutually agreed on, it can be understood from the constitutional conflict that it was 
interpreted differently by the communities. While for G/Cypriots the RoC was formed to 
31 Article 1 of The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960). 
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be a unitary state, in contrast, for T/Cypriots it was established to be a partnership state.32 
These controversial debates resulted in the failure of the leaderships of the two 
communities, which impaired the inter-communal relations and accelerated mistrust 
among them. 
 
The seeds of inter-communal violence were sown when the G/Cypriot president Makarios 
published a proposal so-called ‘The Thirteen Points’ in order to modify the constitution 
of the RoC in 1963.33 Although the purpose of these amendments was determined as 
enhancing the state’s functioning, in reality the fundamental objective was to reduce the 
T/Cypriots to the status of a minority and also to weaken their governmental power. For 
instance, the abandoning of the T/Cypriot vice president’s power of veto was included in 
these amendments.34 
 
The constitutional deadlock resulted in the withdrawal of T/Cypriots from the 
government, which triggered bloody inter-communal violence. On 21 December 1963, 
the G/Cypriot police stopped and wanted to search a T/Cypriot car, asking for the identity 
cards of the people in the car. While the T/Cypriots were refusing to be searched, a group 
of T/Cypriots had gathered in anger and started a clash. This event, which occurred on 
the border of Nicosia, resulted in the first casualties of that period. Two T/Cypriots were 
killed and one G/Cypriot policeman was badly injured by a group of armed Cypriots.35 
This incident triggered severe inter-communal fighting between the two communities 
who used to live together in peace. Within a few days, the violence reached civil war 
level. Civilians were killed and many hostages were taken as pawns. Meanwhile, as a 
result of the assaults, 103 Turkish villages were evacuated, and nearly 20,000 T/Cypriots 
fled from their lands.36 This unfortunate date is engraved in the memory of the T/Cypriot 
community as ‘Bloody Christmas’.37 
32 Dodd (n3) p.11. 
33 See: The Thirteen Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as proposed by President 
Makarios, November 1963, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.html>accessed: 29 November 
2013. 
34 See: Special Research Report No. 3, published by Security Council Report, entitled “Cyprus: New 
Hope After 45 Years on the Security Council Agenda.”, September 4, 2008, p.4. 
35 Zeki Halil and Cemaliye Emirali were the first victims of the violence. See: Ata Atun ‘21 Aralik 1963’ 
KibrisPostasi, 21 Aralik 2011; Dodd (n3) p.13. 
36 Crawshaw (n19) p.368. 
37 Bloody Christmas (Kanli Noel in Turkish): violent attacks against T/Cypriots for the implementation of 
the Akritas Plan, which called for the removal of T/Cypriots from Cyprus and to terrorise T/Cypriots into 
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On December 23–25, 1963, Turkey called upon the Guarantor States to provide security 
in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee. The British Secretary for Commonwealth 
Relations, Duncan Sandys, proposed an agreement to establish a buffer-zone separating 
the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Therefore, following a meeting of the representatives of 
the two communities, the ‘Green Line’38 became a division on the map, which was 
established between G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots.39 
 
In order to settle the inter-conflict, the governments of the United Kingdom, Turkey, 
Greece and the two communities of Cyprus gathered at the London Conference in January 
1964, and once more the parties failed to reach an agreement.40 In March 1964, the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) arrived on the island to prevent fighting, 
maintain law and take measures to stop violence. Despite the involvement of the UNFICP 
in the conflicts, inter-communal attacks erupted again. However, this time Turkey took a 
different stance as a response and declared that, in the case of continuing violent attacks 
on the T/Cypriots, it would use its right of intervention, as provided for under the Treaty 
of Guarantee. Accordingly, G/Cypriots responded by stating that Turkey could not 
unilaterally intervene under this treaty.41 
 
As a result, the vicious cycle of fighting during the period1963 to 1967 led to a strict 
separation of the communities and a collapse of inter-communal relations. The inter-
communal negotiations, which commenced in 1968, finished with failure in 1974, due to 
inter-communal hostility that was fed by genuine mistrust, regardless of the memory of 
the past when the two communities lived side by side in peace.   
 
The conflict in Cyprus reached boiling point when the Greek military junta in Greece 
operated a coup d'état in Cyprus on July 15, 1974 in order to achieve enosis and thus to 
accepting a minority status and then to unite the island with Greece (Enosis), the period of 21–31 December 
1963. 
38 The term ‘Green Line’ refers to the ceasefire line that divides the island into a Turkish-Cypriot northern 
region and a Greek-Cypriot southern region. UNFICP is responsible for the area that separates the two 
sides, or the Buffer Zone.  
39 Hugh D. Purcell, Cyprus, London, Ernest Benn Limited (1969) p.333.  
40 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Background, 
<http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1600&tt=graphic&lang=l1> accessed 11 June 2013; 
Aydogdu (n6) pp. 54–56; Ismail Sabahattin, Kibris Cumhuriyetinin Dogusu-Cokusu ve KKTC’ninKurulusu 
(1960-1983) Akdeniz Haber Ajansi Yayinlari, (1992), p.318. 
41 Kudret Ozersay, Kibris Sorunu Hukuksal Bir Inceleme, 2ndedn. Ankara: ASAM Yayinlari (2002) p.72. 
                                                 
31 
 
establish ‘The Hellenic Republic of Cyprus’. The coup was led by Nikos Sampson and 
was supported by the Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard against President 
Makarios. As a result of the attacks against G/Cypriot supporters of independence, 3,000 
G/Cypriots were killed and an annihilation plan to exterminate T/Cypriots (so-called 
AKRITAS Plan) was put into effect.42As a response to these severe attacks, the issue of 
Turkey’s emerging intervention was raised. At this juncture, the reaction of Turkey is 
significant in understanding the arrival of the Turkish troops on the island, its policy43 
and its role over the northern part of Cyprus. On July 20, 1974, Turkey launched an 
operation called ‘Peace Operation’ in order to protect T/Cypriots against attacks, to stop 
violence and bring peace to the island. However, for G/Cypriots, this was an ‘invasion’ 
by Turkey as a part of Turkish expansionism.44 
 
In this regard, Turkey maintained that her right to intervene stemmed from the Treaty of 
Guarantee that was provided by the 1960 constitution.45 Here, the conflicted 
interpretation of Turkey’s intervention became apparent. For G/Cypriots this period is 
called the ‘Memory of the dark days’ and calls what is a ‘Peace Operation’ for T/Cypriots 
a Turkish ‘invasion’.46 The 1974 war led to a mass displacement of people. It was 
estimated that around 45,000 T/Cypriots47 and 142,000 G/Cypriots48 fled their homes and 
were displaced. T/Cypriots moved from the south to the north for their own security and 
G/Cypriots moved from north to the southern part of the island to protect themselves from 
Turkish attacks.49 In 1974, negotiations towards a settlement began and continued 
42 History of Cyprus “Archbishop Makarios on the Invasion of Cyprus by Greece” Available: 
<http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/makarios-speech.html#speech>Accessed 14 
November 2013; Clement Dodd, “Cyprus: A Historical Introduction” in C.H. Dodd (ed.), The Political, 
Social, and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press 
(1993). 
43 Kyris (n13) pp.80–95. 
44 Dodd, (n3) p.7. 
45 Zenon Stravanides, The Cyprus Conflict, Loris Stravanides Press (1976) p.90; Salahi Sonyel, Cyprus: 
The Destruction of a Republic and its Aftermath (1960-1974), Nicosia: CYREP (2003) p.347.  
46 Aigli Andrea Pittaka, Cultures of Peace Enabled Zoom Along Cyprus, ProQuest (2007) p. 78. 
47 An official report of the Turkish Cypriot administration dated 20 October 1974.  
48 ROC Press and Information Office (PIO), The Cyprus Question (2003) Nicosia: Cyprus, p.12. 
49 Ayla Gürel & Kudret Ozersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ 
and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) 
Cyprus Centre Report (3/2006) pp.3–5; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘Cyprus: Lack of 
Political Settlement Prevents the Displaced from Fully Enjoying Their Property Rights, A profile of the 
Internal Displacement Situation’(18 December 2007),pp.7-8<http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/94CBD5921CA280ECC12573B50039AF47/$file/
Cyprus%20-December%202007.pdf> accessed 11 June 2013. 
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through the 1970s. In spite of several attempts to present a settlement, the parties failed 
to reach an agreement.  
 
Following the collapse of intense but unfruitful negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot 
Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was declared on February 13, 1975. It was declared 
that the TFSC administration would govern T/Cypriots until a new Federal Republic of 
Cyprus was established and the regulations in the 1960 constitution of the RoC were 
implemented.50 Despite the new position of T/Cypriots, efforts to resolve the conflict 
have been made at international level through the Vienna Talks in 1977–1979, which 
were arranged by the UN Secretary-General.  
 
The new series of inter-communal talks between the leaders of the two communities were 
finalised with the Vienna III Agreement on August 2, 1975, which was confirmed by the 
UN Secretary-General’s Report.51This agreement provided that the T/Cypriots living in 
the south were allowed to move to the north, if they wanted to do so, with the assistance 
of the UNFICYP; the G/Cypriots then residing in the north were free to stay, and every 
assistance in leading a normal life, including facilities for education and religion, would 
be given; the G/Cypriots in the north would be permitted to move to the south at their 
own request; access to G/Cypriot villages and habitations in the north was free for the 
UNFICYP.52 
 
Although the communities reached an agreement, interpretation of the Vienna Agreement 
by the communities remains disputed: T/Cypriots refer to it as the ‘1975 Voluntary 
Population Exchange Agreement’ while G/Cypriots maintain that it was a temporary 
measure addressing important humanitarian aspects affecting the lives of the enclaved 
known as the ‘Vienna III (Humanitarian) Agreement’.53 In essence, it can be argued that 
the two different interpretations of the agreement reflect the perspectives, concerns and 
requirements of each side. For T/Cypriots, it represented a ground for bi-zonality and 
50 Ozersay (n 41) pp.110–111. 
51 The Vienna III Agreement, UN Document S/11789, signed in August 2, 1975; Dodd (n3) pp. 99–101. 
52 The Vienna III Agreement, UN Document S/11789, signed in August 2, 1975. 
53Gürel & Ozersay (n 49) p.18; ROC Press and Information Office,‘Enclaved’ 
<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/803883940B86E8D3C2256D6D001EB5CA?OpenDocumen
t> accessed: 12 June 2013; Olga Demetriou Displacement in Cyprus-Consequences of Military and Civil 
Strife, Life Stories: Greek Cypriot Community, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) Cyprus 
Centre Report 1 (2011) p. 6.  
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security; however, for G/Cypriots it was a constrained agreement to prevent the Turks 
from expelling the remaining G/Cypriots in the north and to take precautions against 
further attacks.54 
 
At this point, it should be highlighted that the importance of recognising the T/Cypriot 
perspective on the Vienna Agreement had increased over twenty years after 1975. How 
the T/Cypriots interpreted the agreement is important in understanding their constant 
strategy, which was established in the face of the alleged violations of the G/Cypriots 
regarding their property rights that were carried before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in the late 1990s.55 Following the displacement and continued failure to 
reach an agreement, the property debate transferred to the external level. A number of 
applications against Turkey have been brought to the ECtHR (‘the Court’ hereafter) to 
seek remedy for their property claims. It is notable that since the first judgment of the 
Court concerning property disputes in Cyprus,56 there has been a strategy by the Turkish 
government to justify the actions over those properties established on the grounds of their 
understanding of the Vienna Agreement. The Turkish government followed the same 
adopted approach in almost all of the property claims against it without any strategic 
manoeuvre. 
 
In 1977, another series of inter-communal talks were organised in which the parties failed 
to reach an agreement.57 This time, the G/Cypriots carried the Cyprus question to the UN 
General Assembly. Although the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly were 
promoted by G/Cypriots, those were one-sided resolutions from the point of view of the 
T/Cypriots since they were adopted in the absence of this side.58 The approval of those 
resolutions dealt with intense issues – for example, Resolution 37/253 concerning the 
immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces59– and the final position of the T/Cypriots at the 
negotiations was established. As a result, frustrated by decades of unfruitful negotiations, 
54 Ozersay (n 41) p. 18. 
55 The strategies of T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots concerning property claims of displaced Cypriots before the 
ECtHRwill be examined in Chapter 3 of the thesis.  
56 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para.36. 
57 Dodd (n 3) p.101. 
58 ibid,pp. 102–103. 
59 Nathalie Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating 
Partition in Cyprus? Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, (2004), p. 57. 
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the TFSC unilaterally declared independence and established the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on November 15, 1983. 
 
Subsequently, the UN Security Council declared in Resolution 541(1983) that the 
T/Cypriot declaration of independence was incompatible with the 1960 Treaty of 
Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee and thus the establishment of the ‘TRNC’ is 
invalid.60 Accordingly, the Security Council Resolution 550 (1984) reaffirmed 
Resolution 541 (1983) and the condemnation of ‘all secessionist actions’.61With these 
resolutions, the Security Council called upon all states not to recognise the TRNC. 
 
As a result, while the TRNC has never been recognised by any other states than Turkey, 
the RoC is recognised by all states and enjoys international recognition. Lauterpacht 
argues that it is wrong for the Security Council to express legal opinions as this role is 
more suited to a judicial body, which the Security Council is clearly not.  Its decisions are 
limited to the prescription of specific actions in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and those decisions should not extend beyond that.62 
 
From the wording of these resolutions which the Security Council was concerned, one 
can assume that the illegality of the declaration of independence represented the violation 
of the 1960 treaties. In this regard, it is questionable whether such a violation is sufficient 
to establish the grounds for an international ‘obligation of non-recognition’ of a state.63 
In fact, the question of whether a purported secession is lawful within international law 
is a closed one. The determination of whether an attempt to secede is in accordance with 
international law is unclear since there is an absence in international standards for 
determining whether such an attempt is illegal or invalid.64 
 
60 UN Security Council, 2500th Meeting. Resolution 541 (1983) (S/RES/541) 18 November 
1983.<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16528.html>accessed 12 June 2013. 
61 UN Security Council, 2539th Meeting. Resolution 550 (1984)(S/RES/550) 11 May 1984. 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/550(1984), accessed 12 June 2013. 
62 UN General Assembly, 44th Session, Question of Cyprus: The Status of Two Communities in Cyprus, 
Opinion of Mr E. Lauterpacht. (A/144/968.S/2146), 9 August 1990, p.4. 
63 Yaël Ronen, Transition from Illegal Regimes under International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, (2011), pp.65-66. 
64 John Cerone, ‘The Legality and Legal Effect of Kosovo’s Purported Secession and Ensuing Acts of 
Recognition,’ 3 Annals – Belgrade Law Review (2008), pp. 62-64. 
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Looking at the point of the Security Council Resolutions on the TRNC’s attempted 
establishment, proclamation of its illegality is mainly grounded on the violation of the 
1960 treaties by the intervention of Turkey. Although it was not expressly determined in 
the resolutions, the establishment of the TRNC originated from Turkish intervention. This 
sense has been obscured by calling upon all states to ‘respect the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus’.65 Here, what needs to be pointed out is 
that the establishment of the ‘TRNC’ was proclaimed nine years after the Turkish 
intervention, which ‘was the culmination of the process of political and administrative 
evolution within the Turkish Cypriot people’.66 In this respect, the ground for the 
declaration of the legally invalid status of the ‘TRNC’ may be refuted.     
 
In the case of Cyprus, although the T/Cypriots’ attempted secession was declared as 
legally invalid, this declaration has been made without providing any clear legal merits 
within international law discourse. The exclusion of secession from a test of illegality and 
incoherency of legal requirements, which culminated in the non-recognition of any 
secession, may lead the way to the ‘politicalisation’ of this concept, particularly when the 
interest of the international community is in question. 
 
1.3 Two Communities with Two Contradictory Perspectives and Property 
Mechanisms 
 
In 1974, when a group of G/Cypriot nationalists launched a coup d'état to gain control of 
the country, Turkey carried out an armed operation in Cyprus to assure the security of 
T/Cypriots and took control of 36% of the island.67 With the fear of further violence, 
G/Cypriots living in the north moved to the south and T/Cypriots residing in the south 
moved to the northern part of Cyprus. The majority of people from each community were 
displaced and left their homes behind. This situation created a major social and 
psychological trauma for Cypriots whose effects still continue for many displaced 
persons. The prolonged inter-communal conflicts between the two communities and the 
failure of the representatives to make a concrete effort to reach an agreement had a major 
impact on this unfortunate event. 
65 UN Security Council, 1781st Meeting. Resolution 353 (1974) (S/RES/353) 20 July 1974.  
66 Zaim Necatigil ‘Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the Loizidou Case: A Critical 
Examination’ Journal of International Affairs, vol. IV, no.3 (1999).   
67 Keith Kyle, In Search of Peace, London: Minority Rights Group International (1997) pp. 16-21. 
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Since the early 1960s, the total number of displaced persons, including both G/Cypriots 
and T/Cypriots, was 210,000, which constitutes 30% of the total population in Cyprus at 
that time.68 Ownership of the abandoned properties has always been controversial and 
may be the most intense issue, and one which has remained stagnant within the Cyprus 
problem. Although several attempts have been made, parties have failed to resolve this 
debate. With the passage of time, this crucial debate not only became more complex but 
was also carried to the international arena within the context of property rights. This 
deadlock and its consequences have gained high importance at a global level more than 
ever before. 
 
The civil strife in 1974 resulted with the de facto division of the island, which led the 
property issue to become the Gordian knot of the Cyprus conflict. Following the division, 
the T/Cypriot community established their administration and started living in the 
T/Cypriot-controlled areas of Cyprus under their own political structure.69 The territory 
of the ‘TRNC’, which is not recognised by any states apart from Turkey, represents a 
third of the island and it is referred to in the external arena as ‘those areas of the RoC in 
which the government of the RoC does not exercise effective control’,70whereas the 
G/Cypriot population are living under the control of an internationally recognised RoC.  
 
The issue of property ownership has been a controversial debate since the early 1960s. Its 
significance in any future geopolitical settlement makes this issue the most sensitive one. 
Although this debate was one of the major issues within the inter-communal conflict, 
verification of ownership claims, at that time, were difficult since both of the communities 
refrained from opening their land registration books to an impartial audit.71 
 
Not surprisingly, the figures for the number of displaced persons and the privately owned 
lands affected by the property dispute, provided by the authorities, differ greatly. More 
68 Official Report of the Turkish Cypriot administration dated 20 October 1974; Gurel & Ozersay (n 49) 
p.1; Ahmet An, Kibris Nereye Gidiyor, Istanbul, Everest (2002) p.319; RoC Press and Information Office 
(PIO), The Cyprus Question, Nicosia (2003) p.12. 
69 Ayla Gurel, Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil Strife and Military Strife, Turkish Cypriot 
Legal Framework, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) Cyprus Centre, Report 4 (2012) p. 3.  
70 Article 1 of Protocol No. 10 of the EU Treaty of Accession (2003). 
71 Richard A. Patrick, “Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971”, ed. James H. Bater& 
Richard Preston, Ontario: Department of Geography publications, University of Waterloo (1976) p.15.  
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than 25,000 T/Cypriots and 700 G/Cypriots were displaced between the years 1963 and 
1964.72 These numbers dramatically increased after the division of the island in 1974. 
Following the de facto division, 142,000 G/Cypriots (approximately 30% of the entire 
G/Cypriot community at that time) had to move from the north to the southern part of the 
island73 and 45,000 T/Cypriots (approximately 40% of the entire T/Cypriot community 
at that time) were displaced from the south to the north.74 Displaced people from both 
communities left their houses and lands for security reasons and were enclaved in 
villages, military camps, refugee camps or schools. Correspondingly, percentages of 
privately owned land affected by the property dispute are also considerable, although 
there are no figures mutually accepted.  
 
The figures of privately owned land in the post-1974 territories and their incoherency 
among the two communities are considerable. According to G/Cypriot records on 
privately owned land in the north: 78% of this land belongs to G/Cypriots, 21.1% belongs 
to T/Cypriots; privately owned land in the south: 85.7% is owned by G/Cypriots and 
13.9% by T/Cypriots.75 According to the T/Cypriot estimates on privately owned land in 
the north: 63.8% belongs to G/Cypriots, 33.1% belongs to T/Cypriots; percentages of this 
land in the south: 76.2% owned by G/Cypriots and 22.8% by T/Cypriots.76 Although 
these percentages provided by the sources of the two communities do not match, they are 
considerable, not only within the scope of the Cyprus conflict but also in the matter of 
future ownership claims that may be brought before the Court concerning the issue of 
property rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’ or ‘the 
Convention’ hereafter) system. 
 
In respect of the Convention mechanism, the percentages of ownership that fall within 
the ambit of disputed lands (78.5%, 13.9% for G/Cypriots and 63.8%, 22.8% for 
T/Cypriots) may indicate the level of threat against the effectiveness of the ECtHR system 
72 ibid., pp.74–79. 
73 Gürel & Ozersay (n 49) p.13. 
74 An (n 68) p.139; Gürel & Ozersay (n 49) p. 3.   
75 These figures do not include the percentages of G/Cypriot Church properties, T/Cypriot Evkaf (traditional 
Muslim establishments), Buffer Zone patrolled by the UNFICYP. The Department of Land and Surveys of 
Cyprus,‘Historical 
Background’<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/dls/dls.nsf/dmlhistory_en/dmlhistory_en?opendocument>Acce
ssed: 14 June2013; Gürel&Ozersay (n 49) pp. 4–9. 
76 Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle, Oregon: Hart Publishing (2005) p.175; Gürel & 
Ozersay (n 49) pp. 8–9. 
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and possible caseload crises regarding property claims. In this respect, it may be argued 
that the establishment of regional remedies will be more efficient mainly on two grounds: 
firstly, a bi-communal commission can be established to deal with property claims and 
provide the agreed figures of disputed lands. In the case of such a commission, access to 
the local records and registries of those properties will be feasible and thus a reliable 
evaluation on the value of those properties can be provided.77 This local remedy will be 
able to serve a large extent of displaced people in terms of local accessibility and could 
produce a quick solution for the claims. Secondly, the Court’s caseload will be reduced.  
 
1.3.1 Turkish Cypriot Perspective on the Property Issue and the Regulations on the 
Abandoned Greek Cypriots’ Properties in the North 
 
It can be argued that the root cause of the property deadlock has been created by three 
correlated components: ‘different interpretations of the causes of the dispute’78 (first) 
generate ‘contradicted demands’ (second) from the communities which established a 
ground for the formation of ‘contradicted legal measures’ (third), which can be called the 
‘conflict of property triangle’.  
 
The perceptions of the two communities are considerably contrasted respectively in these 
three aspects. According to the T/Cypriot perspective, the opposition, which created the 
division of the island, was a result of the violation of the 1960 constitution by the 
G/Cypriots aiming to reduce the T/Cypriots to a minority level. This situation paved the 
way for the creation of a zone, after the 1974 events, in which they could securely live 
under their own legal and political system. During the inter-communal negotiations, their 
suggested solution was centred on ‘bi-zonality’, which represented their demands on ‘the 
constituent states to have the unfettered right to decide who could establish residency’.79 
Not surprisingly, their regulations on land-ownership were established on the principle of 
‘bi-zonality’. Correspondingly, the ownership of the abandoned G/Cypriot properties, 
77 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para.97. 
78 Gürel and others (n 1) p, 12. 
79 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 
(S/2003/398) 1 April 2003, para. 107. The term “principle of bi-zonality” was adopted under the main 
Article 10 of the Plan in 2004, finalising negotiations by stating that: ‘The claims of persons who were 
dispossessed of their properties by events prior to entry into force of this Agreement shall be resolved in a 
comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for the individual rights of 
dispossessed owners and current users, and the principle of bi-zonality’; Gurel & Ozersay (n49) pp.11–12. 
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located within the areas under T/Cypriot control, was gradually given to the people living 
there. 
 
As a result, T/Cypriot leadership presumed that the resolution of the Cyprus problem 
could have been achieved through a permanent separation of the two communities in that 
each community should create its own internal structure in its own area and thus live 
securely without being under a security threat.80 Therefore, the rationale of the T/Cypriots 
regarding the settlement of the property problem is established on these perspectives. 
These T/Cypriot approaches have been presented during prolonged inter-communal 
negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict, sponsored by the UN. The demands 
of the T/Cypriots were explained by the UN Secretary-General as follows: 
 
In their wish to avoid the intermingling of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish 
Cypriot side wanted the constituent states to have the unfettered right to decide who could 
establish residency, therein, this was their concept of bi-zonality. 
 
The Turkish Cypriot side argued that property claims should be settled through liquidation 
by means of a global exchange and compensation scheme, meaning that no displaced persons, 
from either side, would have the right to have their properties reinstated.81 
 
 
In this respect, the property dispute should be resolved in parallel with the principle of bi-
zonality, which constitutes a method for a solution through ‘global exchange and 
compensation’.82 This idea was supported on the ground of the view that another 
resolution method might led to significant problems concerning property matters due to 
the fact that 63.8% (according to T/Cypriot figures) of private property in the T/Cypriot-
controlled area belongs to G/Cypriots, which was allocated to T/Cypriots. The settlement 
of the property conflict through the global exchange and compensation method became 
an established formula that would have prevented the displaced G/Cypriots from 
returning to their lands and homes that they left behind in the north. Since 1977, until the 
publication of the UN proposal for the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem 
(the so-called Annan Plan) in 2002, this has been the approach put forward by 
T/Cypriots.83 
 
80 Gürel and others (n1) p. 12.  
81 U.N. Security Council (S/2003/398) para. 107.  
82 Gürel & Ozersay (n 49) pp.12–13. 
83 Gürel (n 69) p.15.   
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As a result of continued failures to reach an agreement, the ‘TRNC’ administration 
unilaterally adopted some legal measures to resettle and rehabilitate the displaced 
T/Cypriots. These regulations were settled on the basis of the principle of global exchange 
and compensation. Therefore, for the first time, the concept of bi-zonality, embodied in 
the ‘TRNC’ constitution, came into force in 1985. According to Article 159 (1) (b) of this 
constitution, all abandoned G/Cypriot properties situated within the T/Cypriot-controlled 
area ‘shall be the property of the TRNC notwithstanding the fact that they are not so 
registered in the records of the Land Registry Office’.84 In fact, although the T/Cypriot 
authorities adopted the said regulations with the purpose of rehabilitation, they 
unwittingly sowed the seeds of the property deadlock that will be carried over to the 
global level. Article 159 (1) (b) of the TRNC constitution provides, where relevant, as 
follows:  
 
All immovable properties, buildings and installations which were found abandoned on l3th 
February, 1975 when the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed or which were 
considered by law as abandoned or not being owned after the abovementioned date, or which 
should have been in the possession or control of the public even though their ownership had 
not yet been determined...and ... situated within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus on l5th November 1983, shall be the property of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus notwithstanding the fact that they are not so registered in the records of the 
Land Registry Office; and the Land Registry Office records shall be amended accordingly. 
 
Additionally, the granting of title to abandoned G/Cypriot properties was allowed by the 
Housing, Allocation of Land and Property of Equal Value Law, No. 41/1977 (Iskan, 
Topraklandirma veEsdeger Mal Yasasi (ITEM law) in Turkish) with an amended 
legislation called the Amendment Law No. 52/1995. The concept of ‘equal value’ or 
‘equivalent property’ was taken as the grounds for the allocation system. This concerned 
granting the T/Cypriots, who left property in the south, the possession of abandoned 
G/Cypriot property of equal value. Title to those abandoned properties was granted after 
all rights of T/Cypriot properties, which were left in the south, was transferred to the 
‘TRNC’. Concordantly, a property evaluation and exchange system was represented by 
the value unit of a ‘point’ system.85 
 
As a result, T/Cypriots who have properties in the south were assigned points in exchange 
for submitting their title deeds of those properties in the north to the T/Cypriot 
84 Article 159 (1) (b) of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (7 May 1982). 
85 Gürel and others (n1) p.13. 
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government. In order to relinquish their right to the properties in the south in favour of 
the T/Cypriot state, individuals were required to sign a document called feragatname 
(certificate of renunciation) indicating their agreement to relinquish their rights. After 
obtaining points, an owner could exchange these for an abandoned G/Cypriot property in 
the north. Point holders were also allowed to trade, donate or inherit their points.86 
 
Moreover, the purpose of the rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced T/Cypriots 
through these property arrangements was gradually extended. There is strong evidence 
that, besides representing the concept of equivalent property, those points were also 
issued as compensation to people who did not move from the south to the north or leave 
any properties such as: victims of the civil strife, people who served in the inter-
communal conflict, people with low incomes and Turkish immigrants who arrived and 
settled in Cyprus before 1982.87 Furthermore, the right to transfer a mortgage to the 
G/Cypriot property received in exchange for points was provided by an official document 
called the ‘definitive possessory certificates’ (‘kesin tasarruf belgesi’ in Turkish), which 
were issued between 1982 and1995. These certificates have been replaced by ‘immovable 
property title deeds’ since 1995. 
 
The T/Cypriot property approach through unilaterally adopted regulations remained 
stable until ownership claims from displaced G/Cypriots were brought before the ECtHR. 
With the influence of the Court’s assessment, the property arrangements were slightly 
amended by preserving the notion of ‘remedy through only compensation’. Accordingly, 
the ‘Law as to Compensation for Immovable Properties Located within the Boundaries 
of the TRNC, which are Within the Scope of the Article 159, Law no. 49/2003’ was 
adopted. The main objective of the law was to provide remedies that could be recognised 
by the ECtHR as effective domestic remedies for G/Cypriot property claims.  
 
As the name of the law reflects, the new law was based on a ‘compensation’ scheme. 
Therefore, the only remedy which has been proposed for the ‘taking’ act of abandoned 
G/Cypriot properties through Article 159 of the ‘TRNC’ constitution was compensation. 
Not surprisingly, since this law had the spirit of ‘bi-zonality’, which is opposed to the  
86 Gürel and others (n1) pp.13–14; Gürel (n69) p.6. 
87 Gürel (n69) p.6. 
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G/Cypriots’ perspective, it was not put into practice. The ‘TRNC’ government insisted 
on preserving the notion of compensation until December 2005. However, following 
another ruling of the ECtHR, the law for ‘the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution 
of Immovable Properties, which is within the Scope of Sub-paragraph (B) of Article 159 
of the Constitution’, (Law no. 7/2005), was enacted.88 Additionally, the ‘Immoveable 
Property Commission’ (IPC) was established to examine G/Cypriot property applications 
under the new regulation. With the said law, the global exchange or compensation line of 
remedies was replaced by three other possible solutions: restitution, exchange or 
compensation, which have been welcomed by the Court.89 The ‘TRNC’ government took 
a further step by adopting regulations in accordance with the Court’s ruling as 
approximately 1,400 G/Cypriot applications have been struck out from the ECtHR’s list 
and transferred to the IPC.90 This development was significant for T/Cypriots as, for the 
first time, a TRNC authority was recognised in the international arena and thus its 
decision would have legal effects elsewhere in the world regardless of its unrecognised 
status.  
 
1.3.2 Greek Cypriot Perspective on the Property Issue and Regulations of the 
Abandoned Turkish Cypriot Properties in the South 
 
While the Cyprus problem was a direct consequence of the 1960 constitutional conflict 
on the T/Cypriot side, in contrast, for G/Cypriots, it was a result of Turkey’s invasion and 
occupation of the northern part of the island in 1974.91 The UN Secretary-General sums 
up the G/Cypriot perspective and demands as follows: 
 
The Greek Cypriots argued that the Turkish Cypriot position amounted to ethnic purity and 
that basic human rights and the principles of the acquis communautaire should allow any 
Cypriot citizen to settle anywhere on the island, any limitations being acceptable only in the 
first few years, for them bi-zonality meant only two distinct zones administered by Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively.92 
 
88 Law for Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties which are within the scope 
of Sub-paragraph (B) of Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the Constitution” (Law no. 67/2005) 22 December 
2005.Although this law can be considered as a converted version of Law no. 49/2003, it in fact abolished 
that law.  
89 Section 8 of Law no. 67/2005; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185, para.37; Kudret 
Ozersay, AIHM’ninXenides-Arestis Karari, SBF Dergisi, vol.61, no.1 (2006). 
90 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
91 Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition. Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, (1992) pp.295–299. 
92 UN. Security Council, (S/2003/398) para.98. 
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The Greek Cypriot side advocated a solution based on full respect for property rights so that 
all displaced persons, from either community, would have the right to have their properties 
reinstated.93 
 
According to the G/Cypriot perspective, the conflict and property problems on the island 
stemmed from Turkey’s violation of human rights by invading the northern part of 
Cyprus in 1974. In essence, this explains why G/Cypriots refer to the first year of inter-
communal strife as 1974, while this period constitutes the early 1960s for T/Cypriots.94 
Concordantly, the G/Cypriot interpretation of the cause of the conflict has reflected their 
prospective resolution to the property dispute. Therefore, the property puzzle could have 
only been solved by the removal of Turkey’s alleged violation of human rights, which 
could be achieved through allowing the right for all of the G/Cypriots to repossess and 
return to their former properties and houses. 
 
On this basis, the G/Cypriot method for property resolution was subject to two conditions: 
first, the right to repossess and return to their former homes, lands and properties; second, 
the application of the so-called ‘three freedoms’ (freedom of movement, settlement and 
right to property) across the whole of the island.95 In essence, the appearance of the two 
dramatically opposed perspectives and opposing expectations of the communities started 
to ring the alarm bells around the property deadlock as a prolonged inter-communal 
conflict. 
 
In parallel with the G/Cypriot angle, which determines the division of the island as a 
temporary situation, a regulation to deal with the abandoned T/Cypriot properties located 
in the south has been enacted. The same attitude has appeared by T/Cypriots when 
T/Cypriot authorities adopted laws in line with their position on the Cyprus problem. 
Therefore, in order to regulate the use and management of the abandoned T/Cypriot 
properties within the G/Cypriot-controlled area, the ‘Turkish-Cypriot properties’ 
(Administration and other matters) (Temporary Provisions) Law of 1991’ (hereinafter 
93 ibid, para. 107. 
94 The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United States, Statement by H.E.Mr Tassos 
Papadopoulos, President of the Republic of Cyprus, at the General Debate of the 59th Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 23 September 2004: Mr Papadopoulos stated that: ‘The Cyprus 
problem is not always perceived in its correct parameters. The fact remains that this problem is the result 
of a military invasion and continued occupation of part of the territory of a sovereign state’. 
95 “Statement by Mr Tassos Papadopoulos on the Territorial Proposal of the Greek Cypriot Side on 31 
March 1977” in Necati M. Ertekun, Inter-communal Talks and the Cyprus Problem, Nicosia: TFSC Press 
(1977) pp.137–139; Gürel & Ozersay (n 49) pp. 20–21. 
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Law no. 139 /1991), and the so-called ‘The Guardianship Law’ were implemented.96 The 
G/Cypriot interpretation of the present situation of the island as a ‘temporary’ division is 
reflected in the name of this law as it was enacted as a ‘temporary provision’.97 
 
The reason for adopting this law was correlated with and explained as being the cause of 
the division. Therefore, the massive removal of the T/Cypriot population was a result of 
the Turkish invasion to the areas occupied by the Turkish invasion forces. Accordingly, 
movable and immovable T/Cypriot properties were abandoned due to the prohibition by 
such forces of the movement of the population within the areas of the RoC.98 The 
regulations under Law no. 139/1991 were settled on the grounds of the view that all 
G/Cypriot and T/Cypriot properties still belong to the original owners.99 According to the 
G/Cypriot measures on dealing with temporarily abandoned T/Cypriot properties, the 
Minister of the Interior was appointed as custodian of all T/Cypriot properties in the south 
in order to take possession and administration of all those properties and Evkaf100 
properties.  
 
The custodian is entitled to administer such properties until a final settlement is achieved. 
The custodian is allowed to make arrangements, conclude or terminate contracts, 
undertake obligations or charges in relation to every such property and lease it, collect 
rents or other sums to be held on behalf of the owner.101 Additionally, compulsory 
acquisition, distribution or sale of such properties was also allowed under specific 
conditions. Moreover, the law exceptionally provided the transfer of the title to the 
96 Law on the Administration of Turkish Cypriot Properties in the Republic and Other Related Matters 
(Temporary Provisions) Law no.139/1991 (24 April 1991) was enacted according to its preamble to 
regulate the administration of Turkish-Cypriot properties in the Republic of Cyprus: 
‘Whereas, because of the massive removal of the Turkish-Cypriot population as a result of the Turkish 
invasion to the areas occupied by the Turkish invasion forces and the prohibition by such forces of the 
movement of such population within the areas of the Republic of Cyprus, properties which consist of 
movable and immovable property were abandoned, 
And whereas it became essential for the protection of those properties to take immediate measures, 
And whereas the measures taken included the administration of such properties by a special committee 
which was constituted through administrative arrangements, 
And whereas the regulation by law of the question of the Turkish-Cypriot properties in the Republic became 
necessary ...’ 
97 Law no. 139/1991. 
98 ibid. 
99 Gürel and others (n1) p.14. 
100 The Evkaf foundation was established as a Vakf institution in 1571. Since 1571, it has accumulated evkaf 
properties (Muslim establishments for charitable uses). These properties cannot be sold.  
101 Article 6 (v) of Law no. 139/1991; Gürel and others (n1) p.15. 
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property if such actions were considered as beneficial for the owner or necessary in the 
public interest. 
 
Contrary to the T/Cypriot measures on displaced G/Cypriot properties, G/Cypriot 
legislation did not allow, apart from in some exceptional situations, the granting of title 
deeds to G/Cypriot citizens. Having said that, the payment of compensation or any 
amount owed to an owner of T/Cypriot property in relation to his/her property is 
suspended until a final comprehensive settlement is achieved.102 Here, it can be argued 
that although the way in which the G/Cypriot legislation has dealt with the ownership of 
T/Cypriot properties seems more legitimate and credible than the T/Cypriot one, in 
practice there is an implicit prevention of T/Cypriots from reclaiming their ownership 
rights over those properties. There is strong evidence that T/Cypriot requisition arising 
from their ownership has been suspended for an indefinite period of time. Moreover, the 
custodian has allowed a number of T/Cypriot properties to be improved, developed, 
modified and used for both private and public purposes, which has led to the restitution 
of such properties in future settlements impossible.103 
 
In light of all the above considerations, one could argue that although both sides require 
a resolution to the property dispute, it is crystal clear from the measures adopted by both 
communities that their processes and procedures for rehabilitation and resettlement of 
displaced Cypriots are beyond the reach of the human rights’ approach to property rights. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a result of prolonged, intense and unfruitful inter-communal negotiations, parties have 
failed to reach any agreement since the early 1960s. Antipodal perspectives of the causes 
of the conflict have paved the way for the establishment of contradictory regulations for 
the properties of the two communities who have both suffered and shared the experiences 
of displacement and resettlement. 
 
In current practice, the two communities are living in two separate zones in a divided 
Cyprus. With the passage of more than four decades, the displaced Cypriots have settled 
102 Article 9 of Law 139/1991.  
103 Article 6 of Law 139/1991; Gürel (n1) pp.15–16. 
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and have adapted to their new social and economic environments on both parts of the 
island.104 However, the property conflict still remains unresolved today. This is due to the 
opposing perceptions and demands of the two sides. On the one hand, the G/Cypriot side 
argues that the property conflict should be achieved by reinstating all properties to their 
legal owners. On the other hand, T/Cypriots advocate a solution through liquidation by 
means of global exchange and a compensation scheme. 
 
In essence, within the story of the two communities, it should be recognised that both 
have suffered from the past experiences of displacement and have become the victims of 
unfortunate political and historical events. Although it has been more than five decades, 
the conflict has remained stagnant. In this respect, the leadership of the two communities 
should undertake full responsibility for finding a durable and feasible solution that 
protects the rights of the two communities without discrimination on any ground. 
 
To conclude, it is crucial to maintain that although the property conflict is perhaps the 
most sensitive and thus most difficult to solve, its settlement is really about people and 
not just principles, and about inter-communal relationships and not just regulations. 
Although principles and regulations are significant, they are not powerful enough to build 
an inter-communal peace nor to make people forget their experiences of displacement or 
civil strife. It may be said, with some conviction, that the property crux can be resolved 
through trust and compromise. Lessons can be learned from past injustices and political 
wrongs which can prevent future generations from repeating them. Therefore, a mutually 
agreed and durable settlement is achievable if these lessons are to be seriously considered 
and not disregarded in the search for a comprehensive settlement. 
 
104 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDmc) Cyprus: Prospects Remain Dim of Political 
Resolution to Change Situation of IDPs (2009)< http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/2B0A6371D0C915CA802570A7004C797B?Ope
nDocument> accessed: 29 November 2013. 
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Chapter 2  
Concept of Property and Property Rights Within the Context of International Law 
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the European Convention on Human 
Rights 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
Throughout history, property has always been one of the most emotive issues and a major 
source of conflict particularly in post-conflict societies. It has also been considered as a 
powerful force in the formation of civil society in the way that the nature of a relationship 
between man and property has led to the foundation of a civil society. According to 
Rousseau,1 in the progress of mankind, developments have established in parallel to the 
requirements of a civil society. The first awareness of human beings was the existence of 
himself, which was followed by the necessity of self-preservation. A way towards the 
idea of property has evolved, using the first tree, caves and then making shelters with mud 
and clay, which ‘was the epoch of a first revolution, which established and distinguished 
families, and introduced a kind of property, in itself the source of a thousand quarrels and 
conflicts’.2 
 
Property as a human right has been subject to controversial debates as it is determined as 
both central to the concept of human rights and also as an instrument for abuse by others.3 
As will be examined in this chapter, the complicated nature of property as a human right, 
which is subject not only to qualifications but also limitations, is reflected in the ECtHR 
case law concerning property rights. Accordingly, interpretation and application of this 
right have developed – and is still developing– through the Court’s case law, which has 
raised controversies as well as inconsistencies among the ECtHR’s judgments.  
 
In order to understand the development of jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 
concerning the right to property under the European Convention on Human Rights 
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (The Second Part) in Brumfitt, J.H & 
Hall J.C. in The Social Contract and Discourses (1973) Great Britain: C. Nicholls & Company Ltd. pp. 
76–79.. 
2 ibid, p.79. 
3 Sepúlveda Magdalena, Theo Van Banning and others, Human Rights Reference Handbook, (3rd ed. rev. 
ed.), Ciudad Colon, Costa Rica: University of Peace (2004) p. 293. 
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(ECHR), it must be noted that reaching an agreement on the formulation of this right 
under the Convention was very difficult and gave rise to controversial debates among 
contracting parties during the drafting process of the ECHR (the Convention). The right 
to property was considered as a complex right, since it was regarded as a civil right and 
even as an integral right.4 While many member states were opposed to the right to 
property, there was strong support for this right by other members.5 The complex nature 
of the right to property became more obvious at the international level during the drafting 
process of the ECHR. From the early stages of drafting the European Convention, P1-1, 
the inclusion of the right to property, created heavily controversial disputes, and as a result 
of long discussions on numerous problems and points of view, the provision for the right 
to property was adopted by allowing the Contracting States a wide power to interfere with 
this right.6 
 
Taking into account the controversial and complicated character of the right to property, 
it can be argued that a conflict arising from the right to property is, perhaps, one of the 
most difficult ones to resolve, among others that are protected under the Convention. The 
property crux of the ancient Cyprus problem reflects this situation very well, particularly 
if one considers the continuity of the problem that has stretched for more than five 
decades. The property conflict due to the division of the island can be considered as the 
major impediment to achieving the resolution of the Cyprus problem. This may be a result 
of opposing approaches towards property of the T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots towards the 
Cyprus conflict. 
 
In order to understand the implementation of the right to property, provided in Article 1 
of Protocol No.1 (P1-1) to the ECHR, and the application of it to the complaints of the 
G/Cypriots concerning alleged violation of their property rights, this chapter will examine 
the meaning and scope of P1-1 by focusing on the ‘three distinct rules’.7 In order to 
determine whether the Court’s attitude towards the claims concerning property rights in 
P1-1 is consistent, its judgments in respect of claimants from other contracting states will 
4 Sepúlveda Magdalena, Theo Van Banning and others, Human Rights Reference Handbook, (3rd ed. rev. 
ed.), Ciudad Colon, Costa Rica: University of Peace (2004) p. 293.p. 293. 
5 Tom Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998, Oxford: Hart Publishing (2005) pp. 20–30. 
6 David J. Harris, Michael O’Boyle and others, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009) p. 655.  
7 Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 61. 
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be considered. In this regard, significant cases that are regarded as contributing to the 
development of the context of P1-1 to the Convention will be observed. On the grounds 
of the findings through this case analysis, the ECtHR’s Cyprus rulings in relation to the 
property complaints will be examined in the next chapter. This approach aims to further 
enlighten the rationale behind the Court’s position towards Cypriot claims.  
 
The comparison of the application of P1-1 to the cases brought against Turkey and other 
contracting parties will shed light on the interaction between the Court’s jurisprudence 
and the Cypriot property disputes, which will in turn illustrate the significance of Cypriot 
property cases within the context of property rights under the ECHR. Meanwhile, this 
approach will help to identify the determinative factors – political, legal and historical –
that create grounds for the Court to depart from its traditional approach in this context 
and change gradually towards a different position.  
 
2.1 A Guarantee for the Protection of Property Rights and the ‘Three Distinct Rules’ 
within the Ambit of Article 1, Protocol No.1 to the ECHR (P1-1) 
 
The meaning and scope of P1-1 is relevant to the purpose of this chapter as explained 
above.  
Article 1 of Protocol 1 reads: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possession. No one shall 
be deprived of his possession except in the public interest, and subject to the conditions provided 
by law and by the general principles of international law.  
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such 
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or 
to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.  
 
The Convention was drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War. The historical 
events during this period had a considerable impact on the drafting process of the property 
clause. As a result of the war, an excessive number of people lost their homes and became 
victims of the property rights’ violations. As a result, property issues arising from these 
violations became the most significant and controversial debates during the drafting 
process of the Convention. The core of the fierce debates was the inclusion of the right 
50 
 
to property itself within the ECHR.8 Finally, the Convention was approved without the 
right to property and it was left as a separate protocol.9 
 
The changing political balance in East and Central Europe had an impact on the notion of 
human rights. In particular, the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia triggered the 
ambition for the ECHR. This paved the way for the first initiative for the ECHR in April 
1948. As a result of the takeover, Western Europe speeded up the drafting process. The 
consideration of the Czech situation was reflected in the introduction of the first proposal 
of the Convention in the following statement: 
 
If countries, which are still now free, are to avoid sharing the recent fate of Czechoslovakia, 
they must together take steps to preserve their common heritage…The conclusion of a 
binding treaty for the collective protection of individual rights and the establishment of 
judicial machinery for enforcing it, is a pressing necessity.10 
 
 
The communist takeover in Czechoslovakia was a deterrent example for the rest of the 
European countries. It was necessarium to prevent disputes between nations and protect 
human rights.11 The writing process of the first draft for the European Convention was 
started by the International Juridical Section of the European Movement in 1949. The 
movement towards the right to property was launched in order to take measures to 
accomplish the main purpose of the Council of Europe (‘CE’ hereafter) for the first 
session of the Consultative Assembly (‘CA’ hereafter) of the CE in August 1949. This 
would be in accordance with Article 1 of the Statute concerning the realisation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The proposal was on the agenda of the CA and it was 
referred to the Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions in August 1949.The 
drafting process of the right to property continued longer than the preparation of the whole 
Convention due to the influence of challenging debates.12 
 
The drafting process of the property rights was exposed to controversies mainly focused 
on the inclusion of this right with other social and economic rights. The arguments were 
raised on the grounds that property rights should not be differentiated from other social 
8 Theo R.G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property, School of Human Rights Research Series, vol.14 
Antwerpen: Intersentia (2002) pp.65–66. 
9 Allen (n 5), p. 24. 
10 Banning (n 8), p.66.  
11 ibid, pp.66–67. 
12 ibid, pp. 64–75. 
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and economic rights that were to be excluded from the Convention. The utility and social 
functions of property were other objects at issue. It was not possible to evaluate the 
legitimacy of the charges and restrictions on private property as a consequence of the 
inherent character of property. The social function and general utility of private property 
were not constant as they vary according to the economic and social conditions of states. 
This argument was supported with the idea that it would be difficult to provide protection 
if disputes regarding property rights were brought to the international arena.13 
The complete deletion of the right to property was also suggested as its insertion would 
bring domestic political questions before the Council of Europe. This thought process 
was the result of the political nature of nationalisation in that period. It is likely that the 
proponents of the exclusion of the right to property were mostly socialist members. 
Conversely, members who were supporting the inclusion of the property issue were 
taking the fascist regimes as a base to support their argument by considering how 
deprivation was used by these regimes in repression in the past. The confiscation of the 
properties of refugees and minorities in Europe was pointed out. Additionally, it was 
agreed that states should be entitled to prevent arbitrary deprivation and to use its power 
for the common good.14 The contentious period continued until the approval of the final 
text. Finally, the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possession was included in Protocol 
No. 1 which was signed on 20 March 1952 and entered into force on 18 May 1954. 
 
In this regard, there is no doubt that economic and cultural circumstances have played a 
determining role in the comprehension of the right to property in a particular state. This 
is because there is no single definition or understanding of the issue of property. However, 
differing understandings of this issue can be minimised by uniting under and respecting 
the international rules concerning property rights. This would help to reduce the number 
of disputes on property rights at the national and international level. The potential of 
property to protect, and the potential to deprive the owner of that property, despite their 
possession, makes the right to property perhaps the most sensitive human right, not least 
also because of the emotional bond the owner has with it. Moreover, although the property 
is protected by provisions, it is also subject to limitations and appropriation by a state, 
making the notion of property a conflicted issue. The complicated case law of the ECtHR 
on property rights can be considered as proof of its complexity and controversy. 
13 Banning (n 8), p.67. 
14 ibid, p. 69. 
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As can be seen from the writing of P1-1, a very wide scope of protection is provided with 
types of possessions without differentiating or defining the types of property that fall 
within the ambit of this provision. Moreover, the extent of the protection provided in P1-
1 is not determined. The indeterminate and broad scope of P1-1 has been developing 
through the Court’s case law since the early years of its adoption. 
 
P1-1 not only provides protection for the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possession but also 
allows states to interfere with a person’s property rights in specific circumstances. In 
essence, although it is not explicitly stated, this article provides both positive and negative 
guarantees within its scope. On the one hand, the notion of a positive guarantee is implied 
by stating that ‘every natural and legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions’. On the other hand, a negative guarantee is provided with the statement that 
‘no one shall be deprived of their possessions’ except in certain circumstances.15 In this 
respect, both positive and negative obligations are imposed upon states by P1-1.16 
 
In respect to negative obligations in the Convention, a state should refrain from actions 
which demand a state abstention.17 For instance, actions that constitute an interference 
with the exercise of property rights, such as the right to not be tortured, fall within the 
scope of negative obligations.18 Within the context of P1-1, positive obligations do not 
require a state to ensure a distribution of property rights that a person does not already 
own and positive obligations do not provide the right for a person to claim the acquisition 
of property from the state. These obligations protect the existing property rights of a 
person and should be understood as the responsibility of a state to protect private 
ownership.19 In one of the Court’s earliest cases, the Marckx case,20 the Court and the 
European Commission (the Commission) held that P1-1 does no more than enshrine the 
right of everyone to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Accordingly, this 
15 Deborah Rook, Property Law and Human Rights, London: Blackstone Press (2001) p.61. 
16 Harris and others (n 6) pp. 664–665. 
17Yvonne Donders & Vladimir Volodin, Human Rights in Education, Science, and Culture: Legal 
Developments and Challenge, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd (2007) p. 237. 
18Antoine Christian Buyse, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The European Human Rights Perspective, 
With a Case Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina,School of Human Rights Research, vol. 25, Intersentia 
Uitgevers N.V. (2008) pp. 17, 59.  
19 Ali R. Coban, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human Rights, Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd (2004) pp. 163–164. 
20Marckx v. Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, para.50. 
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provision applies only to a person’s existing possessions and does not guarantee the right 
to acquire possessions. Additionally, the positive guarantee does not require a state to 
take measures to provide a protection for a reduction in the value of privately owned 
property.21 
 
In the case of X v. Federal Republic of Germany22 the applicant contested the levy of a 
tax on the interest earned on his savings accounts during the year 1994. At that time, the 
inflation rate was higher than the interest paid by the savings institutions. His payment of 
the income tax of his capital while inflation was continuously eroding was improper. 
Laws that impose taxation as a means of financial expenditure are promulgated by every 
state’s power.23 Therefore, a positive guarantee protects the rights over property that an 
owner already owns, and it does not entrench the right to obtain property. In this respect, 
in terms of the enforcement of property rights, a legal system should be provided by the 
state. This system of private ownership should be preserved as the responsibility of the 
state by taking the form of positive guarantee.24 
 
2.1.1 The Structure of P1-1 to the ECHR 
 
As indicated above, although a very wide scope of protection is provided with a wide 
range of possessions, property rights are not absolute rights and restrictions may be 
imposed for reasons of public interest.25 Conditions where a person may be deprived of 
his/her possession by a state without violating this article are iterated in the same 
provision that protects the right to property. The Strasbourg Court explained the main 
objective of P1-1 in its Marckx judgment on13 June 1979, stating that: 
 
By recognising that everyone has the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, Article 
1 (P1-1) is in substance guaranteeing the right of property. This is the clear impression left by 
21 Deborah Rook (n 15) p.61. 
22 X v. Federal Republic of Germany, (1980) 20 DR 226.  
23Annamaria Viterbo, ‘The ECHR’s Protection of Property against Inflation vs. the EC Price Stability 
Principle’, (2006), European University Institute-Working Paper RSCAS No.2006/38, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies European Forum, p.6. 
24 Coban, (n 19), p.164; Peter van den Broek, ‘The Protection of Property under the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, Legal Issues of European Integration (1986) pp. 52–90; Buyse (n 18), p. 85. 
25Anetta Faye Jacobsen, Human Rights Monitoring: A Field Mission Manual, Leiden: Brill Academic 
Publishers, (2008), p. 346; See the case of Aquacultur and Hydro Seafood,10 July 2003, Joined Cases C-
20/00 and 64/00; Ioannis Lianos, ‘A Regulatory Theory of IP: Implications for Competition Law’, CLES 
Working Paper Series, (1/2008), 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-1-2008> accessed 25 July 2013. 
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the words ‘possessions’ and ‘use of property’ (in French: ‘biens’, ‘propriété’, ‘usage des biens’); 
the ‘travaux préparatoires’, for their part, confirm this unequivocally: the drafters continually 
spoke of ‘right of property’ or ‘right to property’ to describe the subject-matter of the successive 
drafts which were the forerunners of the present Article 1 (P1-1).26 
 
The ECtHR examined the meaning and scope of P1-1 in detail in the case of Sporrong 
Lönnroth v. Sweden.27 In its examination, the Court also identified that this article 
comprises three distinct rules, which have gradually been approved in almost all 
subsequent cases concerning property rights, and have become an established method in 
the application of P1-1.28 In its judgment of 23 September 1982, the Court stated: 
 
Article (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces 
the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first sentence of the first 
paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; 
it appears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the States 
are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained in the second 
paragraph.29 
 
According to the Court’s case law, these three rules are not distinct in the sense of being 
unconnected and the relationship between the components of P1-1 has gradually been 
established.30 This relationship was explained in James v. UK. The Court held: 
 
The three distinct rules are not, however, ‘distinct’ in the sense of being unconnected. The 
second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right 
to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general 
principle enunciated in the first rule. 31 
 
The three rules in P1-1 hereafter in the thesis are referred to as Article1/1/1 (first rule), 
Article 1/1/2 (second rule) and Article 1/2 (third rule). According to the Court’s ruling, 
the first rule is a statement of principle, which also provides a ground for interference 
with the right to property that is not regarded as a deprivation of a person’s possessions 
within the ambit of the second rule or third rule.32 
 
26Marckx v. Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, para.63.  
27Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
28 Rook (n 15), p. 61. 
29Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para.61.  
30 Harris and others (n6), pp. 666–667; Aida Grgic and others, The Right to Property under the European 
Convention of Human Rights, A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and its Protocols, Human Rights Handbook No. 10, Strasbourg: Council of Europe (2007) p. 10.  
31James v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para. 37.  
32 Harris and others (n6), p.666. 
                                                 
55 
 
According to the Court’s traditional approach, the first rule is the first sentence of the 
paragraph which states that ‘every natural and legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possession’. This is the overarching rule of the provision and provides 
a general guarantee of the right to property. The second rule is the second sentence of the 
first paragraph, which regulates the deprivation of possessions and determines specific 
conditions for interference with property rights as ‘no one shall be deprived of his 
possession except in the public interest, and subject to the conditions provided by law 
and by the general principles of international law’. It is obvious from its wording that this 
rule imposes requirements for the taking of the property in specific circumstances. The 
third rule is set out in the second paragraph of the article, which provides that ‘the 
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions’. Finally, the third 
rule regulates the states’ power to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest.33 
 
According to the Court’s classical method in the examination of the cases under P1-1, it 
first determines whether there has been any interference with the right to the property in 
question. Finally, the Court determines which of the three rules are applicable to the 
case.34 The Court held that when analysing cases it needs to decide the nature of an 
interference, therefore it first determines whether the second and third rules are 
applicable. If neither is applicable, then the Court considers the first rule and determines 
whether it has been complied with.35 
 
It may be worth noting that although it has become the established method that P1-1 
comprises three distinct rules, the Court has not adopted any particular approach 
regarding a requirement to identify which of the three rules are applicable in a particular 
case. In the majority of cases, the Court indicated under which rules a case is being 
decided. However, in some rare instances, P1-1 is considered as a whole without 
identifying the applicable rule(s).36 
33 Harris and others (n 6) pp. 666–667; Coban (n 19) p. 174. 
34 Grgic (n 30) pp. 10–11. 
35Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para.61; Harris and others (n 6) p.667; Rook (n 15) p. 
62. 
36 Harris and others (n 6) pp.667–668; Rook (n 15) p.61. 
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2.1.2 The Second Rule of P1-1: Deprivation of Property 
As regards to the writing of the second rule, it should be noted that the term ‘deprivation’ 
is interpreted as ‘expropriation’ under P1-1.37 In order to claim for the deprivation of 
property, the applicant must illustrate that he or she was entitled to it.38 In principle, 
deprivation of property is deemed to occur only when all the legal rights of the owner are 
extinguished. This may occur either by operation of law39 or by the exercise of a legal 
power to the same effect.40 Deprivation, in principle, involves the direct transfer of a 
property title to a public body or private individual or destruction of it.41 What is 
remarkable, however, is that it is not always simple to determine when an interference 
constitutes deprivation. This is because in some instances, actions that are not based on a 
legal procedure take place with the same effect as those of formal expropriation. 
Generally, in cases when a substantial interference with the enjoyment of possession by 
the authorities occurs, this may be regarded as de facto expropriation.42 
 
It was the case of Papamichalopoulos v. Greece43 in which the term de facto 
expropriation was used for the first time by the Strasbourg Court. The Court, without 
explicitly stating the existence of deprivation, held that that the physical occupation of 
land was so extensive and the possibility of dealing with it so remote that there was de 
facto expropriation.44 According to the Court’s traditional approach, in the absence of a 
formal expropriation, in order to determine whether there is a deprivation of property 
which falls within the ambit of P1-1, it should look behind appearances and investigate 
the realities of the situation complained about. This stems from the rationale that the 
Convention intended to guarantee rights that are ‘practical and effective’ and therefore 
the Court should examine whether the complaint situation constitutes a de facto 
expropriation.45 
37 Andries J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses-A Comparative Analysis, Cape Town: Juta & 
Co Ltd (1999) p. 110.  
38Holly Monasteries v. Greece (1994) 20 EHRR 1, para. 60. 
39Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium (1995) 21 EHRR 301. 
40Lithgow v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 329; Laurent Sermet, The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Property Rights, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing (1998) p.23.  
41 Sermet (n 40) p.23. 
42 Harris and others (n 6) p. 678. 
43Papamichalopoulos v. Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, paras. 45–46. 
44ibid, paras. 45–46; Harris and others (n 6) p. 528. 
45Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63. 
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According to the Court’s case law, a reduction in the possibility of disposing of the 
properties or limitations on the right of property does not amount to a deprivation within 
the ambit of the second rule. The Court takes the substance of the right to property as a 
basis in order to determine whether there is a deprivation. Even if the right in question 
lost some of its substance, this cannot be regarded as deprivation unless it disappears.46 
Following from this, interference with property rights under the second rule of P1-1 
occurs when there is a formal or de facto deprivation of the title in a property. 
 
Turning to the Cyprus property claims, the Strasbourg Court established a pattern in 
respect of analysing interference with property rights in the very first application brought 
against Turkey. As will be apparent, until very recently, the Court followed the same 
approach in almost all subsequent Cypriot property cases. The case of Loizidou47 was the 
first G/Cypriot application brought before the Court that concerned disputes over property 
ownership that had appeared following the division of the island. This case has set a 
precedent for similar applications to be brought against the Turkish government 
concerning the similar property claims of displaced Cypriots. The Loizidou is regarded as 
a landmark case, not only in the history of law relating to human rights and the 
development of international law, but also in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.48 
 
The Court, in the Loizidou judgment,49 held that there has been continuing violation of 
property rights and thus the displaced G/Cypriots did not lose their entitlement to their 
properties. This decision was made on the grounds that the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus is not recognised under international law. The Constitution of the TRNC, which 
recognised the taking of the property as expropriation according to the T/Cypriot 
authorities, could not be regarded as legally valid and thus those expropriations were not 
valid. The fact that the applicant had been forbidden access to her property and lost all 
46ibid, paras. 62–63. 
47Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
48The case of Loizidou is characterised as the first truly landmark case on the extraterritorial application of 
the ECtHR, See: Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, 
Principles, and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011) p.26; Council of Europe, ‘Parliamentary 
Assembly Official Report of Debats’ 2002 Ordinary Session Fourth Part, September 2002, vol. IV, p. 892; 
Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus characterised the Strasbourg Court’s decision in Loizidou as 
‘historic’ at the press conference<http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cypio/1996/96-12-19.cypio.html> 
accessed 26 July 2013.  
49Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para.47. 
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control over it since the division of the island was determined as interference with the 
substance of property,50 rather than de facto expropriation, without a clear explanation. 
 
As a result, since the TRNC legislation was not regarded as legally valid, expropriation 
made in accordance with the TRNC Constitution was also invalid. Therefore, the 
existence of a legitimate expectation was based on international law regardless of the 
established domestic laws. Put another way, since the laws of the RoC are formally valid, 
regulations established by the non-recognised TRNC are considered null and void and 
could not be deemed to have replaced the laws of the RoC. In a nutshell, the legitimate 
expectation was based on the valid legislation of the RoC, which regarded the applicant 
as owner of the properties in question.51 
 
In this regard, it can be argued that the decisive criterion for determining the continuing 
interference of property was the unrecognised status of the TRNC. Accordingly, it can be 
maintained that if the entity is not recognised under international law, its acts or 
legislation cannot be regarded as legally valid either. Although there is the existence of a 
domestic legal framework for displaced persons’ properties in the north, the Court did not 
consider those regulations and instead took into account the laws of the RoC as it is 
recognised internationally.  
 
2.1.2.1 A Legitimate Interference with Property Rights 
 
Although the right to property is a fundamental right and enshrined in P1-1, it is limited 
by restrictions set out in P1-1. The wording of this provision determines two types of 
interference which will be considered below. However, the Court has developed another 
type of interference through its case law that is not stated under the provision: interference 
with the substance of property. According to P1-1, persons may legitimately be deprived 
of their possessions ‘in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law’ which represented the first type, 
and ‘in the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties’,52 which is determined as the second type of interference, in the second and 
third rule respectively. Since the second type of interference will be examined in the 
50 ibid, para.47. 
51 Buyse (n 18) pp. 67–68. 
52 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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analysis of the third rule of P1-1 and the interference with the substance of property will 
be considered under the first rule of the same provision in the following subsections of 
this chapter, the first type will be considered in this part.  
 
For a legitimate interference with the right to property to comply with P1-1, interference 
must have a legitimate aim. The requirement of a legitimate aim is set out in the second 
sentence of P1-1 by stating ‘in the public interest’ which serves as a safeguard against 
arbitrary measures of states.53 Since there is no standard means of determining the public 
interest, a wide margin of appreciation is granted to states in identifying the public 
interest.54 
 
In James v. UK,55 the Court assessed the public interest and the general interest without 
making any fundamental distinction between them. The Court maintained that the 
purpose and object of P1-1 was to guard against the arbitrary confiscation of property and 
maintained that ‘the taking of property in pursuance of a policy calculated to enhance 
social justice within the community can properly be described as being “in the public 
interest”’.56 It further held that a compulsory transfer of property from one individual to 
another may also be considered in the public interest if the taking is in pursuance of 
legitimate social policies.57 
 
In James, the Court explained its approach on the issue of margin of appreciation. It has 
recognised that since the national authorities have direct knowledge of their society and 
its needs, it is for those authorities to make the initial assessment of the existence of a 
problem of public concern warranting interference with property rights and remedial 
action to be taken.58 The Court clarified its stance on the grounds that the decision to 
enact laws concerning interference with property will commonly involve the 
consideration of political, economic and social issues on which opinions within a 
democratic society may reasonably differ widely.59 In this regard, definitions of public 
53 Sermet (n 40) p.32. 
54 Yves Winisdoerffer, ‘Margin of Appreciation and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’, Human Rights Law 
Journal, (1998), vol.19, no.1, p. 18. 
55 James v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para. 43. 
56 ibid, paras. 41–42.  
57 ibid, para. 39. 
58 ibid, p. 46. 
59 ibid.  
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and general interest vary from country to country and over time60 this leaves the 
contracting parties a margin of appreciation. As a result, the Court has determined its 
limited supervision in the concept of public and general interest.61 
 
2.1.2.2 The Requirement of Lawfulness 
 
Interference with the right to property must first satisfy the requirement of lawfulness. 
This requirement has been expressly stated as ‘subject to the conditions provided by law’ 
in the second rule of P1-1. The legality requirement stems from the ‘rule of law, one of 
the fundamental principles of a democratic society, inherent in all the Articles of the 
Convention’.62 The requirement of lawfulness is a general condition within the context 
of the Convention for all measures limiting human rights in order to protect individuals 
against the arbitrary actions of public authorities.63 
 
The legality requirement is regarded as the first and most important requirement of P1-1, 
and accordingly, any interference with property by a public authority should be lawful.64 
In the context of the legality requirement, the state must have a basis in domestic law65 
for interference and its law must be accessible, precise, and foreseeable.66 The term ‘law’ 
within the scope of P1-1 ‘does not merely refer back to domestic law but also relates to 
the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly 
mentioned in the preamble to the Convention.’67 
 
As indicated above, the lawfulness of interference is the most important requirement of 
P1-1. In some cases, when the Court finds that interference with property falls within the 
ambit of the first rule, it directly examines the proportionality of the interference without 
examining the lawfulness. In contrast, the Court in the Beyeler v. Italy68 case held that an 
essential condition for an interference to be deemed compatible with P1-1 is that it should 
60 Winisdoerffer (n 54) pp.18–20. 
61 Jochen Frowein, ‘The Protection of Property’ in Macdonald, Matscher and Petzold (eds.), The Protection 
System for The Protection of Human Rights, London: Kluwer AP, (1993); Sermet (n 40) p.31; Harris and 
others (n 6).  
62 Harris and others (n6) p. 669; Iatridis v. Greece (1999) 30 EHRR 97, para.58; Grgic and others (n 30) 
p.12.  
63 Coban (n 19), p195. 
64 Iatridis v. Greece (1999) 30 EHRR 97, para. 58. 
65 ibid, para. 62; Spacek, sro v. Czech Republic (1999) 30 EHRR 1010; Harris and others (n 6) p. 669. 
66 Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 52, para.88.  
67Malone v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14, para.67; Lithgow v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 329, para.110. 
68 Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 52, para.108.  
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be lawful. Additionally, with respect to the examination of domestic laws, the Court has 
asserted that it does not interpret and examine whether national law has been applied 
correctly since it does not function as a ‘fourth instance’.69 However, the Court followed 
a different approach in the case of Beyeler and decided that it was required to verify the 
manner in which domestic law was interpreted and applied. Therefore, the Court 
examined the lawfulness of the interference.70 
 
At this juncture, it is worth referring to the Court’s approach concerning the legality 
requirement in the case of Loizidou.71 Although the Court clarifies the concept of the 
lawfulness requirement, its approach concerning the application of this issue is not 
consistent within its case law. In Loizidou,72 the Court did not consider it desirable to 
examine the requirement of the lawfulness of the legislative and administrative acts of 
the TRNC on the grounds that its Constitution was a product of an illegal entity. Here, it 
is of great importance to note that the Loizidou case is considered such a significant one 
that it may affect the way in which the Court deals with future cases, since its decision 
might invite another one hundred thousand or so similar cases.73 Taking this into account, 
it is questionable why the Court did not follow such an approach, neither examining the 
requirement of lawfulness, as it did in the case of Beyeler, nor determining the rule under 
which the interference falls within the ambit of P1-1 in this significant and precedent 
case. 
 
In light of all the above considerations regarding the case of Loizidou, it should be 
highlighted that the Court faced a case which was burdened with highly complex 
political, legal and historical issues. Here, the absence of an examination of the 
lawfulness of the legislative and administrative acts of the TRNC, the Court’s departure 
from its traditional method in determining which of the three rules under P1-1 were 
applicable to the interference, and the lack of a definition in relation to the taking of the 
property in question by the T/Cypriot authorities may be a result of the Court’s intention 
to refrain from creating controversial debates, mainly political, concerning the status of 
69 Van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, Kluwer 
Law Int: London, (1998), p.635.  
70 Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 52, para.110.  
71 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
72 ibid, paras. 44–47.  
73 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, dissenting opinion of Judge Jambrek. 
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the TRNC and the lawfulness of its legislative as well as administrative acts at the 
international level.  
 
Among the possible consequences of adopting a different approach from the one that the 
Court adopted in Loizidou, would have been tremendous conflicts between the 
contracting states. For instance, bearing in mind the fact that the TRNC is a non-
recognised entity in the international arena, if the Court regarded the taking of the 
applicant’s property by the T/Cypriot authorities as unlawful, this would mean the 
removal of the reinstatement of G/Cypriot properties in the north to their original owners. 
Therefore, the underlying reason for the Court’s stance in the Cyprus ruling may be the 
intention to prevent possible complexities that might have stemmed from such scenarios, 
which would have been chaotic for some states. That is to say, the nature of the Cypriot 
property issues, as a ‘hot political potato’, may have prevented the ECtHR from following 
its traditional approach in applying P1-1 to the Convention in the case of Loizidou. 
 
The position in the Loizidou judgment has been adopted and became the Court’s 
established formulation in all subsequent cases concerning the property disputes in 
Cyprus. In almost all of these cases, the Court failed to name the action of interference 
with property rights, such as deprivation, expropriation or de facto expropriation. 
Additionally, without examining and clarifying the nature of those interferences in 
question, it held that there have been continuing violations of P1-1 in all similar Cypriot 
property cases following the Loizidou judgment. In respect of the Court’s Cyprus ruling 
concerning the aforementioned considerations, it would have been beneficial if the Court 
had decided to examine and explain the context of interference in the Cyprus property 
claims in detail within the component parts of P1-1 in order to remove any concerns in 
respect to the Court’s consistency as well as credibility in the examination of cases 
burdened with highly political debates. This would have enlightened and guided the local 
authorities in Cyprus to provide considerable attempts to achieve a settlement regarding 
property disputes over property ownership on the island. 
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2.1.2.3 The Principle of Proportionality 
 
As was established in the Court’s case law, the national authorities are better placed than 
the international judges to assess the policy aims and the factual circumstances of a case 
on the grounds that those authorities have direct knowledge of their society and its 
needs.74 One of the rationales for the formation of the principle of proportionality is to 
provide protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the right to 
property. This principle has been developed as a form of supervision by the Court and it 
is inherent in the whole of the Convention.75 
 
The principle of proportionality was explicitly expressed in the case of Sporrong and 
Lönnroth.76 In this judgment, the Court held that this principle was reached through 
examination by determining ‘whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of 
the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights’.77 Therefore, the term ‘fair balance’ is used for the 
consideration of this requirement. It was also recognised that if the person in question had 
had to bear an excessive and individual burden then the fair balance was not satisfied.78 
Since the search for this balance is inherent on the whole of the ECHR, all types of 
interference with property must respect proportionality. As regards to the proportionality 
of an interference, the Strasbourg Court considered whether ‘a measure must be both 
appropriate for achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto’.79 The test varies and 
has been developed gradually in the Court’s case law. In order to determine whether a 
state interference with a right is proportionate, the ECtHR set out an approach in the case 
of Handyside v. UK.80 
 
According to the classical formulation of the Court’s judgments, interference with the 
right of property can be justified if particular conditions are satisfied: the interference 
must be subject to the conditions provided by law; the interference must pursue a 
74 James v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para. 46. 
75 Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe Publishing, Human Rights Files No. 17, 
Strasbourg,(2000) pp.12–13; Sermet (n 40) pp.24–25. 
76 Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63. 
77 ibid, para. 69. 
78 ibid, para. 73. 
79 James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para.50. 
80 Handyside v. UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 
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legitimate aim in the public interest; it must be appropriate for achieving its aim and there 
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realised.81 In the case of Gillow v. UK,82 the Commission recognised 
that in exercising its supervisory role, two questions needed to be considered: first, 
‘whether the control legislation pursues a legitimate aim in the general interest’ and 
second, whether the operation of the legislation and the control thereby exercised on the 
applicants’ use of the property is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued The 
Commission further added that that measure of proportionality varies in determining 
whether the interference in question constituted control or deprivation on the basis that a 
deprivation of property is inherently more serious than the control of its use, since in the 
former, full ownership is retained. It also pointed out that in the proportionality test, ‘the 
severity of the restrictions imposed’ must be assessed.83 In essence, since the level of 
interference with property determines the level of concern for private interest, the 
supervision of proportionality may vary from case to case.84 
 
According to Sermet,85 it seems reasonable to identify two ways of supervising 
proportionality: one, applying it to deprivation and second, applying it to the three other 
types of interference with property (control of the use of property, deprivation of property 
constituting the control of the use of property, and interference with the substance of 
property). The rationale behind this finding is that in cases where deprivation of property 
is found, proportionality is respected if the dispossessed owner is awarded compensation. 
In the matter of the other three types of interference, supervision of proportionality is 
always defined in the same way even though this supervision varies in content.86 
 
In the case of Gillow, in order to comply with the proportionality or balancing test, the 
Court considered whether interference by public authorities was arbitrary, whether 
interference was in accordance with law, whether compensation has been provided and 
whether legitimate expectations have been respected.87 As a result, in order to determine 
81 ibid; Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 69; James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para.50; 
Lithgow v.UK (1986) 8 EHRR 329, para.120.  
82 Gillow v. UK (1982) 11 EHRR 335, para. 146. 
83 Ibid, para. 148–157. 
84 Sermet (n 40), p.35. 
85 ibid, p.36. 
86 ibid. 
87 Coban (n 19) p.206; Grgic and others (n 30) p. 5. 
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whether interference with property rights was justified, the Court, in principle, considers 
three questions: was the interference lawful? Was it in the public interest? Have the public 
authorities acted lawfully and provided the right balance between the interests of the 
affected individuals and the interests of the state?88 In this regard, a balance needs to be 
struck between the interests of the community and the fundamental rights of an applicant. 
In a contrary situation, the right to the property of an applicant is regarded as being 
violated. 
 
In the examination of interference with property rights, the Court made clear its position 
that if the interference concerned is not in accordance with the law, then it does not need 
to determine the legitimacy of the state’s objective or the proportionality of that 
interference. In such cases, interference will be automatically regarded as a violation of 
P1-1 and thus the Court will not consider whether such unlawful interference was 
conducted as a legitimate aim or whether it had been proportionate.89 
 
2.1.2.4 Compensation 
 
It is established under the Convention that compensation is a requirement of P1-1 in cases 
of interference with property rights as a necessity of legitimate interference. If an 
interference with the right to property is legitimate, there will not be violation of property. 
Since the right to property concerns the ‘thing itself’ and not a right to the ‘value of it’, 
compensation is not a replacement of property.90 Therefore, paying compensation does 
not provide a power to a state to interfere with property rights of the owners. A legitimate 
interference with property by paying compensation requires strong public necessity in 
this regard.91 Although compensation is a requirement of interference in accordance with 
the Court’s case law,92 the Court has also recognised that in some exceptional situations 
interference can also be justified without compensation.93 
 
88Gillow v. UK (1982) 11 EHRR 335, para. 147; See: Icelandic Human Rights Centre, ‘Major 
Requirements: Lawfulness and Proportionality’, <http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights 
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/comparativeanalysis/therighttoproperty/lawfulness/> accessed: 28 
July 2013.  
89 Grgic and others (n 30) p.13. 
90 Coban (n 19) p.210.  
91 ibid, pp.210–211. 
92 Holly Monasteries v. Greece (1994) 20 EHRR 1. 
93 Sermet (n 40); Jahn and Others v. Germany (2004) 42 EHRR 49. 
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In this context, the Court, in the case of James v. UK,94 observed that under the legal 
systems of the contracting states, the taking of property in the public interest without 
paying compensation was treated as justifiable only in exceptional circumstances. As to 
the standard of compensation the Court in the same judgment went on to state that the 
taking of property without payment of a reasonable compensation – an amount reasonably 
related to the value of the property –would normally constitute a disproportionate 
interference which could not be considered justifiable under P1-1. The Court pointed out 
that P1-1 does not guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances. In cases 
which the legitimate objective concerns public interest, the amount of compensation may 
be less than the full market value of the property in question.95 
 
In this regard, it seems that this approach of the Strasbourg Court was not in line with the 
Commission’s assessment in some judgments such as the case of Holy Monasteries v. 
Greece.96 Here, the Commission, on the one hand, held that taking of property without 
compensation was justifiable. The Court, on the other hand, maintained that the 
legislature, which took measures to expropriate a large proportion of monastery 
agricultural property, could not be regarded as exceptional circumstances that justify the 
absence of compensation. Taking this as a ground, the Court found that there was a 
violation of P1-1 to the Convention.97 
 
As to the issue of compensation within the context of interference with G/Cypriot 
properties located in the northern part of the island, the Court, until very recently, 
followed one approach towards its Cyprus rulings. Accordingly, it has consistently 
ordered Turkey to pay compensation only for loss of use of property and not loss of an 
actual ownership of such a property. According to the G/Cypriot perspective on the issue 
of property, restitution should be automatic in the absence of material impossibility and 
thus monetary compensation can only be regarded as a remedy in situations whereby the 
physical restitution of property was materially impossible.98 As will be examined in the 
next chapter, the position of the Strasbourg Court in this context has gradually developed 
following the rejection of the comprehensive settlement plan for the resolution of the 
94 James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para. 54. 
95 ibid; Lithgow v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 329. 
96 Holly Monasteries v. Greece (1994) 20 EHRR 1, paras.74–75. 
97 ibid. 
98 Loizidou v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
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Cyprus problem. Therefore the Court adopted a new stance and new rules in the cases of 
Xenides-Arestis99 and Demopoulos v. Turkey100 in this area.  
 
In the case of Demopoulos,101 the Court maintained that although restitution was an 
indispensable component of remedies for the interference with property rights, it had 
imposed the alternative requirement on the contracting state to pay compensation to the 
value of the property in accordance with the Court’s case law. Differing from its previous 
Cyprus judgments, here, the Court further emphasised that property is a material 
commodity that can be valued and compensated for in monetary terms. In fact, by 
following this approach, the Court explicitly rejected the G/Cypriot view concerning 
automatic restitution of their properties.102 
 
2.1.3 The Third Rule of P1-1: Control of Use  
 
The third rule of P1-1 to the ECHR allows the contracting states a power to impose 
restrictions on the use of property that falls within the ambit of the second paragraph 
of P1-1. The notion of ‘control’ of property is correspondingly wider than 
‘deprivation’ in the second rule.103 The second paragraph of P1-1 is worded as 
follows: 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary, to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
 
The power of a state to intervene with a person’s right to property by controlling the use 
of property which falls within the third rule is a wide one. Control of the use of property 
has two functions, which serve as the basis of two different objectives: to serve the public 
interest and to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.104 
 
 
99 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
100 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306. The cases concerning G/Cypriot property claims 
will be examined in Chapter 3.  
101Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, paras.114–118. 
102 Rhodri C. Williams and Ayla Gürel, The European Court Of Human Rights and the Cyprus Property 
Issue: Charting a Way Forward, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2011) pp. 4–6. 
103 Harris and others (n6) p.686.  
104 Sermet (n 40) p.25; Harris and others (n6) pp. 686–694. 
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2.1.3.1 Control of the Use of Property in the General Interest 
 
The power of control of the state under the third rule is wide and not restricted. Public 
authorities may control the use of property by requiring positive action by individuals and 
legal persons. A state may also control it by imposing restrictions on the activities of the 
owner. The situations for imposing restrictions may arise from town planning, 
environmental orders, economic regulation of professionals, sanctioned regimes, and the 
regulation of the sale of alcohol and crime control.105 
In 1982, a new type of interference ‘with the substance of ownership’ was introduced by 
the Court in the case of Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden106 based on the first rule of P1-1 to 
the ECHR. Under the Convention, there is no any definition or criteria provided in order 
to differentiate between interference that amounts to control of the use of property and 
interference with the substance of property.107 As a result of this absence, numerous 
disputes have been raised in this context. For instance, in the case of Sporrong 
Lönnroth,108 the Court recognised that the prohibitions on the construction in question 
clearly amounted to a control of the use of property, which falls within the ambit of the 
second rule of the ECHR. It further held that the ‘expropriation permits’ must be 
examined under the first rule. This is because those permits were an initial step in a 
procedure leading to deprivation. Taking this as a ground it decided that expropriation 
permits constituted interference with property and thus did not fall within the meaning of 
the second rule of P1-1.109 
Under P1-1 to the Convention, it is explicitly indicated that the notion of ‘control’ 
concerns the use of property. Taking into account the Court’s case law, it seems that this 
term, in practice, also concerns the right to dispose of property. For instance, in the case 
of X v. Austria,110 the Commission stated that restrictions on the amount of rent for certain 
leases, as well as the right of the owner to terminate the lease, did not constitute a 
deprivation of property but could constitute control of the use of property. On the grounds 
of its reasoning, it further maintained that interference with an exclusive right of the 
105 ibid. 
106 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35; Sermet (n 40), p.182. 
107 Sermet (n 40), p. 25; Coban (n 19) p.182.  
108Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, paras. 64–65. 
109 Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, paras. 64–65; Sermet (n 40) pp.24–25. 
110X v. Austria, (1979) 3 EHRR 285 72 DR 17, para. 80; Sermet (n 40) pp.24–28.  
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owner failed to equate to interference with the enjoyment of a possession. Another 
example could be the case of Banèr v. Sweden,111 in which the Court stated that exclusive 
fishing rights that came together with ownership of a lakeside property and that were 
abolished later by law could be considered as a possession. Additionally, it has been held 
that abolishing those rights could be determined as interference with property. On this 
ground, the Court stated that the restrictions of the applicant’s property constituted control 
of use. 
In the case of Pine Valley Developments112 the Court recognised that the planning 
measures, which did not deprive the owner of his legal title to the property, fell within the 
meaning of the control of use of property. Here, the applicants in this judgment alleged 
that there had been a deprivation of their possession on the basis of the Irish Supreme 
Court’s decision, which ruled that the outline planning permission for the applicant’s land 
was null and void. According to the applicants, this decision prevented them from using 
their land for industrial purposes and also reduced its value. In this regard, the Court 
declared that the interference fell under the third rule and constituted a control of the use 
of the property rather than deprivation under the second rule. In reaching this decision, 
the Court explained its rationale on three grounds: first, the applicants retained ownership 
of the land; second, the land could be used for alternative means such as agricultural 
purposes even though it could not be used for industrial purposes as they had intended, 
and finally, it added that although the value of the land in question was substantially 
reduced as claimed by the applicants, this land was not rendered worthless.113 
In light of these considerations, the absence of a distinction as to when an act constitutes 
deprivation or control of use regarding the duty to compensate has been defined as ‘an 
untidy and unsatisfactory’ one.114 The Court’s disinclination in numerous cases to classify 
interference as a control rather than as a deprivation was determined by taking into 
account the fact that compensation must be paid when a person is deprived of property. 
111Banèr v. Sweden (1989) 60 DR 125, paras. 5-6; Mellacher v. Austria (1989) 12 EHRR 391.  
112Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland (1991) 14 EHRR 319, para.55. 
113 Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland (1991) 14 EHRR 319, paras. 55–56; Denev v. Sweden (1989) 59 
DR 127, paras.55–56. 
114 David Anderson, ‘Compensation for Interference with Property’, European Human Rights Review, 
(1999), vol. 6, p.553; Rook (n 15) p. 75. 
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In this regard, a judge of the Court has the discretion to decide whether an absence of 
compensation is acceptable or not.115 
 
2.1.3.2 Control of the Use of Property to Secure Payment of Taxes and Other 
Contributions or Penalties 
 
The third rule of P1-1 explicitly grants power to a state ‘to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties’. The powers 
of the contracting states under this rule are very wide as the power to levy taxes is one of 
the fundamental attributes of national sovereignty.116 The power to secure the payment 
of taxes is a specific aspect of the state’s right to control the use of property 117 and thus 
this power is not restricted by the Convention, apart from the non-discrimination rule in 
Article 14.118 Accordingly, it has been suggested that the decision of a state to raise taxes 
is not examined by the Convention organs.119 However, the protection of property rights 
is not entirely excluded from the concept of taxation. 
 
In the case of Svenska Mangementgruppen AB v. Sweden,120 the European Commission 
determined that ‘a financial liability arising out of the raising of taxes or contributions 
may adversely affect the guarantee of ownership if it places an excessive burden on the 
person concerned or fundamentally interferes with his financial position’. Therefore the 
Court retains the power to review whether the imposition of taxes is disproportionate and 
unjustifiably interferes with property rights.121 Accordingly, the Convention bodies 
review the proportionality between the level of taxes and the means of those who are 
required to pay them.122 The proportionality test has developed within this area. As a 
result, due to the state’s right to control the use of property, the power to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contribution or penalties falls within the ambit of the third rule. 
 
 
 
115 ibid., p. 7; Rook (n 15) pp. 74–75.  
116 Sermet (n 40) pp. 24–25. 
117 Harris and others (n6) pp.692–693.  
118 Sermet (n 40) p. 25; Coban (n 19) p.182. 
119 Sermet (n 40) pp 25–27. 
120 Svenska Managementgruppen AB v. Sweden (1985) 45 DR 211, para. 211. 
121 Rook (n 15) p.86. 
122 Sermet (n 40) p. 25. 
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2.1.4 The First Rule: The Peaceful Enjoyment of a Possession 
 
The concept of the peaceful enjoyment of a possession is set out under the first rule of 
P1-1 as a general rule. This principle involves all situations that interfere with the 
individual’s property rights. The first sentence of P1-1 is worded as follows: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
 
The first rule is often regarded as a general ‘catch-all’123 rule which regulates interference 
with a person’s peaceful enjoyment of his possession. This is the general nature of the 
first rule, which involves all situations that interfere with the individual’s property rights. 
The first rule is separate from and is additional to the second and third rules.124 As 
indicated above, according to the Court’s case law, in the analysis of the cases under P1-
1, the Court first determines whether either the second or third rule is applicable. If the 
interference with the right to property cannot be regarded as deprivation or a control of 
use, then it is examined under the first rule. Following this, the ECtHR examined whether 
an act constitutes interference with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in the case of Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden,125 the Court decided 
that the expropriation permits and the prohibitions on construction for the purpose of the 
redevelopment of the city (that remained in force for twenty-three and eight years for the 
permits; twenty-five and twelve years for the prohibitions) did not constitute deprivation 
of property. This is because although these permits remained in force for a long time, the 
applicants could continue to utilise their possessions. In addition to this, although it 
became very difficult to sell those properties in question, the possibility of selling 
subsisted. The Court held that neither the expropriation permits nor consequential 
prohibitions on construction amounted to a deprivation. Instead, they were determined as 
an initial step in a procedure leading to the deprivation of possession. As a result, they 
did not fall under the second or third rule but the Court decided that there had been 
123 ibid, pp. 28–29; Carss-Frisk, Monica, ‘The Right to Property – A Guide to the Implementation of Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, Council of Europe, Human Rights 
Handbooks, No. 4, Strasbourg (2001) p.24. 
124 Harris and others (n6), p. 672. 
125 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
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interference with the enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of the first rule in P1-
1 to the Convention.126 
 
In respect of its ruling in Sporrong and Lönnroth,127 the Court has come to the approach 
that if an interference neither transfers nor intends to control the use of the property, then 
an interference falls within the scope of the first rule as a form of an interference with the 
substance of property. Within the context of the Court’s Cyprus ruling it adopted this 
approach in almost all of the cases concerning property claims. The Court, on the same 
basis as its reasons in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth, held that in cases where the 
state denies access to property, this will constitute an interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions.128 
 
As a result, the Court identified the concept of ‘interference with the substance of 
ownership’ in the Sporrong and Lönnroth case as falling within the scope of the first rule 
of P1-1 and followed the same stand in various subsequent cases. This ruling has created 
a precedent and thus it has been adopted that such interference does not deprive an owner 
of his property.129 Although this new type of interference with property has been found 
in various cases, its identification has met with severe criticism mainly on two grounds.130 
 
First, it has been argued that P1-1 set out only two types of interference with property: 
deprivation and control. The former irrevocably nullifies, whether or not the property is 
transferred, property rights of the owner whereas in the matter of the latter type, the owner 
can exercise, even to a limited extent, some of his property rights.131 Secondly, it has been 
said that although these types of interference have been developed by the Court’s case 
law, there is an absence of a principle to determine whether an interference falls within 
the ambit of control or interference with the substance of ownership in P1-1.132 The level 
of interference and its duration are the only criteria in determining whether interference 
126 ibid,paras. 63–65. 
127 ibid. 
128 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731; Xenides-Arestis v. 
Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306. 
129 Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para.63. 
130 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property: Recent Developments in International Law’ Recueil des 
cours de l’Académie de Droit international , vol. 176, The Hague (1983) pp.324–327; Sermet (n 40), p.29. 
131 Sermet (n 40) pp. 28–29. 
132 Harris and others (n6) p.672; Sermet (n 40) p.29. 
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falls within the context of control or substance of property.133 
 
In the case of Iatridis v. Greece134 the Court held that an interference with a leasehold 
interest by the state was in breach of national law and thus it fell within the first rule of 
P1-1. This interference was regarded as neither a deprivation, as the applicant held less 
than an ownership interest in the premises, nor as a control on use of the property. The 
Court considered that the interference in question was manifestly a violation of national 
law, which was incompatible with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions and thus it decided that there had been a violation of P1-1. On this basis, the 
Court found it unnecessary to ascertain whether a fair balance had been struck between 
the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.135 
 
With respect to the Court’s ruling in Iatridis v. Greece136 it has been determined that an 
interference with a leasehold interest constituted interference with the substance within 
the first rule of P1-1. In essence, however, the Court’s approach in reaching its decision 
without giving reasons, is questionable. It expressly stated that P1-1 requires that any 
interference by a public authority satisfies the requirement of lawfulness. Moreover, this 
was determined as the first and most important requirement of P1-1. The Court further 
added that these conditions stem from the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles 
of a democratic society.137 As indicated above, within the context of the lawfulness 
requirement, the state must have a basis in national law to justify its interference.138 The 
national law must be sufficiently accessible, precise, and foreseeable. Additionally, the 
law concerned has to be qualitatively sound and should not be arbitrary.139 Having said 
that, in its judgment in the Iatridis case, the Court, recognised that the refusal of national 
authorities to reinstate the applicant in the property in question was in breach of national 
law. According to the Court, the interference in question was manifestly in breach of 
133 Sermet (n 40) p. 29. 
134 Iatridis v. Greece (1999) 30 EHRR 97, para. 62-63. 
135 ibid, paras. 58–63.  
136 ibid, para. 68.  
137 ibid, para. 58. 
138 Iatridis v. Greece (1999) 30 EHRR 97, para. 62; Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland (2005) 42 EHRR 1. 
139James v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123; Spacek, sro v. Czech Republic (1999) 30 EHRR 1010; Beyeler v Italy 
(2000) 33 EHRR 52, para. 88.  
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Greek law and thus incompatible with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possession.  
 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that although the Court in the same ruling expressly 
stated that it must consider whether an interference complies with the principle of 
lawfulness in cases where an interference amounted to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possession within the meaning of the first rule of P1-1, without explaining its reasoning, 
it held that it was not necessary to determine whether a fair balance had been struck, since 
the interference was unlawful.140 In this case, the Court also departed from its classical 
approach141 and did not examine whether the interference in question constituted a de 
facto expropriation either. 
 
In the case of Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece,142 the applicants 
alleged that the national law had the effect of depriving them of their property rights in 
respect of the debt in their favour recognised by the arbitration award. They further 
claimed that as a result of the length and the dilatory nature of the proceedings, their right 
to property guaranteed under P1-1, had been infringed. The Court held that the Greek law 
that declared the award in question void and unenforceable, represented an interference 
with the applicant’s right to property, guaranteed by P1-1. It pointed out that this 
interference was neither was neither an expropriation nor a measure to control the use of 
property; it fell to be dealt with under the first sentence of P1-1.143 After the Court had 
concluded that there was an interference with the applicants’ property right, it analysed 
whether the interference was justifiable. Following this, the Court considered whether a 
fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. In its 
examination, however, it did not consider whether the interference constituted a de facto 
expropriation.144 
 
The Court interestingly followed another approach in Pressos Compania Naviera,145 
140 Iatridis v. Greece (1999) 30 EHRR 97, para. 58; Harris and others (n6) pp. 670–674. 
141 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, paras. 62–63; Harris and others (n6) p. 678. 
142 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece (1994) 19 EHRR 293, para.62-68.  
143 ibid, paras. 66–68.  
144 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63; Harris and others (n6) p. 678. 
145 Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium (1995) 21 EHRR 301. 
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although the facts of this case were same as those in the case of Stran Greek Refineries. 
In Pressos Compania Naviera, it was decided that the retrospective annulment of 
compensation claims stemming from the general law of tort amounted to a deprivation of 
property within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1.146 The 
Court, in its differentiated approach to these cases, between which there was no difference 
on their facts, could not escape criticism. It was argued that there was no reason not to 
find deprivation in the Stran Greek Refineries case.147 
 
In the case of Papamichalopoulos,148 the Court’s assessment was that, in accordance with 
the Convention’s intention to safeguard rights that are practical and effective, it has to be 
considered whether the interference concerned amounted nevertheless to a de facto 
expropriation.149 The Court considered that the occupation of land was so extensive, with 
serious consequences, and the attempts made to remedy the matter complained of were 
so remote that there was a de facto expropriation.150 The Court, without expressly stating 
that there was a deprivation, decided that interference was incompatible with the right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of the applicants’ possessions. 
 
Within the context of the Cyprus property cases,151 which are subject to the extensive 
occupation of lands, the Court departed from its ruling in Papamichalopoulosand did not 
examine whether there has been de facto expropriation. In the case of Loizidou and all 
subsequent cases concerning the property claims of the displaced persons, the Court 
maintained that displaced G/Cypriots were forbidden access to their properties in the 
north and lost all control over them as a result of the division of the island. This situation 
was considered a continuing interference with property rights within the meaning of the 
first rule of P1-1 but not a deprivation of property. According to the Loizidou judgment, 
if a state denies access to a property, then such a situation constitutes interference with 
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Hence, in line with the Court’s ruling, if 
interference with property is not provided by law then there will be violation of P1-1.152 
 
146 ibid, paras. 33–34. 
147 Coban (n 19) p. 188; Sermet (n 40) p. 29. 
148 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440. 
149 ibid, paras. 42–45. 
150 ibid, para.45. 
151 ibid. 
152 Harris and others (n 6) p. 678.  
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With regards to the Court’s ruling in the case of Loizidou, it has been argued that the 
Court should have applied the criteria established in the judgment of Papamichalopoulos 
without considering the argument about the illegality of the TRNC Constitution and thus 
should have found a de facto expropriation. The Court’s differentiated approach among 
these rulings was characterised as ‘playing devil’s advocate’ since its disinclination to 
find a de facto expropriation was because of the possibility that these cases might have 
been out of the jurisdiction of the Court ratione temporis had it decided otherwise.153 
 
Another judgment that needs to be considered is the case of Beyeler. 154 In the Beyeler 
case the applicant contended that the Italian authorities had expropriated a painting of 
which he claimed to be the legal owner and alleged a violation of P1-1. According to 
national law, a contract for the purchase of a painting was null and void. The Court 
determined that the applicant had been in possession of the painting for several years and 
moreover the authorities had considered the applicant as having a proprietary interest in 
the painting and even as its real owner. The Strasbourg Court decided on this basis that 
the applicant had a proprietary interest which constituted a possession for the purposes of 
P1-1.155 Taking these considerations into account, the Court did not find it necessary to 
rule on whether the second sentence of P1-1 was applicable to the case.  
 
The Court refrained from assessing the correctness of the Italian court’s decision which 
considered the sale as null and void. Nor did the Court determine whether the applicant 
should have been considered the real owner of the painting under national law. This 
decision has been made on the grounds of the Court’s assessment, which maintained that 
‘the complexity of the factual and legal position prevents its being classified in a precise 
category’.156 Since the determination of the correctness of the national court’s decision 
would have been required to determine the type of interference under the second and third 
rule,157the Court examined the situation and complained about it within the first rule of 
P1-1, although it could have considered that it constituted deprivation. Here, the Court’s 
approach to the issue of classification under the second and third rules seems very 
questionable. It can be argued that since the applicant was regarded as having a 
153 Coban (n 19) p. 188. 
154 Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 52, para. 78.  
155 ibid, paras. 104–105. 
156 ibid, para. 106. 
157 Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 52, paras.106–107; Harris and others (n 6), p.673.  
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proprietary interest in the painting, which constituted a possession by the Court, it could 
have been decided that there was a deprivation within the second rule of P1-1. There was 
no reason not to determine deprivation by the national authorities.158 
 
In light of the Court’s ruling in Beyeler,159 it could be suggested that in cases in which 
property is held in possession contrary to national law or under a contract which is null 
and void, the Court examines the circumstances of a case in detail.160 As for the 
compliance with the principle of lawfulness, the Court held that it has limited power to 
review compliance with domestic law.161 Nevertheless, if the national legal provisions in 
question have been applied manifestly erroneously or so as to reach arbitrary 
conclusions162 then the Court may also undertake the interpretation or the application of 
national law.163 
 
To conclude, although P1-1 expressly sets out two types of interference, the Court has 
developed another type of interference with property through its case law. This new type 
of interference with the substance of property has been approved in a number of cases. It 
can be argued that the Court’s approach to the application and interpretation of 
interference with the substance of property in its case law seems inconsistent. This 
situation may derive from the absence of the Court’s criteria in respect of the interference 
with the substance of property.  
 
It has been argued that the only substantive criterion concerning the consideration of this 
type of interference is the ‘level of interference... its duration and more or less definitive 
character’.164 There is no difference between examining a case under the first rule and the 
second rule or the third rule of P1-1 since interference with substance does not necessarily 
mean violation of the right to property.165 In cases concerning interference with property 
rights, the Court should examine lawfulness and legitimacy of interference and apply a 
fair balance test. These requirements in the analysis of interference render the type of 
158 Coban (n 19) p.189. 
159 Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 52. 
160 ibid, para.106; Harris and others (n 6) p. 659. 
161 Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 297, para. 47.  
162 Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 52, para.108; Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden (1989) 13 EHRR 
309, para.58. 
163 Harris and others (n 6) p. 670. 
164 Sermet (n 40) p. 29.  
165 Coban (n 19) p. 189. 
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interference with substance of property unnecessary in determining whether an act of state 
constitutes a violation of P1-1.166 
 
Taking the Court’s inconsistent approach in classifying interferences into account, it can 
be emphasised that the concept of interference with the substance of property is used by 
the Court mainly in cases in which it is difficult to determine within which rule of P1-1 a 
particular case falls. In essence, by its very concept as a general rule, a potential legal 
escape route from classifying interferences has been established for the Court when it is 
faced with cases in which it is difficult to determine whether an act has violated P1-1 to 
the Convention. This may explain the determination of interference with substance of 
property as a ‘kind of catch-all category for any kind of interference which is hard to pin 
down’.167 
 
Conclusion 
 
The thrust of this chapter was to explore the structure, meaning and scope of Article 1 of 
the First Protocol. This approach will shed light on the application of P1-1 to the cases 
concerning disputes over property ownership in Cyprus following the division of the 
island due to inter-communal violence, which will be examined in detail in the following 
chapter. In this chapter, it has been shown that the right to property is a fundamental right 
and enshrined in P1-1. Although this provision protects peaceful enjoyment of an existing 
possession, it does not prevent the contracting states from interfering with this right by 
satisfying certain conditions set out under the same provision. According to P1-1, the 
public authorities may interfere with property rights for legitimate purposes on the bases 
of a balancing test between the interest of the individual and that of society. The 
Convention organs developed measures in order to identify the limits and conditions for 
a legitimate interference.  
 
As considered above, P1-1 comprises three distinct rules that provide separate grounds 
for three kinds of interference, which are based on the effect of interference on property 
rights. Although the Court has developed the relationship between these rules, it has not 
produced clear criteria to determine within which rule a particular case falls. As a result, 
166 Sermet (n 40) p. 29. 
167 ibid. 
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the identification of the type of interference with property in some cases has become very 
difficult due to the absence of such criteria. In this regard, it may be said with some 
conviction that the rationale behind the Court’s recent approach, in refraining from 
determining the type of interference and thus within which sentence a case falls, derives 
from this vagueness. What is remarkable here, however, is that the Court’s stance in 
applying directly a balancing test, regardless of the applicable rule under which a case is 
being decided, turns the fair balance test into a legal gap-filler mechanism. To some 
extent, the uncertainty and inconsistency in the application of P1-1 to the ECHR tends to 
provoke confusion within the concept of this provision, which may undermine not only 
the credibility but also the effectiveness of the protection mechanism of the Convention 
concerning property rights. 
 
As was indicated in the beginning of this chapter, there has been an examination of the 
protection of property rights provided by P1-1in order to understand the Court’s approach 
in its Cyprus rulings as will be examined in the next chapter. As to the application of P1-
1 to the Cyprus property cases, the Court found a state interference with property rights 
in almost all property claims of the G/Cypriots.  
 
Loizidou is the first case that was brought before the ECtHR to deal with property claims 
on the island. The Court held that there has been a continuous denial of access to the 
applicant’s right by Turkish military forces which amounted to an interference with the 
applicant’s rights under P1-1. This interference was not regarded as being either a 
deprivation or a control of use but determined that it fell within the meaning of the first 
rule of P1-1 as an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.168 Finding a 
violation on this ground has considerable consequences for the right of return for 
internally displaced persons.169 This is because such a decision may affect the way in 
which the Court might handle future cases involving other contracting states where 
significant numbers of people were displaced and the alleged violation of property rights 
would be counted in millions, not ‘only’ in hundreds and thousands of possible cases.170 
 
168 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para.63. 
169 Harris and others (n 6) p. 663. 
170 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, dissenting opinion of Judge Jambrek. 
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In light of the above considerations, it can be stated that the concept of the right to 
property has been developing in accordance with the Court’s judgments. However, the 
absence of a clear definition concerning the types of interference and a lack of any criteria 
to distinguish when an act constitutes interference with substance or control of use has 
led to an inconsistency across the Court’s judgments. In order to avoid the creation of 
such an inconsistency, which may give rise to considerable confusions among the 
contracting states, one can suggest that the components of P1-1 should be interpreted 
clearly by providing some distinct features within their context. Following the same 
approach in similar cases may likely provide consistent, predictable and credible 
outcomes.  
 
As a result, the Court should determine the requirements for legitimate interference within 
the ambit of each category under P1-1 and explain the reasons for its decisions in each 
judgment. Although the components of the context of right to property cannot be 
restricted due to its wide scope, absence of definite measures in determining the notions 
under P1-1 may be satisfied –at least to some extent– by following the same line of 
attitude in cases which have similar facts. Taking the various numbers of cases before the 
Court into account, the Court should provide clear guidance in order to prevent any 
contradictions within its protection mechanism concerning the right to property under the 
Convention mechanism. Adopting an approach in line with previous judgments may, 
perhaps, encourage the contracting states to reinforce their national laws in accordance 
with the Court’s judgments and also increase the credibility of the Court’s case-law. 
 
To sum up, the gradual development in the assessment of interference with property rights 
through the Court’s case law mainly stems from a lack of definitive criteria concerning 
P1-1. In respect of the Court’s Cyprus rulings, what is remarkable is the interaction 
between the Court’s case law and the property dispute on the island. The next chapter will 
examine significant property complaints of G/Cypriots which were brought before the 
Court. As will become apparent, the development of local regulations, as well as politics 
regarding the Cypriot property conflict, have occurred in accordance with the 
developments within the case law of the Strasbourg Court itself. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Cypriot Property Claims Before the European Court of Human Rights 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
In this chapter, a detailed analysis will take place on the application of P1-1 to the ECHR 
(‘the Convention’ hereafter) to the cases from Cyprus and other Contracting States in the 
field of right to property under the Convention. By using this approach in analysing and 
comparing the application of P1-1 in similar cases, attention will be drawn to the 
determination of the extent to which P1-1 has been differently applied to the Court’s 
Cypriot case law in comparison with other judgments concerning other Contracting 
States.  
 
The case analysis and the focus on the application of P1-1 to various cases will reflect the 
importance of the Cyprus case law in relation to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (the 
Court hereafter). In light of the determinations that will be provided, it will be suggested 
that special attention should be paid to the Court’s approach in its rulings on Cyprus in 
order to facilitate understanding of the issue of right to property under the Convention 
mechanism. This chapter will further examine, local developments, particularly those 
undertaken by the TRNC authorities concerning the regulations that deal with the 
ownership claims of G/Cypriots which have been developed by taking into account the 
Court’s decisions. The examination will concentrate on the overall case law of the Court 
that has had considerable impact on the process of producing effective domestic remedies 
for the property claims of Cypriots. 
 
As will become apparent, the attitude of the Court towards the cases on Cyprus, spread 
over a decade, has gradually changed. The reason for the change in the Court’s position 
will be analysed in order to indicate and understand the interaction between the protection 
mechanism of property rights under the Convention system and the unresolved property 
conflict on the island. It will be questioned as to whether the Court’s departure from its 
traditional rulings in Cypriot case law, following the failure of the comprehensive 
settlement plan for the Cyprus problem, was a consequence of the rejection of this plan.  
On the basis of the aforementioned findings, considerations will be given to whether the 
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political situation in Cyprus has influenced the approach of the Court towards its rulings 
on Cypriot cases and thus whether it has itself gradually turned into a political actor in 
the Cyprus conflict. It will be argued that a different application of P1-1 to the case law 
in Cyprus is understandable if one considers the sui generis nature of the property claims 
of Cypriots, which renders those cases relevant to being subject to examination in the 
context of the protection mechanism of property rights under the ECHR system. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter will examine four particular cases that were lodged before the 
Court mainly by G/Cypriots against Turkey. All these cases concern the alleged violation 
of property rights of displaced G/Cypriot owners of those properties located in the north 
of Cyprus. The applicants alleged that violation of property rights is a result of Turkey’s 
occupation over the northern part of the island as well as of the division of the island. The 
cases that will be focused on are: Loizidou v. Turkey; Cyprus v. Turkey (also known as 
the Fourth Interstate application of Cyprus against Turkey); Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey 
and Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey.1 
 
The reason for focusing particularly on these aforementioned judgments is that these are 
the cases that clearly trace the gradual change in the Court’s attitude towards its case law 
on Cyprus and the rationale behind this change in the course of fourteen years. The 
examination will therefore indicate how these cases have contributed to the ongoing 
progress of property-related issues within the ambit of the Cypriot property conflict and 
how the Court’s rulings in these four cases have gained a prominent place in the issue at 
hand. It also aims to show the effect of changes in factual circumstances over the Court’s 
position towards the Cyprus rulings. 
 
These four rulings of the Court have not only served as a major contribution to reforming 
the local framework concerning the issue of property, but were also used as precedents 
both by the Court itself and by other Contracting States’ parties in cases that are similar 
to those from Cyprus. This situation will be analysed in order to illustrate the considerable 
interaction between the property matters on the island and the case law of the Court in the 
field of property rights. Against this backdrop, it can be said with some conviction that 
1Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731; 
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, (2010) ECHR 306. 
 
                                                 
83 
 
the above-mentioned landmark cases deserve a detailed examination. 
 
3.1 The Landmark Case in the History of Human Rights Law and in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Loizidou v. Turkey 
 
On 15 July 1974, a coup d’état took place by Greek troops with the backing of Greek 
Cypriots against Makarios,2 the president of the Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter the 
RoC), with the aim of effecting enosis. In response to the coup, Turkish military forces 
landed in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, justifying this action by claiming compliance with the 
terms of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, in order to protect Turkish Cypriots against the 
violence in the island. These were the major events that led up to the war of 1974, the 
effects of which are still sorely felt.3 
 
The war of 1974 ended in the partition of the island along what is called the ‘Green Line’, 
which still divides Cyprus today. It is a ceasefire line which serves as a barrier running 
across the island and is supervised by the UN. In the aftermath of the war of 1974, the 
overwhelming majority of Cypriots were displaced and left their properties behind. The 
effect of this massive displacement on both T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots was traumatic. 
Approximately 40% of the entire T/Cypriot community and 30% of the entire G/Cypriot 
community at that time relocated from the south to the north and vice versa. The total 
population of Cyprus, including both T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots, was 636,000 in 1974.4 
As a result of the events that occurred in 1974, approximately 210,000 persons, which 
corresponded to 30% of the entire population of the island, including both communities, 
were displaced.5 In essence, even taking only these numbers into account is enough to 
illustrate the significance of the property conflict and its consequences that have arisen or 
may arise in Cyprus.6 
 
2 Makarios III was the first president of the Republic of Cyprus and also the archbishop of the Cypriot 
Orthodox Church.  
3 The rise of the inter-communal strife and the historical background of displacement in Cyprus is examined 
in Chapter 1.  
4 L. W. St John-Jones, The Population of Cyprus, London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies (1983) 
pp.34–62. 
5 Ayla Gürel & Kudret Ozersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ 
and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) 
Cyprus Centre Report (3/2006) pp.3–4. 
6 ibid, pp.3–5; L. W. St John-Jones (n 4) pp.34–62.  
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As a result of the continuing division of the island for more than three decades, the issue 
of ownership in respect of those properties located in the north and owned by displaced 
G/Cypriots has become one of the major complexities of the inter-communal negotiations 
on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Both communities have suffered great tragedy. 
As to the consequences within the legal sphere, repercussions of this massive 
displacement of Cypriots from their land and houses have been continuing both at the 
local and international level since the early 1990s.  
 
Two decades have now elapsed since the consequences of 1974 events have been brought 
before the Court by the victims, mainly G/Cypriots, of this massive displacement. The 
complaints of those displaced G/Cypriots concerned their property rights over the 
properties that they had to leave behind in the northern part of the Green Line due to the 
division of the island. Meanwhile, the repeated attempts of the authorities of both sides 
to resolve the Cyprus conflict have continuously failed. Therefore, no settlement of the 
Cyprus conflict has been achieved and thus neither has the issue of property been 
resolved. 
 
The continuing failure of authorities to resolve the property problems led Cypriots, 
exhausted by prolonged and vain negotiations, to seek remedies at the international level. 
It seems that Cypriots, unlike the negotiators to the dispute, were determined to remediate 
their losses that arose from the conflict. As a result, the property claims have reached 
fruition – at least to some extent–via the Strasbourg Court. As time went by, more claims 
concerning the property matters in Cyprus have been lodged before the Court and it 
started to play a decisive role within the process of seeking a resolution of the Cyprus 
question. As a result of increased involvement by the Court, and of its assessments and 
decisions on the Cypriot cases that came before it, in parallel with the increased number 
of G/Cypriot applications, the Court gained a more prominent place in the progress of 
reaching a resolution of the Cyprus problem than had the communities’ authorities. 
 
Over the course of fourteen years, the Court’s Cyprus rulings have gone far beyond the 
legal scope and it has lit the torch to show which approach the parties to the Cyprus 
conflict should follow in order to achieve a settlement of the property dispute. In this 
regard, it is even suggested that for a permanent and durable resolution, the Court’s 
decisions on Cypriot cases should be taken as grounds for any negotiated property 
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settlement by the parties of this conflict.7 
 
The case of Loizidou v. Turkey 8 is the first case that brought the key issues in respect of 
the Cyprus property conflict before the Court. The case provided the opportunity to 
examine the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of the TRNC at the global 
level. One of the major features of this case is that it is the first case before the Court that 
concerns the violations of G/Cypriot rights under P1-1 to the Convention. As will be 
shown below, the Court’s judgment in Loizidou can be regarded as a contribution to the 
ECtHR case law within the context of property rights in post-conflict situations. As will 
also be demonstrated below, it is the case that has launched the development process of 
the property conflict in Cyprus. Moreover, it opened the way for hundreds of other 
displaced G/Cypriots to bring their property claims before the Court. 
 
In its Loizidou judgment, the Court held that Turkey was responsible for all acts and 
omissions in the northern part of Cyprus by virtue of exercising effective overall control 
through its military forces in this part of the island.9 As regards the issue of Turkey’s 
responsibility for the matters complained of, the Court pointed out the unrecognised status 
of the TRNC in accordance with international practice and regarded the TRNC as a 
subordinate local administration of Turkey.10 By taking these considerations into account, 
the Court decided that Turkey was liable for the administrative acts and decisions of the 
TRNC due to the existence of the large number of troops that were engaged in active 
duties in the north.11 
 
What is remarkable here is that the Court reached this decision through factual 
circumstances of the case rather than substantive jurisdiction,12 which was considered 
sufficient to hold that the issues complained of were imputable to Turkey. As a result of 
7 Rhodri C. Williams and Ayla Gürel, The European Court Of Human Rights and the Cyprus Property 
Issue: Charting a Way Forward, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2011) p.1. 
8 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
9 Council of Europe, ‘Parliamentary Assembly Official Report of Debates’ 2002 Ordinary Session Fourth 
Part, September 2002, vol. IV, p. 892. 
10 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, paras.44–57. 
11 ibid, para.56. 
12 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, European Journal of International Law, vol. 14 
(2003) p.545. 
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this determination, the issue of the extraterritorial application of the ECHR was raised 
and the Court established that: 
 
… although Article 1 (art. 1) sets limits on the reach of the Convention, the concept of 
“jurisdiction” under this provision is not restricted to the national territory of the High 
Contracting Parties. According to its established case-law, for example, the Court has held 
that the extradition or expulsion of a person by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue 
under Article 3 (art. 3), and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the 
Convention … In addition, the responsibility of Contracting Parties can be involved because 
of acts of their authorities, whether performed within or outside national boundaries, which 
produce effects outside their own territory.13 
 
 
It can be argued that Loizidou is a case which contributes to the development of the notion 
of a continuing violation of P1-1 of the ECHR within the scope of the Court’s case law.14 
Moreover, by means of this finding, the Loizidou judgment was considered as one of the 
most authoritative cases on the extraterritorial application of the ECHR.15 After 
considering various issues burdened with highly political and legal matters the Court held 
that there has been a continuous breach of P1-1 due to the denial of access to the 
applicant’s property and consequent loss of all control over it, which was imputable to 
Turkey.16 
 
As a result of this decision, thousands of G/Cypriots and the RoC brought applications 
against Turkey concerning their property rights that have been affected by the political 
dispute in and since 1974. Since then, the Court has played a significant role in the Cyprus 
property conflict. As will become apparent, the reason behind this is that the Court’s 
decisions in this regard have had a considerable impact not only over the politics but also 
over the juridical issues concerning the Cyprus question, to which attention will now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 62. 
14 Antoine Christian Buyse, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The European Human Rights Perspective, 
With a Case Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, School of Human Rights Research, vol. 25, Intersentia 
Uitgevers N.V (2008) p.238. 
15 Dobroslawa C. Budzianowska, ‘Some Reflections on the Extraterritorial Application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics, vol.2, no.1 (2012) 
p. 54. 
16 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
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3.1.1 Significant Findings in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey 
 
In Loizidou,17 the Court was faced with complicated issues, since the facts of the case 
derive from a problem which was burdened with historical and political complexities. 
The G/Cypriot applicant, Ms Loizidou, fled her home located in the northern part of 
Cyprus following Turkey’s intervention in 1974 and settled in the south of the island. She 
complained that there had been continued denial of access to her property and thus she 
had effectively lost all control over it. On this ground, she alleged that Turkey was 
responsible for violation of her rights under P1-1 to the Convention.18 
 
On 8 July, 1993, in its Report, the Commission characterised the refusal of the applicant’s 
access to property in the north of Cyprus as an issue of freedom of movement and stated 
that ‘a distinction must be made between claims concerning the peaceful enjoyment of 
one’s possessions and claims of freedom of movement’.19 According to the Commission, 
the refusal of access to the property may be an indirect effect of the limitations of the 
freedom of movement. However, it could not be regarded that a deprivation of liberty, as 
a type of restriction of access to an area, interfered directly with the right to property 
under P1-1. On the grounds of this reasoning, the Commission found that the applicant’s 
claim of free access to the north of the island could not be based on her alleged ownership 
of property in that part of Cyprus and thus it concluded that there had been no violation 
of P1-1.20 
 
At the hearing on the merits, on 18 December, 1996, the Strasbourg Court rejected the 
Commission’s argument and stated that Ms Loizidou’s complaint not only concerned the 
issue of physical access but also the continuing violation of P1-1. The rationale behind 
this was that the refusal of her access during the passage of sixteen years has gradually 
affected her right to a peaceful enjoyment of possession, which constituted a continuing 
violation of P1-1.21 At this point, it can be argued that the Court’s approach in deciding 
that the denial of access to the applicant’s property and consequent loss of control was 
attributable to Turkey, by taking into account the presence of Turkish forces in that area, 
17 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513.  
18 ibid, para. 49. 
19 Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey, (1991) 68 DR, para.97. 
20 ibid, paras. 97–99 
21 Loizidou v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 60. 
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can be considered as a new test for the issue of jurisdiction.22 Moreover, besides taking 
the existence of Turkish troops as a ground, the Court also considered the denial of 
physical access to the property in its finding of a violation of P1-1. It has been argued that 
this approach may have significant implications in the context of right of return for 
internally displaced persons.23 
 
Loizidou,24 on the other hand, is the case in which the concept of ‘continuing violation’ 
as well as the ‘extraterritorial reach’ of the Convention has been developed and confirmed 
respectively. The compliance of states with their obligations under the Convention is 
considered within the notion of a continuing violation in ECtHR case law.25 As regards 
the case of Loizidou, the applicant argued that Turkey was responsible for a continuing 
violation of her rights on the grounds of the fact that she had been denied access to her 
property since 1974.26 As a response, Turkey contended that the taking of property started 
in 1974 and ‘ripened into an irreversible expropriation’27 in accordance with Article 
159(1)(b) of the 1985 TRNC Constitution which was prior to Turkey’s acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction, on 22 January 1990, under Article 46 of the Convention.28 The Court 
rejected this argument and concluded that the act of preventing the applicant from having 
access to her land constituted a continuing violation of peaceful enjoyment of her 
possessions under P1-1 due to the fact that the legal owner of the land in question was 
still Ms Loizidou.29 
 
In fact, a yardstick was adopted in the case of Loizidou. One of the most significant 
findings in this case was about the nature of alleged violations against Turkey. The Court 
held that alleged violations of human rights provided under the Convention were 
continuing in nature. This finding was attributed to the fact that the applicant was still the 
legal owner of the land and she had been continuously denied access to this property as 
22 Karen de Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2012) p. 108.  
23 David J. Harris, Michael O’Boyle and others, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009) p. 19 
24 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
25 Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, adopted by the International 
Law Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001, reproduced in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part II, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.04.V.17 (Part 2) p. 112. 
26 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para.36. 
27 ibid, para. 35 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid, paras. 39–47. 
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its legal owner. Due to the fact that Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution, purporting to 
expropriate the land, was not legally valid since the international community does not 
regard the TRNC as a state, the Court determined the applicant as the legal owner. In 
reaching the determination of the continuity nature of the violation, the Court did not take 
the closing of the border, which divides the island into two, into account. Although it is 
crystal clear that the roots of this situation lie in the unresolved and prolonged political 
dispute, the Court disregarded this fact and failed to clarify the reason for its ignoring it.  
 
What is remarkable, however, is that the aforementioned decision was attributed to the 
illegality of the TRNC Constitution, which had originated from the same political conflict 
that gave rise to the establishment of the border-line. Furthermore, and rather obscurely, 
although the mainstay of the finding that the continuing violation was the legally invalid 
character of the TRNC Constitution,30 the Court was disinclined to elaborate on the 
lawfulness of the legislative and administrative acts of the TRNC. Against this 
background, it can be argued that the Strasbourg Court, by failing to clarify its reasoning 
in concentrating on the invalid nature of the TRNC, rather than on the closing of the 
border-line in reaching its decision, had not refrained from becoming a political actor and 
therefore adding a political element to this ruling. As a result, in light of the above 
considerations, the political conflict in Cyprus began to overshadow the ECtHR’s stand 
in its Cyprus ruling with the case of Loizidou. 
 
Another interesting finding of the Court in Loizidou is related to the issue of the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR, which contributes to this judgment being 
considered as one of the most authoritative cases in this field.31 In Loizidou, the Court 
held that ‘the concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention is not restricted to 
the national territory of the Contracting States.’32 Therefore, Contracting States can be 
held responsible for acts and omissions of their authorities that produce effects outside 
their territory. The Court further pointed out the relevant principles of international law 
concerning this issue and added that the responsibility of a Contracting State could also 
arise when ‘as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises 
30 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, paras. 41–47. 
31 Budzianowska (n 15), p. 54. 
32 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para. 62 referred in Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, 
para. 52. 
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effective control of an area outside its national territory’.33 
 
In Loizidou,34 the Court found that the matter of continuous denial of the applicant’s 
access to her property located in north of Cyprus and ensuing loss of all control over it 
fell within the jurisdiction of Turkey for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention. The 
decision was attributed to the ‘large number’ of Turkish troops that were stationed in 
north Cyprus. According to the Court, it was evident from the ‘large number’ of forces 
that Turkey exercised ‘effective overall control’ over that part of Cyprus. Turkey’s 
responsibility for the policies and actions of the TRNC stemmed from such control. 
Accordingly, it decided that those affected by such policies or actions fell within the 
jurisdiction of Turkey.35 
 
The Court made clear its position in the extraterritorial application of the Convention in 
the Loizidou36 judgment and reiterated that position and its reasoning in almost all 
subsequent Cypriot property cases37 brought against Turkey. However, this clarity was 
undermined by the Court itself in its ruling on Banković.38 In the Loizidou judgment, the 
Court, with its approach to the issue of applying the Convention extraterritorially, has 
provided further guidance within its case law.39 In essence, taking into account ‘effective 
control’ to ascertain whether jurisdiction has been established, as in Loizidou, widens the 
potential for applying the ECHR extraterritorially.40 However, considerable confusion 
was subsequently created in the Court’s ruling on Banković. This is the case in which the 
Strasbourg Court adopted the most restrictive view regarding the determination of 
whether there has been effective control exercised by a state.41 
 
As regards the ‘effective control’ test, the Court departed from its Loizidou approach in 
the case of Banković.42 As will be seen, this manoeuvre resulted in a strong tendency 
33 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para.52. 
34 ibid, paras.54–56.  
35 ibid, para.56. 
36 ibid. 
37 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185; Demopoulos 
and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306. 
38 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75. 
39 Buyse (n 14) p. 54. 
40 ibid. 
41 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75. 
42 ibid. 
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towards an inconsistent application of this test. In the case of Banković,43 the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR had to deal with an issue concerning the applicants, who were 
injured and whose relatives had been killed in the air bombing on the territory of a non-
party to the Convention, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter ‘FRY’), at the 
Serbian Radio and Television building by NATO in 1999.44 The applicants complained 
of a number of violations, including the right to life (Article 2 of the ECHR), provided 
under the ECHR. The applicants alleged that their claims fell within the jurisdiction of 
the respondent states (all states parties to the ECHR were also members of NATO) and 
further added that the extent of the positive obligation under Article 1 of the ECHR to 
secure Convention rights would be ‘proportionate to the level of control in fact 
exercised’.45 The defendant states maintained that the complaints did not fall within their 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. The Court did not examine the merits of 
applicants’ claims since it declared the application inadmissible on the grounds that the 
applicants fell outside the respondent states’ jurisdiction and thus held that it was not 
competent to adjudicate their claims.46 
 
In a nutshell, the Court in Banković, focused on the ‘essential question’47 of whether the 
applicants and their deceased relatives were, as a result of that extraterritorial act, capable 
of falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent states. The Court reached its decision 
on three grounds. First, the Court stressed that the jurisdictional competence of the 
Contracting States is primarily territorial.48 Although extraterritorial jurisdiction of a state 
is recognised in international law, the concept of jurisdiction, as a general rule, is limited 
by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant states. It further added that in 
accordance with public international law, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘jurisdiction’ 
in Article 1 of the Convention is primarily territorial.49 
 
In Loizidou, the Court emphasised that ‘the responsibility of Contracting States can be 
involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which produce effects outside their 
43 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid, para.42. 
46 ibid, para.111. 
47 ibid. 
48 Orakhelashvili (n 12) p.539. 
49Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75, para. 59. 
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own territory’50 and decided on this ground that the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ is not 
restricted to the national territory of the Contracting States. It further maintained that, 
taking into account the object and purpose of the Convention, an act falls within a state’s 
jurisdiction under Article 1 in cases when a state exercises effective control of an area 
outside its national territory and the existence of such control leads to the obligation to 
secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.51 
 
As a result, in the case of Loizidou, the Court held that extraterritorial applicability of 
Article 1 of the Convention stems from the relevant principles of state responsibility and 
thus such applicability is a normal consequence of Article 1.52 However, rather obscurely, 
in the case of Banković, since survivors and relatives of the victims of the NATO aerial 
bombing were not considered to fall within the jurisdiction of respondent states under the 
scope of Article 1, the NATO member states were not found to be responsible for 
violations of human rights due to the bombing.53 At this point, the inconsistency in the 
Court’s approach to the issue of ‘jurisdiction’ between its Loizidou and Banković rulings 
became evident. While ‘extraterritorial applicability’ was determined as a ‘normal 
consequence’ of Article 1 of the Convention in the case of Loizidou, the Court shifted 
from this stance in Banković54 and held that the acts of the states that produce effects 
outside their territory could amount to an exercise of their jurisdiction within the meaning 
of Article 1 of the Convention ‘only in exceptional cases’.55 
 
In contrast with its Loizidou ruling, the Court in the case of Banković interpreted the 
notion of ‘jurisdiction’ by taking into account public international law and applied a very 
restrictive interpretation of effective control. Therefore, this ruling broke with the 
antecedent case and the Court did not apply Article 1 extraterritorially. As a result of its 
Banković decision, the Court could not prevent itself from attack and its position received 
strong criticism concerning restrictive interpretation of this approach from commentators 
who claimed that ‘the Court limited itself to black letter law principles, not attaching 
50 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para.52; Drozd and Janousek v. France (1992) 14 EHRR 745, 
para. 91; Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey (1991) 68 DR, para.121; Loizidou v. 
Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para.62. 
51 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para.63. 
52 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para.52. 
53 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75, para. 67. 
54 Orakhelashvili (n 12) p.539. 
55 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75, para. 67. 
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enough weight to the purpose and spirit of the Convention. Fortunately it has not been, 
and hopefully will not be, followed in the later case law.’56 
 
Second, the Court in Banković held that extraterritorial jurisdiction was exceptionally 
found when a respondent state, through the effective control of the relevant territory and 
its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, ‘exercises all or some of 
the public powers normally to be exercised by that government’.57 However in Loizidou, 
the Court determined that extraterritorial applicability can arise by way of acts and 
omissions of Contracting States or their authorities.58 The Court shifted from this 
approach in Banković and introduced a new requirement for the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction through ‘all or some of the public powers’59 of a Contracting State which 
notably was not mentioned in Loizidou.60 
 
Third, which can also be considered as the Court’s third contrast among these 
aforementioned cases, in Banković it held that extraterritorial applicability to jurisdiction 
was ‘essentially regional’ and ‘notably in the legal space (espace juridique)’.61 In this 
respect, the Court regarded the Convention as a multi-lateral treaty that operated in the 
legal space of the Contracting Parties and was not to be applied throughout the world. On 
this basis, it concluded that the FRY ‘clearly’ was not within this legal space and thus the 
applicants and their deceased relatives did not fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent 
states.62 In this regard, the situation in Banković was determined as ‘entirely different’ 
from the Cyprus cases.  
 
The rationale behind this differentiation was the fact that, while the Cypriot government 
has been a Contracting State, on the other hand, the FRY was not at the time of the 
bombing. Bearing all this in mind, it is arguable that the desire to avoid a vacuum as 
regards responsibility for violations of human rights was used in favour of 
56 Budzianowska (n 15), p. 56; Amnesty International, “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? 
Violations of the Laws of War by NATO During Operation Allied Force, at 41–48 (2000). 
57 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75, para.71; Orakhelashvili (n12), p.539. 
58 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para. 52. 
59 Bankovićand others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75, para.71. 
60 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para. 52. 
61 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75, para. 80. 
62 ibid, para. 82. 
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extraterritoriality in cases when the territory in question would normally be covered by 
the Convention such as in Cyprus property cases. In its Cyprus ruling, the Court did not 
adopt a conservative approach and instead widened the application of extraterritoriality 
through finding of effective control. However, in Banković it was determined that no 
vacuum had been created since Belgrade was not covered by the Convention.63 In this 
regard, a conservative approach was adopted through the ‘primarily’ territorial notion of 
jurisdiction under Article 1.64 
 
Against this background, it can be argued that the Banković decision is completely 
inconsistent with the Court’s approach in Loizidou. It is, perhaps, for this reason that these 
two cases have been considered as the most authoritative cases in examining the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR.65 The Court’s dilemma66 and its contradictory 
positions that have become apparent through its rulings in these two cases have met with 
some criticism. Although its stance in Banković was supported by some,67 it could not 
prevent itself from objection by the majority of others.68 
 
Considerable confusion has been created in the Strasbourg jurisprudence on Loizidou and 
Banković. It can be argued that the shift in its attitude in examining the factors that were 
relevant to the Court in reaching these decisions can be considered as a potential legal 
escape route from the consistent application of extraterritoriality. The Court took into 
account the large number of troops as an obvious element when deciding 
extraterritoriality in Loizidou. This raises the question of under what rationale the NATO 
63 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75, para. 80. 
64 Orakhelashvili (n 12), pp. 529–568; Budzianowska (n15) p. 54; Rick Lawson, ‘Life after Banković: On 
the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Fons Coomans & Menno 
T. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp: Intersentia (2004) 
pp.85,123. 
65 Budzianowska (n15) p. 54. 
66 Mark Gibney, Erik Roxstrom & Tenje Einarsen, ‘The NATO Bombing Case (Banković v. Belgium et 
al.): One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?’ Boston University Journal of International Law, vol.23 no.55 
(2005) p. 87. 
67 Georg Ress, ‘State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations. The Case of Banković’, 
Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien vol. 6 (2003) pp. 73–89; Michael O’Boyle, ‘The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Comment on “Life after Banković” in: 
Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, 
Antwerp: Intersentia (2004) pp. 125–139. 
68 Buyse (n 14) p. 260; Orakhelashvili (n 12) pp. 529–568; Lawson (n 64) pp. 91–92; Martin Scheinin, 
‘Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in: Fons Coomans & 
Menno T. Kamminga, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp: Intersentia (2004) 
pp. 73–81; Michal Gondek, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
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bombing, which resulted in the killings and serious injuries of people, was not considered 
as effective control that generates extraterritoriality, while the number of troops ‘clearly’ 
raised the issue of extraterritoriality. If such an act with consequences of the killings and 
injuries of innocent people was not regarded as a result of a control of a state within the 
meaning of ‘effective control’ then it can be said with some conviction that the 
Convention organs have sorely failed to fill a vacuum in interpreting this significant term 
of ‘effective control’.  
 
Another question that went unanswered was ‘why the Banković Court would spend so 
much time on the legality of a Contracting State’s extraterritorial activities when, 
apparently, it does not seem to matter… [W]hy is it that the Court has spent so much time 
defending its territorial reading of the Convention when territory has not proven 
dispositive either?’69 The Court’s inconsistent approach to the extraterritorial application 
of Article 1 is worrying. Another case that illustrates that the application of 
extraterritoriality was left in abeyance70 is Issa and Others v. Turkey71 to which attention 
will now turn. 
 
Issa and Others v. Turkey72 is the case that implicitly overrules the case of Banković.73 In 
Issa, the Court was faced with the complaints of six Iraqi nationals who alleged that 
Turkey had violated various provisions of the Convention through a military operation in 
northern Iraq. The applicants, who were the relatives of the deceased persons, complained 
of the unlawful arrest, detention, ill-treatment and subsequent killing of their relatives due 
to Turkey’s military operation in that area.74 
 
As regards the concept of ‘jurisdiction’, the Court in its Issa judgment drifted away from 
the territorial notion of jurisdiction and stressed, by referring to Banković, that, in 
accordance with public international law, a state’s jurisdictional competence is primarily 
territorial. It further added that this concept was not necessarily restricted to the national 
69 Gibney and others (n 66), p. 90. 
70 Oliver de Schutter, ‘Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, Baltic Yearbook of International Law, vol. 6, (2006), pp.10–11.  
71 Issa v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 567. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid, para. 4 
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territory of the contracting states and this time it referred to the case of Loizidou.75 The 
Court stated that: 
 
… a State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms 
of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former 
State’s authority and control through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – 
in the latter State’. Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the 
Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory.76 
 
In light of these determinations, the Court expressed its dissatisfaction concerning the 
claim that the applicants’ relatives were within the jurisdiction of the respondent state.77 
As regards the determination of extraterritoriality by considering the state’s ‘authority 
and control’, as it appeared in Banković, the position was reiterated in Issa. While the 
Court, in Loizidou, defined the creation of responsibility of a state by using the term 
‘area’,78 in Issa the Court’s language became clearer by replacing this term with 
‘territory’.79 In the Issa case, the Court also considered the possibility that the respondent 
state could be held responsible through a consequence of military action, in this case that 
was temporarily exercised, for six weeks, amounting to effective overall control of a 
particular portion of the territory of northern Iraq.80 In this regard, the Issa Court did not 
find sufficient grounds for holding that Turkey exercised effective overall control of the 
entire area of northern Iraq.81 The Court reached this determination notwithstanding the 
large number of troops involved in the aforementioned military operations. 
 
It was inevitable that the case of Loizidou would be referred to at this point when the 
Court stressed the amount of troops involved in the Turkish military operation. 
Accordingly, the Court held that: 
 
Notwithstanding the large number of troops involved in the aforementioned military operations, it 
does not appear that Turkey exercised effective overall control of the entire area of northern Iraq. 
This situation is therefore in contrast to the one which was obtained in northern Cyprus in the 
Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v. Turkey cases (…). In the latter cases, the Court found that the 
respondent Government’s armed forces totalled more than 30,000 personnel (which is, admittedly, 
no less than the number alleged by the applicants in the instant case (…) but with the difference that 
75 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 67–68. 
76 Issa v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 567, para. 71 
77 ibid, para. 82.  
78 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 52 
79 Issa v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 567, para. 71; Buyse (n14) p.263; Schutter (n 70) pp. 183–245. 
80 Issa v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 567, para. 74. 
81 ibid. 
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the troops in northern Cyprus were present over a very much longer period of time) and were 
stationed throughout the whole of the territory of northern Cyprus. Moreover, that area was 
constantly patrolled and had check points on all main lines of communication between the northern 
and southern parts of the island.82 
 
Here, the Court made a distinction from its Loizidou judgment. Although the number of 
Turkey’s armed forces in Cyprus was no less than the number in Iraq, the Court’s decision 
was not the same as its Loizidou ruling. Taking this into account, it can be stated that 
another new ‘measure’ for the application of extraterritoriality was introduced to the 
Court’s case law. The distinctive line between these cases was that: in contrast with the 
case of Issa, the presence of Turkish forces in northern Cyprus was over a very much 
longer period of time and these forces were stationed throughout the whole of the territory 
of northern Cyprus.83 
 
In essence, in line with the Issa case, it is reasonable to state that the length of the passage 
of time and the extent of the territory over which military forces were present became 
determining ‘new’ factors within the context of extraterritoriality. In this regard, since the 
scope of territoriality is becoming more inconsistent with new measures, it can be argued 
and expected that within a couple of years the ambiguities in extraterritoriality will 
increase and become more unpredictable. Turning to the Court’s approach, differentiated 
in Issa from its Loizidou ruling, it has been suggested that the admissibility decision in 
Issa derives either from the fact that Turkey did not exercise effective control over the 
entire area of northern Iraq or ‘the judicial mechanism of Turkey, a foreign country, was 
physically and financially inaccessible to them’.84 
 
3.2 The case of Cyprus v. Turkey (The Fourth Interstate Application of Cyprus v. 
Turkey) 
 
The case of Cyprus v. Turkey85 is another landmark case for Strasbourg case law, and it 
also has great importance for Cypriots as well as for the future the property conflict on 
the island. As will be seen, the Court’s gradual change in its attitude towards the Cypriot 
property claims has become more visible with the judgment of this case. The ambiguity 
82 Issa v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 567, para. 75. 
83 ibid. 
84 Rick Lawson, ‘The Concept of Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Acts of State’, in Gerard Kreijen, State 
Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2004), p. 292. 
85Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731. 
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of the Court’s approach in the application of P1-1 will evolve in subsequent cases 
concerning the property rights of displaced G/Cypriots.  
 
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, this part will examine the gradual change in 
the Court’s attitude in its Cyprus rulings. In order to identify the issues on which the Court 
has shifted from its previous stance, the examination of these will extend throughout this 
section. For instance, although the issue of de facto expropriation was raised in the 
Loizidou case, this matter will be considered in the following case of Cyprus v. Turkey. 
This approach avoids unnecessary duplication in the Cypriot case analysis. This is 
because, although the Court has continuously adopted new stands regarding the property 
cases of Cypriots, in almost all of its subsequent judgments on Cypriot property cases, 
the Court referred to its previous findings and assessments. This analysis will also 
illustrate the factors that have influenced the Court’s position in the course of these 
particular cases. Additionally, due to the purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on the 
issue of the property dispute in the examination of this judgment. 
 
In the case of Cyprus v. Turkey,86 the RoC alleged that Turkey had continuously violated 
the majority of the provisions (except for Articles 7, 12, 15 and16) set out under the 
ECHR due to its occupation of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. As a result of this 
judgment, Turkey was found to be responsible for securing all human rights provided 
under the Convention and the Protocols it has ratified. The grounds of this decision was 
Turkey’s effective control over northern Cyprus. While reaching this decision, the Court 
referred to the Loizidou87 judgment and finally held that the facts complained of fell 
within the jurisdiction of Turkey. The decision was a bitter disappointment for the Turkish 
side as the Court held that there had been fourteen violations of the Convention by 
Turkey. At this juncture, it can be stated that this finding explains why the ruling of 
Cyprus v. Turkey was considered a milestone decision and the ‘most important victory on 
the legal plane’88 by the G/Cypriot side. 
86 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731. 
87 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99; Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
88 Nikola Kyriakou, ‘Enforced Disappearances in Cyprus: Problems and Prospects of the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’,Université Catholique de Louvain CRIDHO Working Papers, 
(2011)<http://cridho.uclouvain.be/documents/Working.Papers/CRIDHO%20WP%202011-01.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2013;Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, ‘The Council of Europe 
and the Cyprus Question”,(15 April 
2008),<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/90ADC505C94B392BC22571EA00271CC6?Open
Document> accessed: 17 September 2013. 
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In the Cyprus v. Turkey89 judgment, in respect to the issue of property and the return of 
displaced G/Cypriots, Turkey argued that these issues were the subject of inter-communal 
negotiations and further added that the claims regarding property rights could only be 
resolved through negotiations aimed to achieve the comprehensive settlement of the 
Cypriot problem.90 The rationale behind this is the view that returns would occasion ‘the 
risk of conflict which the intermingling of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities’ 
would create.91 
 
In this regard, the Court maintained that displaced persons continued to be prevented from 
returning to their previous homes, which constituted a continuing violation of Article 8 
of the Convention. The Court reached this consideration regardless of Turkey’s appeal to 
public safety and domestic law within the ambit of the second paragraph of Article 8. As 
to Turkey’s view, that the issue of property should be resolved within the framework of 
the inter-communal negotiations, the Court held that political negotiations, which were 
still far from reaching any result, could not be invoked to justify the continuing violations 
of the Convention.92 In essence, taking the Court’s approach into account, it is 
questionable whether the finding of a violation without considering the existence of 
domestic law would create a ground for the justification of similar interference in cases 
in which such a law exists.93 
 
Turkey, as a response to the allegation of the RoC regarding its continuing violation of 
the majority of human rights guaranteed under the Convention as a result of her 
occupation in the north, claimed that, with the same reasoning as put forward in the 
previous Loizidou94 judgment, the acts and omissions complained of were imputable to 
the TRNC as it is an independent state that had exclusive control and authority over the 
territory in the north of Cyprus. They further stressed that the Court in its Loizidou ruling 
had erroneously decided that the TRNC was a local administration of Turkey.95 
 
89 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731. 
90 ibid, paras.16, 33. 
91 ibid, para.173. 
92 ibid,para. 169. 
93 Buyse (n 14), p. 58. 
94 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
95 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, para. 69. 
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The Court rejected this argument and reiterated its findings in its former Loizidou ruling. 
It further stated that the grounds of this decision were framed ‘in terms of a broad 
statement of principle as regards Turkey’s general responsibility under the Convention 
for the policies and actions of the TRNC authorities’.96 Turkey’s responsibility derives 
from the acts of its soldiers and also the acts of the local administration which survives 
due to Turkish military or other support. As a result, it held that ‘in terms of Article 1 of 
the Convention, Turkey’s “jurisdiction” must be considered to extend to securing the 
entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols 
which she has ratified, and that violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey’.97 
 
In fact, in light of the Court’s attitude towards Turkey’s position within the context of the 
Cyprus conflict, it can be assumed that any violations of the provisions under the 
Convention occurring in the northern part of the island, which are relevant to the events 
of 1974, are automatically attributable to Turkey.98 It can be argued that the Court 
disguised the rationale behind its policy on Turkey and established, in essence, the 
principle of the automatic responsibility of Turkey concerning the violations of human 
rights in the TRNC. Against this background, it is questionable whether the Court, in the 
future, will follow the same approach in cases like Loizidou concerning other Contracting 
States to the Convention. 
 
Turkey’s obligation to secure the rights and freedoms provided under the Convention in 
northern Cyprus is a significant issue that needs to be considered within the context of 
the Court’s change in its position in its Cyprus ruling. In almost all Cypriot property 
claims, it was reiterated by referring to the international community’s view that the 
government of the RoC is the sole legitimate government of Cyprus and thus the TRNC 
was an illegal entity under international law.99 This position was adopted and applied by 
the Court by taking the Resolutions100 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as 
a base. According to these Resolutions, since the sole legitimate government in the island 
is the RoC, Turkey, in this respect, could not enforce its laws in the north under 
96 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, para. 77. 
97 ibid. 
98 Gibney and others (n 66), p.84. 
99 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, para.70. 
100 UN Security Council, Resolution 550 (1984) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2539th meeting, on 
11 May 1984,S/RES/550 (1984),available at: 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/550(1984), accessed 12 June 2013. 
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international law.101 
 
In respect of Turkey’s obligation in northern Cyprus, to secure the rights and freedoms 
provided under the Convention, the Court adopted a position which was reiterated in 
almost every case concerning the property rights of G/Cypriots against Turkey. 
According to its position, which was established by taking the view of the international 
community as a base, it considered that the TRNC is not a state under international law 
and thus the RoC is the sole legitimate government in Cyprus.102 Flowing from this 
determination, Turkey cannot enforce its laws in northern Cyprus under international law 
due to the fact that the RoC is the only legitimate government on the island.103 
 
The Court, however, undermined the basis of its decision, in which it regarded Turkey as 
the responsible state for all violations of human rights that have been occurring in the 
northern part of Cyprus. This becomes clear when the Court, surprisingly, supported the 
view that Turkey must introduce remedies ‘to individuals generally in northern Cyprus to 
enable them to secure redress for violations of their Convention rights’.104 Moreover, in 
order to support its new position in this respect, it pointed out the purpose of Article 35 
of the Convention and therefore continued to maintain that remedies available in the 
TRNC may be regarded as domestic remedies of Turkey.105 However, while reaching its 
decision on Turkey’s responsibility, the Court took into account the UN Security Council 
Resolutions, which stated that Turkey had no legal right to enforce its laws in the TRNC. 
Against this background, by concluding that Turkey must produce remedies in northern 
Cyprus, one can assume that the Court implicitly recognised that Turkey had a right to 
govern that part of Cyprus.106 
 
Hence, the Court made clear its position on the imputability question by stigmatising 
Turkey as the sole responsible state for securing all human rights in the TRNC, under the 
Convention, and by relying on international law as well as the opinion of the international 
101 Gibney and others, (n 66), p. 85. 
102 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, para.70; UN Security Council, Resolution 550 (1984) Adopted 
by the Security Council at its 2539th meeting, on 11 May 1984,S/RES/550 (1984),available at: 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/550(1984), accessed 12 June 2013. 
103 Gibney and others, (n 66), p. 85. 
104 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, paras. 90–102. 
105 ibid, para. 102. 
106 Gibney and others, (n 66) p.85. 
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community. Bearing the foregoing consideration in mind, it is reasonable to state that the 
Court’s opposed approaches, which emerged from the same mainstay, stemmed from the 
absence of distinct criteria for the application of the Convention’s principles. Put another 
way, it can be argued that, as a result of the Convention’s open-ended character regarding 
interpretation and application of its provisions, the Court in its Cyprus case law ‘revived 
the dead’ following the declaration of death of the TRNC.  
 
As regards the Court’s decision in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey,107 which required 
applicants to exhaust domestic remedies in the TRNC in accordance with Article 35 of 
the Convention, the Court pointed out the advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice in the case of Namibia.108 It is notable that this reference to the Namibia case, in 
order to support the Court’s amended attitude towards the domestic remedies in the 
TRNC, was taken further and became the Court’s model case in the ruling of its Cyprus 
v. Turkey judgment.109 This is evident from the Court’s examination of the requirement 
to exhaust domestic remedies in the Cyprus case as it not only took into account the 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice but also applied the same line of 
thinking from the Namibia ruling in its Cyprus judgment. 
 
As a result of taking the Namibia case as a model in respect of the examination of the 
validity of legislative and administrative acts of the TRNC, the Court gave a green light 
to Turkey for the establishment of domestic remedies in accordance with international 
law, in order to secure redress for violations of the rights provided and guaranteed under 
the Convention. It ruled that since that there is no obligation in international law to 
disregard the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and transactions of de facto 
regimes such as the TRNC, international law recognises the validity of certain legislative 
and administrative acts of such regimes, ‘for instance as regards the registration of births, 
deaths, and marriages, the effects of which can only be ignored to the detriment of the 
inhabitants of the [t]erritory’.110 
107 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, paras. 90–91. 
108 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] International Court of Justice 
Reports 16. 
109 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, paras. 91–98. 
110 ibid, para. 90; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] International Court 
of Justice Reports 16. 
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The Court takes the position that if, in a case, it can be proven that remedies in question 
have been provided for the benefit of individuals and secures prevention of the violations 
of rights guaranteed under the Convention, then such remedies should be used by 
individuals. While addressing the special character of the Convention as an instrument 
for the protection of individuals, the Court highlighted the significance of a vacuum in 
the protection of the human rights provided under the Convention. On this basis, the Court 
held that in order to avoid a vacuum in the protection of human rights in the territory of 
northern Cyprus, use may be made of the remedies set out by the TRNC courts.111 
 
The Court supported its position by emphasising that the failure of institutions of de facto 
regimes to produce remedies for human rights violations would work to the detriment of 
that community. Despite the Court’s invitation for the formation of domestic remedies, it 
did not disregard the possibility of a failure of such institutions to fulfil the requirements 
indicated by the Court. As a result, these remedies may be required to be exhausted, unless 
their inexistence or ineffectiveness can be proved – an issue that needs to be examined on 
a case-by-case basis.112 
 
It is important at this stage to stress some interesting points in respect of the Court’s 
approach on the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of the TRNC within its 
Cyprus rulings. First, as is indicated above, in the case of Loizidou, the Court took the 
view of the international community on the status of the TRNC into account as a ground 
for its decision. It considered Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution, which, according to 
the Turkish authorities, purported to expropriate G/Cypriot properties within the 
boundaries of the TRNC that were considered abandoned after 1975, as legally invalid 
under international law. The underlying reason for this determination was that this Article 
was produced by a secessionist illegal entity whose origin lies in the illegal use of Turkish 
forces in northern Cyprus.113 
 
Despite the illegality of the TRNC Constitution being the core of the Court’s reasoning 
in its decisions regarding property claims of Cypriots, it failed to examine the legality of 
111 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, paras.78, 91, 92, 98. 
112 ibid, para. 98. 
113 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, paras.44–46. 
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the TRNC and its legislative acts and as a result it adopted the view of the international 
community instead. It explicitly confined itself with this view by emphasising its 
unwillingness to deal with the lawfulness of the TRNC and its relevant acts in Cypriot 
property cases. In other words, the Court omitted all consideration of such a significant 
issue, and this came to represent the backbone of the Court’s established pattern in all 
subsequent cases concerning the issue of disputed property rights in Cyprus. 
 
The general impression flowing from Loizidou and Cyprus is that the Strasbourg Court 
sowed the seeds of belief that, despite the ongoing political negotiations between the 
parties of this conflict, the issue of property would be resolved in favour of the G/Cypriots 
by the Court through obligatory restitution.114 Not surprisingly, the Court’s favourable 
position on the property rights of displaced G/Cypriots paved the way for various clone 
cases being submitted to the Court. In this regard, the number of property cases pending 
before the Court, primarily by G/Cypriots against Turkey, was approximately 1,400 in 
2005.115 This trend, which has resulted in a number of rulings in favour of the G/Cypriot 
applicants, has contributed to the failure of attempts to achieve a comprehensive and 
negotiated settlement for the property conflict within the Cyprus problem.  
 
After the failure in 2004 of the G/Cypriots to approve the peace plan, proposed by UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan (the so-called Annan Plan), for the reunification of the 
island by finalising the long-lasting Cyprus problem in a referendum, the widespread 
expectation that the Court would take a position in favour of the G/Cypriot perspective 
on property claims has changed. Although the impact of this political failure on the 
Court’s stance towards the property claims of displaced G/Cypriots has not been 
explicitly stated, it became abundantly clear with the case of Xenides-Arestis.116 Against 
this background, in order to explore the development of the anomaly of the Court’s 
position in its Cyprus rulings, it is necessary to examine particular factors which gave a 
new impetus to the issue of property in Cyprus. 
 
 
 
114 Williams and Gürel (n 7), p.5. 
115 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185, para.38. 
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3.3 The Cypriot Property Saga Has Taken Yet Another Turn with the Case of 
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey: 
 
Within the case law of the ECtHR in respect of the Cypriot property claimants, Xenides-
Arestis117 can be regarded as another important case that has contributed not only to the 
issue of property in Cyprus but also to the ECHR mechanism, within the context of 
property rights guaranteed under the Convention, in different respects. It is the first 
application after the failure of the Annan Plan that the Court had to deal with. What is 
also worth considering in this case is that the Court applied a pilot judgment procedure, 
adjourning all other cases, in order to examine Law no. 49/2003. In its decision, it held 
that this law did not provide an effective remedy. Therefore it ordered Turkey to introduce 
a remedy which would secure genuinely effective redress not only for the applicant in the 
case of Xenides-Arestis, but also for all similar applications pending before it.  
 
It should also be stressed that Xenides-Arestis is the case in which it is clearly illustrated 
how the weight of politics in Cyprus started to increase in the Court’s case law in the 
matter of Cypriot property claims. In a sense, it is a landmark case which reflects the 
attempts of the parties to use the Courtroom in Strasbourg as a battlefield for the property 
war among themselves by using the Annan Plan as a weapon in order to develop their 
arguments. At this juncture, it is worth noting that in 2010 the Court had met with severe 
criticism from the G/Cypriot side on the grounds that the Demopoulos v. Turkey and 7 
other cases118 ruling, in which the Court adopted the so-called pilot judgment procedure, 
was highly political in that it was an attempt to avoid repetitive Cypriot property cases 
being brought before it.119 In this regard, it can be argued that, it was not the Court but, 
mainly, the Turkish and the G/Cypriot sides that started to implicitly politicise the Court’s 
case law through their arguments around the admissibility stage of the Xenides-Arestis 
case. This raises the question of whether the political nature of the property cases has 
been used by the parties to object to the Court’s rulings when a judgment is made against 
them. The answer will be apparent in the following section of this chapter where the case 
117 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
118 ibid. 
119 Alexia Solomou, ‘Case Report on Demopoulos & Others v. Turkey’, The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 104, no.4 (2010) p.631; Loukis G. Loucaides, ‘Current Legal Developments: Is the 
European Court of Human Rights Still a Principled Court of Human Rights After the Demopoulos Case?’ 
Legal Journal of International Law, vol. 24 (2011) pp.435–465; Williams and Gürel (n7) pp. 11–13. 
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of Demopoulos will be examined. Against this backdrop, the facts of the Xenides-Arestis 
and the parties’ attitudes in this case deserve to be examined. 
 
In the case of Xenides-Arestis, the applicant, Myra Xenides-Arestis, was a Cypriot 
national of G/Cypriot origin who complained of a continuing violation of her right to 
respect for the home (Article 8), her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions (P1-
1) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14) under the Convention. She owned a 
plot of land and three houses, including her home where she lived with her family in 
Famagusta, a town in northern Cyprus. The applicant complained that she has been 
prevented from living in her home or using her property since 1974 due to the division of 
the island by the conduct of Turkish military forces in the northern part of the island. She 
further alleged that this act amounted to discrimination under the ECHR. 
 
At the admissibility stage of the Xenides-Arestis application, the Turkish side raised the 
preliminary objection that the applicant should exhaust Law no. 49/2003 as a domestic 
remedy as required by Article 35 of the Convention. In relation to the availability, 
effectiveness and adequacy of the remedy proposed under Law no. 49/2003, the Turkish 
government referred to the Annan Plan to support the view that this law should be 
accepted as a domestic remedy. The Turkish government further argued that the 
significance of the plan lies in the acknowledgement of the reality that the ‘physical 
restitution of property is likely to be limited and is only likely to be available as part of a 
wider political settlement and not by way of individual applications to the Court’.120 
According to the applicant, due to the fact that Law no. 49/2003 arose from an illegal 
source established as a subordinate local administration of Turkey that has no validity in 
international law, this remedy was inadequate and ineffective. Therefore, Law no. 
49/2003 could not be regarded as a domestic remedy for the purposes of Article 35(1) of 
the Convention. 
 
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court rejected the Turkish 
government’s plea of inadmissibility for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on the 
grounds that the remedy proposed by the TRNC did not satisfy the requirements provided 
under Article 35(1) of the ECHR. In this respect, the Court held that Law no. 49/2003 
120 ECtHR, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (admissibility decision of 14 March 2005 (unpublished). 
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was not an effective or adequate means for redressing the complaints of the applicant. 
What is remarkable here is that, in addition to the determination of the unsatisfactory 
nature of Law no. 49/2003 as a complete system of redress, the Court took a further step 
and pointed out the deficiencies of this law.  
 
It can be argued that, although this decision was not in favour of the T/Cypriot side, in 
essence, the Court, by stressing the deficiencies, took the first step to assist the Turkish 
government in producing an effective and adequate domestic remedy for the property 
claims. This approach in reaching this decision was remarkable in the sense that if the 
Turkish authorities would set down another law in accordance with the Court’s 
suggestions, then this new law might be considered as a domestic remedy to deal with 
property claims in the TRNC.121 The Court’s implicit invitation to the Turkish 
government to produce another law that could be determined as a domestic remedy 
became evident in the judgment on merits of the Xenides-Arestis. 
 
By taking into account the Court’s assessment of the remedy proposed by the TRNC 
authorities, it can be said that Xenides-Arestis is one of the leading authoritative cases on 
the issue of whether compensation and restitution mechanisms of post-conflict 
societies122 and of ‘entities that look and act like states’123 could be seen as effective 
remedies. In this regard, the significance of the case in question and all other Cypriot 
property cases ought to be made apparent by realising their actual relationship to the issue 
of property claims of displaced persons and refugees in post-conflict situations. Since the 
Court’s judgment at the admissibility stage of Xenides-Arestis set out guidelines by 
pointing out the deficiencies of Law no. 49/2003 and suggestions for the amendments of 
the property compensation mechanism provided under this law, the Court’s findings in 
this case deserve a close examination. 
 
As indicated above, the Court rejected Turkey’s preliminary objection that the applicant 
should exhaust the domestic remedy provided by Law no.49/2003 on the grounds that the 
proposed remedy by the Turkish government did not satisfy the requirements under 
121 Ayla Gürel & Kudret Ozersay, ‘Property and Human Rights in Cyprus: The European Court of Human 
Rights as a Platform of Political Struggle’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.44, no.2 (2008) pp.291–292.  
122 Buyse (n 14) p.212. 
123 Nina Caspersen and Antje Herrberg, ‘Engaging Unrecognised States in Conflict Resolution: An 
Opportunity or Challenge for the EU?’,The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Brussels, 2010, p. 7. 
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Article 35(1) of the Convention and thus it was not considered as an effective or adequate 
remedy. What is particularly important in this assessment is that the Court explicitly 
highlighted that the elimination of the restitution award was the major defect of the law 
in question. According to the Court, a property mechanism to remediate the rights of 
displaced persons could not be regarded as a complete system of redress for the 
interference of property rights if it fails to provide the possibility of restitution as a 
remedy, but only compensation. In order to support its finding, the Court referred to the 
cases of Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece and Brumărescu v. Romania124 in 
which it held that: 
 
If the nature of the breach allows of restitution in integrum, it is for the respondent 
State to effect it, the Court having neither the power nor the practical possibility of 
doing so itself. If, on the other hand, national law does not allow – or allows only 
partial – reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach, Article 50 (art. 50) 
empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be 
appropriate. 
 
 
Although the Court in Xenides-Arestis, as well as in a number of cases regarding the 
property claims of displaced G/Cypriots,125 has repeatedly ruled that the applicants had 
not lost title to their property located in northern Cyprus, no requirement for specific 
restitution as a precondition for the adequacy of a domestic remedy has been established. 
In other words, the holding of legal title may not require the restitution of possession of 
property to the G/Cypriot owners. Against this backdrop, it can be stated that the Court, 
without any explicit statement, did not disregard the interest of the current users who had 
possession of the properties of displaced G/Cypriot owners. 
 
In the Xenides-Arestis judgment, the Court did not lay down clear criteria as to what type 
of alternatives – such as exchange and/or compensation –must be provided by a domestic 
remedy in order to consider it as a complete system of redress. As indicated above, the 
Court explicitly stated that the major defect of the TRNC’s purported remedy was the 
absence of the possibility of restitution. By taking into account the Court’s assessment, it 
is conceivable that even if the other deficiencies, which were pointed out by the Court, 
124 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, paras.34–38; Brumărescu v. Romania (2001) 33 
EHRR 36, paras. 19–22. 
125 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731; Demades v. Turkey, 
(decision of 31 July 2003), (unreported); Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. 
Turkey (2003) 39 EHRR 772. 
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had been cured, the elimination of the restitution award would have turned this remedy 
into an inadequate remedial mechanism. The Court’s approach to the issue of 
effectiveness of a domestic remedy seems to suggest that providing a restitution option 
should be the minimum requirement for the creation of an effective domestic mechanism 
within the context of property claims.126 
 
In this regard, it has been maintained that the Court’s assessment in Xenides-Arestis of 
the compensation-based remedy of the TRNC is applicable to the issue of local 
compensation and a restitution system in respect of post-conflict societies. It has been 
further argued that by means of this decision in question, the Strasbourg Court made clear 
its position in examining the effectiveness of domestic remedies in the post-conflict 
context. Accordingly, states should provide at least the restitution option under their 
property mechanism for refugees or displaced persons within the matter of the 
compensation scheme of the post-conflict situations.127 
 
In addition to the major striking feature of Law no. 49/2003, the Court underlined 
additional points that need to be considered. First of all, it stressed that the compensation 
offered by Law no.49/2003 was limited to damages concerning pecuniary loss for 
immovable property and no provision was made concerning movable property or non-
pecuniary damages. Second, the law did not address the applicant’s complaints under 
Article 8 and Article 14. Although the Court stressed that the aforementioned issues were 
withheld under the proposed remedy, it did not explicitly explain the rationale behind its 
concerns in this respect, stating instead, ‘although compensation is foreseen, this cannot 
in the opinion of the Court be considered as a complete system of redress regulating the 
basic aspects of the interferences complained of.’128 In this connection, one could suggest 
that the terms of an effective domestic remedy would have considered the compensation 
for non-pecuniary damages and the notion of home under Article 8 of the Convention.129 
 
Finally, the Court made a suggestion in respect of the composition of the compensation 
commission that was established in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 49/2003. 
126 Buyse (n 14) p. 213. 
127 Anneke Smit, The Property Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Beyond Restitution, 
New York: Routledge (2012) pp. 18–19; Buyse (n 14), p. 213. 
128 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, (admissibility decision of 14 March 2005) (unpublished), p.21. 
129 Buyse (n 14) p. 213. 
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Since the majority of the commission’s members were living in the displaced G/Cypriot 
properties, the Court raised its concern on the issue of impartiality of the compensation 
commission. In this respect, the Court recommended that an international composition 
would enhance the commission’s standing and credibility. 
 
As a result, in its 2005 admissibility decision, the Court held that the compensation-based 
remedy proposed by the Turkish government could not fully redress the negation of the 
applicant’s property and therefore, Law no.49/2003 was not an adequate or effective 
remedy. In the judgment, on the merits, of December 22, 2005 in the Xenides-Arestis 
case, the Court followed the same approach in its previous Cyprus property rulings and 
once again held that there had been violation of the rights to the home and to property 
(Article 8 and P1-1 respectively) under the Convention. However, what is considerably 
different from its previous judgments was that the Court in this judgment ordered Turkey 
to introduce a remedy which ‘secures the effective protection of the rights laid down in 
Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to the present 
applicant as well as in respect of all similar applications pending before the Court’.130 
Accordingly, the Court adjourned its consideration of all similar Cypriot property 
complaints. 
 
Taking into account the Court’s attitude at the judgment on the merits of Xenides-Arestis, 
it can be stated that this is another landmark case within the context of property disputes 
in the Court’s case law in which the Court initiated a pilot judgment procedure by pointing 
out the various number of repetitive cases pending before it by G/Cypriots against Turkey. 
The rationale behind the Court’s amended attitude in this respect was the fact that the 
violation of the applicant’s rights in the instant case was flowing from a problem affecting 
a large number of people. The Court stressed the seriousness of this situation, which could 
not be ignored, by highlighting the approximate number of 1,400 repetitive property cases 
pending before it.131 
 
It seems clear from the Court’s assessment in Xenides-Arestis that the increased number 
of cases had a profound impact on its shift in attitude towards the case law in respect of 
the Cypriot property claims. In essence, the caseload that resulted from a number of 
130 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185, para.40. 
131 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185, paras. 38–40. 
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repetitive cases, which was driven from the same problem, preponderated over the 
realisation of the complexity of those Cypriot property complaints. In line with the 
Strasbourg Court’s reasoning, it can be argued that the concern about the ability to cope 
with significant numbers of repetitive cases not only led the Court to retain its role in 
relation to the principles of subsidiarity132 in its Cyprus case law but also created grounds 
for the recognition of a compensation or restitution mechanism of an unrecognised entity 
as an effective remedy.  
 
The Court held, in a number of cases, that large numbers of applications deriving from 
the same cause represent a significant threat to the future effectiveness of the 
Convention’s machinery.133 In such cases, the Court has underlined the subsidiary 
character of its own nature. This explains why the subsidiary nature of the Strasbourg 
system has gained a prominent position in the case of Xenides-Arestis.  
 
Similarly, in a number of cases, the Court ruled that it is in principle not for the Court to 
determine what remedial measures may be appropriate to satisfy the respondent state's 
obligations under Article 46 of the Convention.134 On the grounds of this reasoning, the 
Court adopted an approach and has ruled repeatedly in such cases that:  
 
…in view of the systemic situation which it has identified, the Court would observe that 
general measures at national level are undoubtedly called for in execution of the present 
judgment, measures which must take into account the many people affected. Above all, 
the measures adopted must be such as to remedy the systemic defect underlying the 
Court’s finding of a violation so as not to overburden the Convention system with large 
numbers of applications deriving from the same cause. Such measures should therefore 
include a scheme which offers to those affected redress for the Convention violation 
identified in the instant judgment in relation to the present applicant. In this context the 
Court’s concern is to facilitate the most speedy and effective resolution of a dysfunction 
established in national human rights protection. Once such a defect has been identified, it 
falls to the national authorities, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, to 
take, retroactively if appropriate … the necessary remedial measures in accordance with 
the subsidiary character of the Convention, so that the Court does not have to repeat its 
finding in a lengthy series of comparable cases.135 
 
In the same vein, the Court in the Xenides-Arestis judgment retained its subsidiary role in 
order to lower the backlog of approximately 1,400 property cases pending before it.136 In 
132 Buyse (n 14) p. 214; Williams and Gürel (n7) p.214. 
133 Broniowski v. Poland (2004) 40 EHRR 21, para. 193; Bottazzi v. Italy (1999) ECHR 62, para.22; Di 
Mauro v. Italy (1999) ECHR 63, para.23.  
134 Broniowski v. Poland (2004) 40 EHRR 21, para. 193. 
135 Bottazzi v. Italy (1999) ECHR 62, para.22; Di Mauro v. Italy (1999) ECHR 63, para.23. 
136 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185, para.38. 
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accordance with the Court’s approach in this judgment, it can be argued that, in respect 
of post-conflict property rights, an entity which is not internationally recognised as a state 
but is regarded as a subordinate local authority of a Contracting State, may also be able 
to produce a restitution or compensation mechanism that can be regarded as an effective 
domestic remedy. As for Cyprus, the Court created the grounds to recognise a property 
regulation of the Turkish government that may be seen as a domestic remedy to deal with 
G/Cypriot property claims.  
 
Moreover, the Court played a pivotal role in showing which route the Turkish side should 
follow in order to be able to produce an effective local remedy. Although the failure of 
the Turkish government to produce an acceptable local remedy was confirmed in Xenides-
Arestis, in essence, the Court gave endorsement for it to take the right steps in the next 
attempt. It was clear that the present case could help avoid future failures by the Turkish 
side if they agreed to set out a new property mechanism by taking the Court’s guidance 
as a basis. 
 
Within the context of the Cyprus issue, the Strasbourg Court, with the Xenides-Arestis 
decision, took a further step, which both parties of this prolonged conflict had repeatedly 
failed to do for more than five decades. Moreover, this decision can also be considered as 
a significant case within the context of post-conflict property remedies,137 as it has opened 
the door to a new form of redress which would be determined as a domestic remedy. 
 
By the time the Court made its judgment on just satisfaction in Xenides-Arestis, in order 
to implement the Court’s order at the merits stage of this case, the TRNC Parliament 
enacted the new ‘Law for the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable 
Properties’ (hereinafter ‘Law no. 67/2005’) which entered into force on December 22, 
2005 and the ‘By-Law made under Sections 8(2)(A) and 22 of the Law for the 
Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties which are within the 
scope of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1) of Article 159 of the Convention’ ( Law no. 
67/2005) which entered into force on March 20, 2006. It appeared from its name that the 
legal framework of the aforementioned law rendered this proposed remedy prima facie 
capable of providing effective redress in respect of G/Cypriot property claims.  
137 Buyse (n 14) pp. 214, 217. 
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Following its enactment, the new Law no. 67/2005 was in need of a new commission in 
order to examine G/Cypriot applications. Accordingly, the Turkish government took into 
account the Court’s recommendations in the Xenides-Arestis case and established the new 
‘Immovable Property Commission’ (hereinafter the IPC) under Law no.67/2005 to deal 
with property claims made in respect of properties within the scope of the new regulation. 
It is notable that the major difference between the new Commission and the former one 
that had been set up under Law no. 49/2003 was that the IPC had the competence to 
decide on the restitution, exchange of properties or payment of compensation. 
 
One of the most considerable differences between Law no. 67/2005 and the former 
property regulation was that Law no.67/2005 allows restitution in situations in which the 
ownership or the use of the property ‘has not been transferred to any natural or legal 
person other than the State’ and when the restitution of such property ‘shall not endanger 
national security and public order and … such property is not allocated for public interest 
reasons and …the immovable property is outside the military areas or military 
installations’.138 In this respect, one could argue that the new legal phase within the 
context of Cypriot property matters has begun to follow the enactment of the new property 
mechanism produced by the Turkish side.  
 
Another further step taken in line with the Strasbourg Court’s guidance in Xenides-Arestis 
concerned the composition of the new commission. Under the new legislation, the IPC, 
composed of a president, a vice-president, and a minimum five, maximum of seven 
members was established. In order to implement the Court’s advice in respect of the 
impartiality of a property commission, it was regulated under the new legislation that at 
least two members of the IPC ‘shall not be nationals of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, United Kingdom, Greece, Greek Cypriot Administration or Republic of 
Turkey’.139 Furthermore, with regard to the issue of retrospective effect of Law no. 
67/2005, it was explicitly indicated that those people who had applied to the Court, 
regarding their complaints on those properties located in the north of Cyprus, before the 
138 Section 8 of the ‘Law for Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties which are 
within the scope of Sub-paragraph (B) of Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the Constitution’ (Law no. 67/2005), 
22 December 2005. 
139 Section 11/1 of the Law no.67/2005. 
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entry into force of the new law, may also apply to the IPC.140 
 
Against this backdrop, it should be said without any prejudice that the Turkish 
government took into account the Court’s recommendations, pointed out in its decision 
on admissibility and the judgment on the merits of Xenides-Arestis, in order to produce 
an effective domestic remedy to deal with property claims of G/Cypriots. On 7 December 
2006, the Court in its final judgment of Xenides-Arestis (just satisfaction) held that: 
 
The Court welcomes the steps taken by the Government in an effort to provide redress 
for the violations of the applicant’s Convention rights as well in respect of all similar 
applications pending before it. The Court notes that the new compensation and restitution 
mechanism, in principle, has taken care of the requirements of the decision of the Court 
on admissibility of 14 March 2005 and the judgment on the merits of 22 December 
2005.141 
 
The question to which an answer is sought here is whether the Turkish government 
departed from its traditional stance in respect of the settlement of the property issue and 
adopted an opposite approach, not only in theory but also in practice, to their well-known 
‘global exchange and compensation’ perspective. In order to illustrate that they pulled 
their weight and took concrete steps in accordance with the Court’s recommendations, 
the Turkish side submitted the numbers of applications that the IPC examined at the time 
of the judgment on Xenides-Arestis.142 There were sixty applications that had been lodged 
with the IPC and the examination of nine of these had been concluded. In six of these 
applications, the applicants received a payment by way of compensation and in the 
remaining applications the IPC decided on the restitution of the properties in question.143 
 
The Court’s new attitude, which seemed to be in favour of the Turkish side, became 
obvious when it explicitly ‘welcome[d] the steps taken by the government’.144 What is 
notable, however, is that although the Court held that Turkey as a respondent government, 
‘in principle’, took all necessary measures into account in complying with the previous 
judgments,145 the Court did not examine and confirm the effectiveness of the proposed 
remedy, Law no. 67/2005.Not surprisingly, the aforementioned shift in the Court’s 
140 Article 21 of Law no.67/2005. 
141 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (just satisfaction) Judgment 7 December 2006, 44 EHRR SE 13, para.36. 
142 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
143 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (just satisfaction) Judgment 7 December 2006, 44 EHRR SE 13, para. 12. 
144 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (just satisfaction) Judgment 7 December 2006, 44 EHRR SE 13, para. 37. 
145 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
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position was not without consequences. Following its assessment on the new 
compensation and restitution mechanism, the Court met with some criticism. In 
particular, there was a strong correlation between the Court’s appreciation of the Turkish 
government’s effort to provide redress for the violation of the Convention rights and the 
rejection of the Annan Plan by the G/Cypriots.146 
 
The basis for the foregoing argument was that there was a considerable number of clone 
cases that were brought primarily by G/Cypriots before the Court against Turkey. 
Following the decision in the case of Loizidou, the number of applications deriving from 
the same problem has ballooned to an unmanageable level. By the time of the judgment 
in Xenides-Arestis, there were more than 1,400 repetitive G/Cypriot cases before the 
Court. If the comprehensive settlement plan had been approved by both G/Cypriots and 
T/Cypriots, G/Cypriot property cases would have been out of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
However, since the plan was not approved in the G/Cypriot referendum, the settlement 
plan did not enter into force. This meant that the effectiveness of the Court and thus the 
human rights protection system of the Convention were still under threat of repetitive 
Cypriot cases.147 
 
Taking the unresolved Cyprus problem into consideration, it could convincingly be 
argued that the Strasbourg Court is not the one that should pay the price for such a long-
standing political failure of the parties. With the increase in the caseload as well as the 
issue of the Convention’s effectiveness, the establishment of an effective remedy became 
more significant than ever in respect of the Court’s case law on its Cyprus rulings. In 
2010, the Court took a further step and adopted a new approach in order to deal with those 
cases of G/Cypriots. In order to examine whether Law no. 67/2005 satisfied the 
requirements of adequacy and effectiveness of domestic remedies under Article 35 of the 
ECHR, the Court selected eight test-cases: the Demopoulos v. Turkey and 7 other cases. 
 
The case of Demopoulos is, perhaps, one of the most significant cases in respect of the 
146 Nikos Skoutaris, ‘Building Transitional Justice Mechanisms without a Peace Settlement: A Critical 
Appraisal of Recent Case Law of the Strasbourg Court on the Cyprus Issue’, European Law Review, vol. 
35 no.5 (2010) p.633. 
147 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185, para 38; Nikos Skoutaris, ‘The European Courts as 
Political Actors in the Cyprus Conflict’ inFrancis Snyderand Imelda Maher (eds.), The Evolution of the 
European Courts: Institutional Change and Continuity: Sixth International Workshop for Young Scholars 
(WISH) Bruylant, Brussels (2009) pp. 235–257. 
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Court’s case law concerning the property complaints of Cypriots. As will be examined, 
this judgment has changed the stagnant framework of the property debate within the 
context of the Cypriot conflict in many respects, from both a political and a legal aspect. 
Put another way, it is the landmark case that has broken the line of the Court’s Cyprus 
rulings into a ‘pre-Demopoulos’ and a ‘post-Demopoulos’ era. Not surprisingly, the 
Court’s new attitude against the property cases from Cyprus has considerable 
consequences both at the local and international level. With its decision on Demopoulos, 
the Strasbourg Court has met with severe criticism and moreover, for the first time within 
the line of Cypriot property cases within the Court’s case law, the efficiency of the 
Convention’s system was questioned. In this regard, the case of Demopoulos, which has 
carried the issue of property conflict into a new era, deserves to be examined in detail. 
 
3.4 The Last Stop of the Property Claims: Demopoulos v. Turkey and 7 other cases 
 
On March 1, 2010, the sui generis nature of the cases concerning the property conflict in 
Cyprus became more apparent than ever when the Strasbourg Court delivered its decision 
in Demopoulos v. Turkey.148 This is the first judgment in which the Court examined the 
effectiveness of a remedy set out by the authorities of an entity which is not recognised 
as a state at international level.149 The decision created a controversial area that has raised 
significant legal debates and opposing views concerning the effectiveness of Law no. 
67/2003 as a domestic remedy. With this judgment, the Court has become the main actor 
in respect of the property saga on the island. 
 
In the case of Demopoulos and 7 others,150 all of the applicants were Cypriot nationals of 
G/Cypriot origin who claimed to own immovable and/or movable property in the northern 
part of Cyprus under the control of the TRNC. They alleged that they had been deprived 
of their property rights since 1974 due to the division of the island by the Turkish military 
forces. The applicants argued that they had been prevented from having access to and 
from using and enjoying their homes and property in that part of the island by the Turkish 
forces following the invasion of northern Cyprus by Turkey. In this respect, they 
complained principally under Article 8 of the Convention and P1-1. 
148 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306. 
149 Skoutaris (n 148), p. 720. 
150 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 40. 
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The Court mainly examined whether the proposed remedy of the TRNC satisfied the 
requirements that were set out in the Court’s previous decision in Xenides-Arestis,151 in 
which the pilot judgment procedure was developed in order to deal with large numbers 
of repetitive cases that derive from the same widespread problem. In its decision, it found 
that Law no. 67/2005, established by the TRNC authorities, could constitute an effective 
domestic remedy within the meaning of Article 35(1) of the ECHR and the G/Cypriot 
applicant property owners were required to exhaust this remedy before applying to the 
Court. By virtue of the fact that the applicants in Demopoulos had not made the use of 
this mechanism, their complaints under P1-1 were rejected on the ground of non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies in accordance with Article 35(1) of the Convention.152 
 
In light of the aforementioned finding, the Court’s new approach towards the Cypriot 
property claims, introduced in the Xenides-Arestis case, took the most concrete and recent 
form with the judgment in Demopoulos. This becomes clear when the Court’s findings in 
the case of Demopoulos are considered in detail. Moreover, the reasoning in reaching 
these findings explains why legal and political debates in respect of the issue of property 
have been raised, particularly following the decision in the Demopoulos case. Therefore, 
in order to grasp the way in which a new dimension153 to the right to property within the 
Convention mechanism has been brought about with the Demopoulos decision, it will be 
useful to analyse the Court’s assessments on particular points that have received some 
severe criticisms in the legal and political arena. 
 
In establishing its framework for examining the Demopoulos case, the Strasbourg Court 
primarily applied the pilot judgment procedure to cases concerning property in northern 
Cyprus. In respect of the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court stressed that 
the protection mechanism established by the Convention was subsidiary to the national 
systems safeguarding human rights. In this respect, the Court pointed out its supervisory 
role in the implementation of the obligations of the Contracting States under the 
151 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185, para. 38. 
152 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 127. Article 35(1) of the ECHR provides 
that: ‘The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according 
to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on 
which the final decision was taken.’ 
153 Williams and Gürel (n 7) p. 5. 
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Convention. Since it was the responsibility of the Contracting States to ensure that the 
fundamental rights and freedoms under the Convention were respected and protected on 
a domestic level, it could not usurp this role. This situation derived from the fact that the 
rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies was the fundamental aspect of the functioning of 
this system of protection.154 
 
In applying the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies in the Demopoulos case as 
a pilot case of eight G/Cypriot applicants, the Court made significant determinations 
regarding the context of these applications. It should be highlighted that these 
determinations had not been pointed out until the present judgment in a way that enabled 
the Court to approach its decisions on Cyprus cases consistently. In this respect, the Court 
stressed that the arguments of all the parties mirrors the chronic political conflict between 
the RoC and Turkey concerning the resolution of the property issue. 
 
The Court further underlined the passage of thirty-five years since the applicants lost 
possession of their property in the northern part of the island. Interestingly, departing 
from its former judgments on Cyprus, the Strasbourg Court, this time, called attention to 
the chain of inevitable consequences in respect of the property issue that had been brought 
on by the elapsing of thirty-five years as follows:  
 
Generations have passed. The local population has not remained static. Turkish 
Cypriots who inhabited the north have migrated elsewhere; Turkish-Cypriot refugees 
from the south have settled in the north; Turkish settlers from Turkey have arrived in 
large numbers and established their homes. Much Greek-Cypriot property has 
changed hands at least once, whether by sale, donation or inheritance.155 
 
On the basis of the aforementioned observation, the Court held that the present cases were 
burdened with a political, historical and factual complexity flowing from a problem. The 
highly complicated context of such a problem primarily requires to be resolved by all 
parties assuming full responsibility for finding a political solution on a political level. The 
Court considered it necessary to interpret and apply the Convention to the case of 
Demopoulos by taking into account the combination of factors as the factual 
circumstances of this judgment: the complex origin of the cases, the passage of time and 
154 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 69; Akdivar and others v. Turkey (1996) 23 
EHRR 143. 
155 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 84. 
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the prolonged failure of the parties to reach a political solution to the Cyprus problem.156 
 
In light of the above observation, it can be argued that it is only at a very late stage that 
the Court has become aware of the highly political nature of the Cyprus property cases, 
which primarily require a political resolution at the domestic level. This is evident when 
one takes into account the former judgments on Cyprus. In almost all these cases 
concerning the property claims of Cypriots, the Turkish government has repeatedly 
argued that the issue of property was one of the core items in the inter-communal talks, 
such negotiations being the only appropriate way of resolving this problem. This view 
was put forward for the first time in the case of Loizidou and has been followed in all 
subsequent cases regarding the property claims from Cyprus. What is remarkable, 
however, is that, as a response to this argument, the Court held that the fact that property 
rights were the subject of inter-communal talks involving the two communities could not 
justify the interference with property rights under the Convention.157 This determination 
was adopted by the Court and became a traditional approach as well as a basis in reaching 
its decisions in this respect until very recently.  
 
Here, it should be stressed that the Turkish side, by supporting the view that the question 
of right to property could only be resolved within the framework of the inter-communal 
talks,158 did not attempt to justify the interference with property rights, but essayed to 
procure acceptance of the political nature of the Cypriot property claims. It can validly be 
argued that the Turkish government was all along supporting the Court’s most recent 
position towards the complexity of the cases deriving from a problem that should be 
resolved by both communities. Put another way, it seems from the Demopoulos judgment 
that the Court, after more than a decade, departed from its traditional approach and tends 
towards the position of the Turkish government. 
 
With regard to the first question of whether remedies available in the TRNC, in particular, 
the IPC mechanism, could be regarded as domestic remedies of Turkey for the purposes 
of Article 35(1) of the Convention, the Court held that the IPC procedure may be so 
156 ibid, paras. 83–86 
157 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 64. 
158 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, para. 29. 
                                                 
120 
 
regarded.159 In light of the above considerations regarding the complex nature of cases, 
the Court, in determining whether the IPC system may be regarded as a domestic remedy, 
focused on four main issues.  
 
First, the Court examined the applicants’ arguments that the assessment as to exhaustion 
of domestic remedies should be, in principle, carried out with reference to the date on 
which the applications were lodged with it. In respect of their case, the applicants alleged 
that since there were no exceptional situations to justify a departure from this rule, they 
were not required to exhaust a remedy which was set out after they lodged their 
applications.160 As a response, the Court held that such an assessment was normally 
carried out with reference to the date on which the applications were lodged. However, 
this rule is subject to exceptions that may be justified by the particular circumstances of 
each case.161 In a number of judgments, the Court departed from this general rule, 
particularly in cases, for example, concerning remedies against the excessive length of 
proceedings162 and cases in respect of a new compensation for interference with 
property.163 
 
As to the circumstances in Demopoulos, the Court stressed that remedies proposed by the 
Turkish side, particularly the IPC mechanism, were produced to provide redress for the 
Convention violations of persons whose applications were pending before the Court that 
concerned similar issues. By taking this situation into account with the subsidiary 
character of its role, the Court held that the aforementioned exception was applicable in 
this case.164 Therefore, although the remedies under consideration were enacted after the 
applications had been lodged, the applicants were required to exhaust these remedies. 
 
Second, the Court examined the government of the RoC’s argument that the applicants 
were not required to exhaust the IPC as it was a TRNC remedy. They further maintained 
that, according to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the applicants were only 
159 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 103. 
160 ibid. para.58. 
161 Baumann v. France (2001) 34 EHRR 1041. 
162 Nogolica v.Croatia (2002) ECHR 2002-VIII. Andrášik and Others v.Slovakia (2002) ECHR 2002-IX; 
Icyer v Turkey,Judgment of 9 February 2006, (unreported). 
163 Charzyński v. Poland (2005) ECHR 2005-V.  
164 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, paras. 87–88. 
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required to exhaust G/Cypriot remedies.165 The Court considered this as an artificial 
argument and rejected it. In order to support this decision, the Court then went on to 
explain the reason for this rejection on two grounds.  
 
In this regard, the first rationale behind this decision revolves around the issue of 
imputability. The Court stated that its competence to examine the claims brought by 
G/Cypriots against Turkey concerning their property located in the north of the island 
derives from the fact that Turkey has been held responsible for the acts and omissions of 
the authorities that produce effects in that part of Cyprus in a number of cases. In this 
respect, the Court went on to state that any domestic remedy that is produced by the 
TRNC authorities or institutions ‘may be regarded as a “domestic remedy” or “national 
remedy” vis-à-vis Turkey for the purposes of Article 35 § 1’.166As to the second reason 
for rejecting this argument, the Court stressed that Law no. 67/2005 and the IPC were 
established as a consequence of its holding in Xenides-Arestis167 that Turkey had to 
introduce a remedy which secures the effective protection of the rights set out in P1-1 in 
relation to the applicant in Xenides-Arestis as well as in respect of all similar applications 
pending before the Court.168 
 
On the basis of the reasoning made, it can be argued that the Court was in line with its 
earlier judgments in respect of complaints against Turkey concerning the alleged 
violation of human rights in north Cyprus. In this connection, it can correctly be presumed 
that it would have been self-contradictory for the Court not to reject the argument in 
question. By the same token, in such a situation, tremendous inconsistencies among its 
previous findings in significant issues would have been created. This is because, in 
examining the Cyprus cases, significant determinations have been made in respect of the 
application and interpretation of the provisions under the Convention.  
 
In essence, what is remarkable here is that the Court, in examining the cases regarding 
the property conflict in Cyprus, reached some authoritative findings concerning important 
issues within its case law. For instance, the determinations of the Court in the question of 
165 ibid, para. 64.  
166 ibid., para. 89; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, para. 101–102. 
167 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
168 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 89. 
                                                 
122 
 
imputability, the extraterritorial application of the Convention and the establishment of 
state responsibility169 have been referred to in similar subsequent applications against 
other Contracting States.170 Therefore, it seems that, if the Court had not rejected the 
present argument, its credibility in assessing significant issues within its case law would 
have been undermined.  
 
The Court, thirdly, examined the argument that no obligation to exhaust domestic 
remedies arose since there was an administrative practice of ongoing violations of the 
applicants’ rights. The Court referred to the inter-state case,171 in which the European 
Commission of Human Rights found that the TRNC authorities’ refusal to allow the entry 
of G/Cypriots into northern Cyprus reflected the acknowledged public policy of the 
authorities and therefore constituted an administrative practice. This was because, at the 
time of this holding, the applicable legislation and official policies did not render the 
formation of effective remedies possible.172 However, in the case of Demopoulos, the 
Court held that this situation has changed with Law no.67/2005, which sought to provide 
a mechanism of redress, and found it necessary to open the way for Turkey to take further 
steps to eliminate administrative practice. 
 
It is abundantly clear that, within the context of the Cyprus property dispute, continuing 
failure of politics to achieve a mutually agreed compensation or restitution mechanism at 
the local level has gradually become a serious threat to the Convention mechanism. As 
indicated above, the new property mechanism under Law no. 67/2005 and the IPC came 
into existence as the consequence of the Court holding in Xenides-Arestis that Turkey had 
to introduce a remedy which secured the effective protection of the rights under the 
Convention.173 
 
Importantly, in respect of property claims of Cypriots, it has taken nearly a decade for the 
Court to support the Turkish government, under its guidance, in producing adequate 
169 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 52. 
170 Banković and others v. Belgium (2004) 44 EHRR SE 75. 
171 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, paras. 264–265. 
172 ibid, paras. 171–184. 
173 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185; UN General Assembly, Implementation of General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 entitled ‘Human Rights Council’, Report of the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Question of Human Rights in Cyprus: Note by the 
Secretary-General, p 3.  
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redress for its violations in northern Cyprus, since its first judgment concerning the 
alleged violation of property rights under the Convention. In essence, the Court reached 
a point in which it adopted its most recent position in its Cyprus rulings, subsequent to 
the rejection of the Annan Plan, a position which included a property mechanism for the 
resolution of the property issue, in favour of the G/Cypriots. In addition to the repetitive 
cases of Cypriots, the subsidiary character of the Strasbourg Court has become more of 
an issue within the Court’s case law regarding the Cyprus cases with the realisation that 
these cases constitute a serious threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention’s 
machinery. 
 
Against this backdrop, it really has to be asked what the Court’s attitude towards the 
repetitive Cyprus cases would be, should the comprehensive settlement plan never come 
into existence. To be more precise: which factual circumstances would have triggered the 
Court to depart from its traditional pattern in Cyprus rulings? Taking into account the 
fourteen-year timeline of the Court’s case law in respect of northern Cyprus, a 
considerable change in the Court’s approach to the Cypriot property cases can clearly be 
observed. However, the Court’s standards in its Cyprus judgments are still unclear and 
unpredictable. There is no doubt that this situation derives from the origin of these cases 
which, can be regarded as an ‘ancient conflict’ between two communities. But what is 
even more considerable is the essentially unresolved status of this problem. Accordingly, 
it can be maintained that, with regard to the aforementioned questions, as long as the 
Court examines cases that are the consequence of unresolved conflicts between the parties 
of the claims particularly burdened with historical, legal and political issues, there will be 
an increase in the inconsistencies among its judgments.  
 
Bearing all this in mind, it is conceivable that, in addition to the increased number of 
clone cases, the examination of cases originating from an unresolved conflict that affects 
a significant number of individuals may also represent a serious threat to the Convention’s 
mechanism. This becomes abundantly clear when one considers that there is no 
established case law regarding such conflicts, as there is in Cyprus cases, including where 
the violation of Convention rights may arise in an unrecognised entity/ state at 
international level. This may lead to an unpredictability and inconsistency in the 
jurisprudence of the Court and therefore may become a threat to the effectiveness and 
credibility of the Strasbourg Court. 
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Turning to the case of Demopoulos, the Court rejected the fourth argument, that requiring 
exhaustion lent legitimacy to an illegal occupation. In order to support its decision, the 
Court referred to the previous finding in the inter-state case174 and to the so-called 
‘Namibia Principle’175 by maintaining that ‘… even if the legitimacy of the administration 
of a territory is not recognised by the international community, “international law 
recognises the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and transactions in such a 
situation, … the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants 
of the [t]erritory”’.176 It went on to state that the mere fact that there was an illegal 
occupation ‘does not deprive all administrative or putative legal or judicial acts therein of 
any relevance under the Convention’.177 
 
The Court, in line with its previous judgments on northern Cyprus, held that Turkey was 
the responsible state for the actions and policies of the TRNC and for those affected by 
such policies and actions. This is due to the overall control exercised by Turkey over the 
territory of northern Cyprus. These policies and actions fall within the jurisdiction of 
Turkey for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention, which makes Turkey accountable 
for violations of Convention rights that take place in that part of the island. This 
accountability entails Turkey taking positive steps for the protection of Convention 
rights.178 In essence, the rationale behind this reasoning can also be considered as the 
avoidance of the Court’s self-contradiction concerning its previous findings in this 
respect. 
 
In addition to Turkey’s accountability for violations of the Convention in the TRNC, 
another crucial consideration for the Court was to avoid a vacuum. In the Court’s view, 
the creation of a legal vacuum would operate to the detriment of the inhabitants of the 
TRNC or to those who live outside of that territory who may claim to have been the 
victims of infringements of their rights. Receiving protection of the Convention rights of 
individuals on a daily basis has an outstanding importance in the Court’s jurisdiction. 
174 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, paras. 89–102. 
175 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case (Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] International Court of Justice Reports 16,. p. 56, para. 125). 
176 ibid; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para.94. 
177 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para.94. 
178 ibid, para. 95. 
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Therefore, regardless of in which part of the island the applicants live, the rule of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35(1) of the Convention is applicable if 
an effective remedy is available in the northern part of the island for the complaints of the 
applicants concerning their rights under the Convention.179 
 
In light of these findings, the Court held that remedies available in the TRNC, in particular 
the IPC procedure, may be regarded as domestic remedies of Turkey for the purpose of 
Article 35(1) of the Convention. Following this finding, the Court went on to examine the 
effectiveness of Law no. 67/2005 and the IPC mechanism. 
 
3.5 Determination of Whether Law no. 67/2005 and the IPC Provide Practical and 
Effective Remedies 
 
In respect of the existence of practical and effective remedies, the Court found that Law 
no. 67/2005 provides an accessible and effective framework of redress concerning 
complaints about interference with the property owned by G/Cypriots.180 In assessing the 
applicants’ and the government of RoC’s arguments on the lack of effectiveness of the 
IPC mechanism, the Court examined four issues in this regard: the adequacy of the 
redress, the independence and impartiality of the redress, the adequacy of the 
compensation to G/Cypriots and the accessibility and efficiency of the remedy. 
 
 
As regards the adequacy of the redress, the applicants and the government of the RoC put 
forward that the main objective of the IPC mechanism was to legitimise the illegal seizure 
of the G/Cypriot property but not to provide effective redress for property owners. On 
this basis, they regarded the new restitution and compensation system as a ‘sham or smoke 
screen’ mechanism. This argument was supported on two bases. First, there was no 
provision in the IPC procedure to acknowledge the breaches of the rights and, second, the 
IPC mechanism was based on Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution which purported to 
expropriate the G/Cypriot property.181 They underlined the low percentage of property 
that had been restored and further argued that restitution had to be the primary remedy.182 
179 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 95. 
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As a response to the argument concerning the ambition to legitimise the illegal seizure of 
the G/Cypriot property, the Court reiterated the finding in the case of Loizidou which had 
become a doctrine concerning the status of the TRNC. On the basis of the fact that the 
international community did not regard the TRNC as a state under international law, and 
thus the sole legitimate government of Cyprus was the RoC, the Court held that it could 
not attribute legal validity to Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution. Although the fact 
that Article 159 had not been repealed, according to the Court, the international law 
position and the findings of the Court in this regard have been acknowledged by the 
TRNC authorities.183 
 
Additionally, the Court maintained that the Turkish government no longer contested their 
responsibility under the Convention for the areas in the northern part of the island that are 
under the control of the TRNC. The Court continued to note that the Turkish authorities 
acknowledged the rights of G/Cypriot owners to remedies for breaches of their rights 
under P1-1, which was reflected to the IPC mechanism. This acknowledgement was 
considered as an indication that the IPC mechanism sought to apply the Court’s findings 
and guidance in the earlier cases.184 Moreover, the Court also maintained that the specific 
recognition of a violation of rights by the authorities was not generally a requirement 
under Article 35(1) of the Convention.185 In light of the above consideration, the Court 
found no basis to hold that ‘the adequacy of the remedy is affected by lack of any formal 
indication of unlawfulness or breach of rights’.186 
 
In assessing the criticism regarding an ‘overly-restrictive’ approach to the restitution of 
possession of property to G/Cypriots, the Court reiterated that the validity of Article 159 
of the TRNC Constitution was rejected in its previous cases.187 Since G/Cypriot owners 
continued to be regarded as the legal owners of title, there was a continuing violation of 
P1-1 due to the continuing denial of access to and enjoyment of G/Cypriot property. For 
this reason, G/Cypriot owners did not claim compensation for the loss of the properties 
183 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 107. 
184 ibid, para. 108. 
185 ibid, para. 109 
186 ibid, para. 109. 
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but only pecuniary damages.188 What is remarkable, here, is that the Court, differing from 
its previous Cyprus rulings, drew attention to the possible outcome of this situation. In 
this regard, it could be the case that G/Cypriot owners of properties located in the north 
may apply to the Court ‘periodically and indefinitely’ in order to claim loss of rents until 
the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.  
 
In this regard, the Court stressed the time-dependent changes following the loss of 
possession by the owners. In many cases, property has changed hands in various ways 
such as by gift or succession. Another concern of the Court was possible property claims 
of those who may have never seen or ever used the property in question. In light of these 
presumptions, after the Court questioned ‘to what extent the notion of legal title, and the 
expectation of enjoying the full benefits of that title, is realistic in practice’, it regarded 
such losses ‘increasingly speculative and hypothetical’.189 In this respect, the Court 
recalled that ‘there has always been a strong legal and factual link between ownership 
and possession … and it must be recognised that with the passage of time the holding of 
a title may be emptied of any practical consequences’.190 
 
Taking this rationale into account, it could be argued that the Court disregarded the 
property claims of legal successors of G/Cypriot owners. Although the Court recognised 
the legal ownership of the applicants over the properties in question, this approach seems 
to exclude the individuals who have never seen or used the property in question. In line 
with the Court’s position in this respect, one could argue that the protection of rights of 
G/Cypriot claimants whose property could be regarded their ‘home’191 within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the Convention outweighs the rights of individuals who have no 
significant links to those properties they left in the northern part of the island. The Court, 
in the case of Gillow,192 ruled that an applicant who built a house and moved into that 
house with an intention to live in it and established no other domicile elsewhere could be 
regarded to have ‘strong and sufficient links’193 with his or her house. According to the 
Court, this was sufficient to consider that house his or her home within the meaning of 
188 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 110. 
189 ibid., para. 111.  
190 ibid. 
191 Gillow v. UK (1982) 11 EHRR 335, para. 46. 
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Article 8 of the ECHR.194 
 
It seems that the claim of a property owner whose house falls within the notion of ‘home’ 
under Article 8 will receive more lenient assessment than the legal owner who had not 
retained ‘sufficient and continuing links’ with his or her house. It is conceivable on this 
point that the passage of time factor has gained importance within the scope of property 
claims of individuals from post-conflict societies.  
 
In the same vein, the Court gave a prominent place to the time factor in assessing 
G/Cypriot property claimants’ rights to the home under Article 8 of the ECHR and current 
T/Cypriot occupants. The claims concerning the loss of possession by G/Cypriot owners 
whose property was not to be considered their ‘home’ was regarded as ‘increasingly 
speculative and hypothetical’. The Court went on to state that the passage of time may 
break a link between ownership and possession and may also eradicate the holding of a 
title.195 
 
In this regard, the Court emphasised that recognition of the breaking power of the time 
factor should not be equated to the applicants in Demopoulos having lost their ownership. 
Taking into account the cause of the eviction, it has been held that title could not be legally 
imputed to the invading power as a form of adverse possession in the case of military 
occupation. That being said, the Court found it unrealistic to directly order Turkey to 
ensure that the applicants ‘obtain access to, and full possession of, their properties, 
irrespective of who is now living there or whether the property is allegedly in a militarily 
sensitive zone or used for vital public purposes’.196 In essence, the current situation of the 
claimed properties has become a determinant factor in assessing the property claims of 
G/Cypriot owners. Although the loss of possession caused by military forces does not 
remove ownership, it may weaken the link between owner and the claimed property with 
the passage of time. 
 
In this respect, it may true to state that it is at a very late stage that the rights of current 
194 Grgic and others, The Right to Property under the European Convention of Human Rights, A Guide to 
the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols, Human Rights 
Handbook No. 10, Strasbourg: Council of Europe (2007) p. 19. 
195 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 111.  
196 ibid, 112. 
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users or other factors related to those properties in question (whether they are located in 
a militarily sensitive zone or used for vital purposes) are considered noteworthy enough 
to be taken into account while examining the rights of G/Cypriot property claimants. In 
fact, it seems clear that any interference with the rights of persons who currently occupy 
the properties in question may not be justified for the protection of the rights of the 
owners. 
 
In light of these considerations, the Court noted that the attenuation over time of the tie 
between the holding of title and the possession of the property must have consequences 
on the nature of the redress which can be considered as fulfilling the requirements of 
Article 35(1) of the Convention.197 What is remarkable is that the Court gave a green light 
to the Turkish government to produce remedies that take into account the current 
situations of the occupants and the properties claimed for. 
 
As for the nature of the redress, it has been established in the Court’s case law that the 
Contracting Parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will 
comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. If the nature of the breach 
allows restitutio in integrum, it is for the respondent state to implement it. However, if it 
is not possible to restore the position, in such situations where national law does not allow 
or allows only partial reparation, the Court has imposed alternative forms of reparation. 
It is Article 41(1) of the ECHR which empowers the Court to impose alternative 
requirements on the Contracting State198 to pay compensation for the value of the 
property.199 
 
The Court noted that this approach has been consistently applied in various cases, even 
to those concerning unlawful expropriations of property.200 It has been accepted by the 
Court that this principle is also applicable where the illegality is on an international level. 
In respect of Turkey’s occupation in the northern part of the island, the Court may not 
depart from this approach in assessing applications concerning interference with property 
rights. Following this position, the Court seems to be taking the position that the 
197 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 113. 
198 Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 477. 
199 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 114; Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 
16 EHRR 440. 
200 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440; Iatridis v. Greece (1999) 30 EHRR 97.  
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respondent government can award the property claimant other forms of redress including 
compensation and alternative non-monetary redress. It appears that State Parties are not 
obliged to implement restitutio in integrum even if violation of property rights derive 
from illegal occupation of a Contracting State over the territories of other states. 
 
As a response to the applicant’s argument that to allow Turkey to apply alternative 
remedies other than restitutio in integrum would lead Turkey to benefit from its own 
illegality, the Court stressed the notion of property within the Convention mechanism. It 
further went on to indicate that ‘property is a material commodity which can be valued 
and compensated for in monetary terms’.201 No unfair balance between the parties appears 
as long as compensation is paid in accordance with the Court’s case law. Besides 
compensation, the Court recognised that an exchange of property may also be an 
acceptable redress within this field. 
 
The Court explained the rationale behind this approach by stressing the passage of some 
thirty-five years since the applicants or their predecessors in title left their property in the 
north. According to the Court, the lapse of some thirty-five years was sufficient to refrain 
from imposing an obligation on the respondent state to implement restitution in all cases, 
as to act otherwise ‘it would risk being arbitrary and injudicious’ for the Court.202 It 
further rejected an argument aimed at preventing the respondent State from taking into 
account other considerations, in particular the position of third parties. Imposing an 
obligation on Turkey to provide restitution would mean ignoring the rights of the current 
occupants of the properties claimed. It has been stressed that following such an approach 
would pave the way for new violations of human rights. 
 
It has been stressed that following such an approach would establish a basis for new 
violations of human rights that would affect various numbers of individuals. In this 
context, the Court held that: 
 
 
It cannot be within this Court’s task in interpreting and applying the provisions of the 
Convention to impose an unconditional obligation on a Government to embark on the 
forcible eviction and rehousing of potentially large numbers of men, women and children 
even with the aim of vindicating the rights of victims of violations of the Convention.203 
201 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 115. 
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In a nutshell, the Court seems in its most recent Cyprus ruling to be taking the position 
that the lapse of thirty-five years is thus sufficient: to allow the respondent state to 
implement remedies other than restitution even though the cause of violation originates 
from an illegal use of force; to consider the situations of current users to those properties 
in question; to weaken the link between the owner and the claimed property, which may 
outweigh the rights of current users and not to consider any interference with the rights 
of these users justifiable to protect the rights of the owners. 
 
It is notable that, by accepting ‘compensation’ and ‘exchange’ as alternative forms of 
redress, the Court did not reject ‘restitution’ as a remedy for the violation of applicants’ 
rights. Within the scope of the Convention mechanism, the Court stated that the principal 
purpose of restitution is to mitigate the consequences of violations of property rights. 
However, imposing an obligation on the respondent state to effect restitution to put an 
end to the violations and re-establish the situation concerning property matters may create 
new violations of human rights. In order to refrain from creating new breaches of property 
rights of various numbers of people, the Court found it crucial to ensure that the redress 
applied to those old injuries does not create new violations of individuals’ rights.204 
Therefore, the property mechanism provided to remedy the breaches of property rights 
should consider the particular circumstances in each case.  
 
Taking into account the Court’s earlier judgment in Xenides-Arestis, it appears that 
restitution was seen as a precondition for a remedial mechanism concerning the property 
claims of displaced persons.205 The absence of any provision for restitution was regarded 
as the major deficiency of the proposed remedy, Law no. 49/2003, of the respondent state. 
Taken together with the Court’s approach in Demopoulos, it seems clear that balancing 
the interests of G/Cypriot property owners with the interests of the current occupants has 
also gained a prominent place within the context of a complete system of redress. This 
became evident in the case of Demopoulos when one considers the Court’s stance, which 
allowed Turkey to choose the type of redress to remedy its violations of property rights 
on the grounds of the concept of a margin of appreciation.  
 
204 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 117.  
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Failure of a domestic remedy in creating a balance between the aforementioned interests 
of individuals may result in new violations of rights protected by the Convention. 
According to the Court such a balance can best be obtained by Contracting States as it is 
they are ‘who are in the best position to assess the practicalities, priorities and conflicting 
interests on a domestic level’.206 This rationale impelled the Court to leave the choice of 
implementation of the most appropriate form of reparation to Contracting States. It 
explicitly stated that this approach can also be followed in the case of the northern part of 
Cyprus. Taking these considerations into account, as to the new law of the respondent 
government, the Court held that ‘no problem therefore arises as regards the impugned 
discretionary nature of the restitutionary power under Law 67/2005’.207 
 
Finally, in assessing the adequacy of Law no. 67/2005, the Court noted that the amount 
of property that is eligible for restitution in practice, whether a small proportion or not, 
cannot be considered as a factor that undermines the effectiveness of the new redress of 
the respondent government. The Court recalled its previous finding, in which the lack of 
any provision for restitution was determined as a defect. Taking into account the fact that 
restitution of property had already occurred at the time of its judgment in Demopoulos, 
the Court concluded that ‘the amended law has made good of this shortcoming’.208 
 
The independence and impartiality of the IPC is another issue that needed to be examined 
in order to decide whether the IPC provided a practical and effective form of redress to 
G/Cypriot property claimants. Since Law no.67/2005 would be implemented by the IPC, 
its composition was crucial in the matter of independence and impartiality of the property 
mechanism. The Court rejected the applicants’ arguments in this respect and found ‘no 
specific, and substantiated, grounds concerning any lack of subjective impartiality of 
members of the IPC have been put forward’.209 
 
In reaching this decision, two factors were taken into account. First, the Court pointed out 
that the IPC is made up of a minimum of five (and a maximum of seven) members, two 
of whom are independent international members. Second, none of its members are living 
206 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 118 
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in houses owned or built in property owned by G/Cypriots as such persons are expressly 
excluded. The Court further noted that the illegal nature of the regime under international 
law and the existence of the Turkish army or the appointment of the IPC members by the 
TRNC president could not remove any objective impartiality or independence from the 
IPC. 
 
It appears that the Court’s stance taken here is in line with its earlier judgment.210 In 
assessing the composition of the former commission, which was established under Law 
no. 49/2003, it had raised concerns about its independence and impartiality as the majority 
of its member were occupants of G/Cypriot property. Moreover, the Court in Xenides-
Arestis suggested that an international composition would enhance the commission’s 
standing and credibility.211 
 
As to the arguments of the applicants concerning the adequacy of the compensation, the 
Court was not convinced that ‘the sums of compensation awarded under Law no. 67/2005 
will automatically fall short of what can be regarded as reasonable compensation.’212 It 
noted that the amount of compensation awarded for pecuniary damages in Xenides-
Arestis was EUR 800,000, which was the equivalent of the figure of CYP 466,289 put 
forward by the IPC. In assessing this issue, the Court also pointed out the case of Eugenia 
Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey in which a friendly 
settlement had been reached and then approved by the Court.213 
 
The final examination was the accessibility and efficiency of the remedy. The concern of 
the applicants in this issue was the burden of proof which was placed on claimants by 
Law no. 67/2005. The Court explicitly stated that the requirement that immovable or 
movable property claimants provide title deeds or proof of ownership was a necessary 
and unavoidable precondition to making an application. The Court concluded that 
applicants claiming property are required to prove their ownership or title beyond 
reasonable doubt by noting that the same burden of proof is often relied on by the 
210 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, Decision on Admissibility of 14 March 2005, unpublished. 
211 ibid. 
212 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para.123. 
213 Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd. and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey (2003) 39 EHRR 772, para. 
121. 
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Court.214 
 
The Court noted that the need to attend numerous sessions of the IPC as a part of the 
process for submitting a claim for property does not render the IPC mechanism ‘unduly 
onerous or inaccessible’.215 As to another concern, that decisions were unreasoned and 
lacking in transparency, the Court pointed out that most of the claims have been settled 
at an earlier stage of a decision on the merits from the IPC. There are only few cases that 
have reached the merits stage of a decision, which is not sufficient enough to draw any 
general conclusion concerning the process of the IPC.216 According to the new 
compensation and restitution mechanism, a right of appeal lay with the TRNC High 
Administrative Court. Therefore, the Court noted that if any property claimant considered 
that there had been material unfairness or procedural irregularity they would have a right 
to appeal the IPC decision before the TRNC High Administrative Court. 
 
In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that Law no. 67/2005 provides an 
accessible and effective framework of redress to G/Cypriot property claimants for their 
complaints about interference with property rights. As to the case of Demopoulos, since 
the applicant property owners had not made use of the IPC mechanism in respect of 
property claims, the Court rejected their complaints under P1-1 to the Convention for 
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.217 
 
In this respect, the Court made its finding clear in that applicants are not required to apply 
to the IPC. If applicants do not want to submit their claims for a decision by the IPC, they 
may choose to await a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. In any event, if 
any applicant wishes to bring a claim concerning his or her rights under the Convention 
before the Court, the aforementioned principles and approach will be applied in the 
admissibility of this claim. Accordingly, applicants who have exhausted available 
domestic remedies in pursuant to Article 35(1) of the Convention can bring their 
complaints before the Court, through its supervisory jurisdiction, in conformity with the 
principle of subsidiarity.218 
214 ibid, para.124. 
215 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 126. 
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217 ibid, para.127.  
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In a number of cases, the Court stressed that the supervision system set up by the 
Convention is subsidiary in character.219 The principle of subsidiarity represents one of 
the cornerstones of the Court’s case law and has extremely important consequences for 
the process of applying the Convention.220 It has been recognised as a basic principle for 
the process of implementing the Convention.221 The Court explicitly indicated the 
subsidiary nature of the Convention as follows: 
 
The machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national 
systems safeguarding human rights …The Convention leaves to each Contracting State, in 
the first place, the task of securing the rights and freedoms it enshrines. The institutions 
created by it make their own contribution to this task but they become involved only through 
contentious proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been exhausted (Article 26).222 
 
In this respect, the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is generated from the 
subsidiary nature of the Convention. In a number of cases, the Court reiterated that the 
rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention 
‘obliges those seeking to bring their case against the state before an international judicial 
organ to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system.’223 Therefore, states 
are given an ‘opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system’.224 It has 
been recognised that this rule is based on the assumption that there is an effective remedy 
available in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system.225 Here, the underlying 
rationale is the principle of subsidiarity, which recognises that ‘the primary competence 
and duty of the State [is] to protect effectively within the domestic legal order the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention’.226 
 
As has been recognised in Article 1 of the Convention, it is for the Contracting Parties to 
secure the rights of everyone within their jurisdiction. In other words, a person has to 
exhaust national remedies that have been provided in relation to the alleged violations. 
219 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 143, para. 64. 
220 ibid, para. 3. 
221 Herbert Petzold, “The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity” in Ronald St. J. Macdonald, F. 
Matscher, and H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1993) pp. 50, 59–60. 
222 Handyside v. UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para. 48. 
223 ibid, para. 48; Aksoy v.Turkey (1996) 23EHRR 553, para.51. 
224Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 143, para. 64; Handyside v. UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, 
paras. 47–48. 
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As is set out in Article 1 of the Convention, the primary responsibility for securing the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention falls upon the 
national authorities while the responsibility of the Convention institutions are secondary 
in this respect due to the fact that their main objective is ‘essentially to guide and to assist 
with a view to ensuring that the Convention States secure to individuals the necessary 
protection through their own institutions and procedures.’227 
 
As to the case of Demopoulos, the Court found no grounds for exception of the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity. The paramount importance of this principle of ensuring 
the protection of rights at national level was stressed.228 It appears that, where practical 
and effective remedies are available, the principle of exhaustion of those remedies is 
applicable. 
 
At this juncture, it is interesting to note that, less than two weeks before the Court’s 
decision in Demopoulos, the significance of the subsidiary nature of the supervisory 
mechanism established by the Convention was emphasised at the High Level Conference 
meeting at Interlaken on February 18–19, 2010. A deep concern in respect of a large 
backlog of applications before the Court was stressed and the crucial consequences of this 
situation were explicitly indicated: 
 
 
…this situation causes damage to the effectiveness and credibility of the Convention and its 
supervisory mechanism and represents a threat to the quality and the consistency of the case-
law and the authority of the Court.229 
 
During the conference, it was reiterated that the State Parties are obliged to ensure that 
the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention are fully secure at the national level. 
In this regard, a call has been made to those states for a strengthening of the principle of 
subsidiarity. The conference also invited the Court to ‘apply uniformly and rigorously the 
criteria concerning admissibility and jurisdiction and take fully into account its subsidiary 
role in the interpretation and application of the Convention.’230 
227 ibid, p.61. 
228 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para.101.  
229 The ‘High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights’ ended with the 
passing of the Interlaken Declaration, 19 February 2010, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/Reform+of+the+Court/Conferences/>accessed: 
17 September 2013. 
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It seems clear that the principle of subsidiarity is fast gaining importance in line with the 
increase in applications before the Court. This situation is stressed by the president of the 
Court, Jean-Paul Costa, when he called upon the State Parties to the Convention to use 
the Interlaken Conference to emphasise state support for the Court as well as to initiate a 
process of long-term reform of the Strasbourg control system.231 
 
In the memorandum of President Costa with a view to preparing the Interlaken 
Conference, he noted that the Convention system and the Court had achieved remarkable 
success. However, he expressed a deep concern about the consequences of the Court’s 
heavy caseload and pointed out that the number of new applications was almost 50,000 
and the number of cases pending was almost 100,000 at the end of 2008. He went on to 
identify three categories of cases from these numbers: first, the numerous inadmissible 
cases; second, repetitive applications usually well founded and reflecting a structural 
problem already diagnosed by the Court; and third, rare applications raising new issues.  
 
Turning to the situation in Cyprus, it is clear that G/Cypriot applications concerning the 
alleged violations of property rights fall under the second category. Importantly, it must 
be noted, a particular emphasis has been placed on what maybe the appropriate measures 
that could be taken immediately without amending the Convention. The ones that are 
relevant to the Cypriot claims can be determined as follows: 
 
Many of the problems will be resolved if the States take the necessary preventive and 
corrective measures at national level … and if they execute the Court’s judgments promptly. 
The Court can and must help them by… adopting a judicial policy giving more extensive 
effect to Article 13 which is one of the key elements of subsidiarity and in respect of which 
Article 35 (the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies before bringing a case to Strasbourg) 
is the opposite side of the coin.  
 
States should be encouraged to participate in certain methods or procedures initiated by the 
Court: friendly settlements and unilateral declarations; pilot judgments and ‘freezing’ of cases 
of the same type pending a general solution.  
 
More effective implementation at national level and application by the national courts not 
only have the potential to reduce the case-load. They also make it easier for the Court to 
maintain an appropriate distance from national proceedings in full compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity.232 
231 Alastair Mowbray, ‘The Interlaken Declaration: The Beginning of a New Era for the European Court of 
Human Rights?’ Human Rights Law Review (2010)  vol. 10, no.3, pp. 519–528 
232 Memorandum of the President of the European Court of Human Rights to the States with a View  
to Preparing the Interlaken Conference, 3 July 2009, < www.coe.int/t/dc/files/ 
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In the case of Demopoulos, the Court’s approach to the issue of domestic remedies in the 
north part of Cyprus seems in parallel to the points stressed in the Interlaken Conference. 
Although the Court’s decision – Law no. 67/2005 provides an accessible and effective 
framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference with the property owned 
by G/Cypriots – has met with severe criticism,233 it can correctly be argued that this 
decision is the major contributor to the progress of the property dispute in Cyprus. This 
is evidently true if one considers that the number of repetitive cases, all based on similar 
property issues, from Cyprus, was more than 8,000 at the time of Demopoulos.234 In 
addition to its local impact, the Court decision in Demopoulos is also of importance, to 
some extent, in relation to the effectiveness of the Convention system through reducing 
the flood of repetitive applications before the Court. 
 
Demopoulos is the first case in which the Court, for the first time in its Cyprus rulings, 
rejected the G/Cypriot complaints under P1-1 to the Convention for non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies by way of the TRNC. Since the Court found the IPC to be an effective 
domestic remedy for the purpose of Article 35(1) of the Convention, with this ruling, 
G/Cypriots have no longer direct recourse to the Court for their complaints concerning 
interference with property rights. Hence, this judgment broke with the Court’s traditional 
approach towards the Cypriot property cases. Not surprisingly, the decision triggered 
strong criticism, which will be examined in the next chapter of this thesis, in respect of 
the Court’s new stance in such cases. 
 
3.6 The Property Regime of the Annan Plan and its Impact on the Cyprus Rulings 
of the Strasbourg Court 
 
A proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, the so-called Annan 
Plan, failed since the majority of the G/Cypriots voted against it. Therefore, the plan has 
become null and void, and has no legal effect. To put it differently, the peace plan is 
effectively dead and thus as is the property mechanism proposed under it. However, it 
 p. 6. (emphasis added). 
233 Arguments in this debate will be examined in Chapter 4.  
234 Press and Information Office of the RoC, ‘Commentaries, Editorials and Analysis’ (8 August 2010), 
<www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/24C351AE3A568355C22576E0004B72DF?OpenDocument> 
accessed: 19 September 2013.  
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can validly be argued that the spirit of the dead plan is still around and the plan itself 
remains a point of reference within the context of the property issue in Cyprus. This is 
clear if one considers two particular cases. The first one is the case of Xenides-Arestis in 
which the parties to the case attempted to use the Annan Plan to develop their arguments. 
The second one is the case of Demopoulos, which can be differentiated from Xenides-
Arestis. This is because, in Demopoulos, it was the Strasbourg Court that referred 
extensively to the Annan Plan and further analysed the complex treatment of property 
claims provided by the plan. In order to understand whether the plan had an impact on 
the Court’s recent Cyprus ruling, it will be beneficial to briefly look at the property 
mechanism set out by the plan. 
 
Following the displacement due to the division of the island in 1974, authorities of both 
communities established rules for the dispossessed properties of displaced Cypriots. As 
indicated earlier, the nature of these regulations was in line with the contradictory 
perspectives of the two communities on the Cyprus problem. In particular, the T/Cypriot 
side had no concerns in respect of G/Cypriot properties in the north as they were 
supporting the view that the property conflict should be resolved in accordance with the 
‘established principle of bi-zonality’ or otherwise through ‘global exchange and 
compensation’.235 Accordingly, a provision, in line with this perspective, was provided 
under the TRNC Constitution, which declared abandoned G/Cypriot properties in the 
north as ‘the property of the TRNC notwithstanding the fact that they are not so registered 
in the books of the Land Registry Office’.236 This approach had no legal consequences 
until the advent of the Loizidou case. 
 
On 28 January 1987, Turkey accepted the competence of the European Commission of 
Human Rights and of it to receive petitions according to Article 25 of the Convention and 
on 22 January 1990, it recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention that relate to the exercise 
of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. These were the major 
developments which were regarded as strategic moves aimed at facilitating Turkey’s 
membership to the EU.237 
235 Gürel & Kudret (n 5), p.12.  
236 Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution.  
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As to Turkey’s presence in Cyprus, the aforementioned recognition opening the way for  
displaced G/Cypriots to access the Court and bring their claims concerning the alleged 
violation of their rights against Turkey. Loizidou was the first judgment in this context 
and the Court found Turkey responsible for human rights violations in the northern part 
of Cyprus. This finding was reiterated in all subsequent cases concerning similar 
complaints by G/Cypriots and became a well-known fact in the Court’s Cyprus rulings. 
It is important to note that when the Turkish government rejected the implementation of 
the Court’s decision in Loizidou, on the basis that the issue was related to the settlement 
of the Cyprus problem, the case became a significant political obstacle for Turkey.  
 
During the year of 1999, the pressure on Turkey to comply with this ruling had steadily 
grown. Turkey faced possible suspension of its membership of the Council of Europe. 
Additionally, Turkey’s refusal to comply with the Court’s decision in Loizidou would 
also jeopardise its EU accession prospects.238 Taking these considerations into account, 
Turkey, finally, implemented the Court’s decision and thus paid Ms Loizidou over one 
million dollars in compensation for the loss of use of her property in the north. In essence, 
with the rise of G/Cypriot property claims before the Court, settlement of the Cyprus 
conflict was a prerequisite of the EU accession process of Turkey.239 
 
The European Council Summit, held in 1999, recognised Turkey as a candidate for EU 
membership. Turkey’s contribution to the settlement of the Cyprus problem was therefore 
one of the requirements for its accession into the EU. On 11 November 2002, the new 
government of Turkey formed by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) clearly 
supported the final version of a UN-sponsored proposal for the reunification of Cyprus. 
The Annan Plan was put to separate and simultaneous referenda in both parts of the island 
on April 24, 2004. In the referenda, 64.9% of T/Cypriots voted for the plan, whereas 
75.8% of G/Cypriots vetoed it. The Annan Plan did not enter into force and became null 
and void. Following the rejection, the RoC entered the EU as a divided island on 1 May 
2004. 
Implementation and Domestic Reform’ Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) 
Publications, (2007); Tufan Erhurman, Kibris’ta Akil Tutulmasi, Lefkosa, Isik Kitapevi Yayinlari (2007) 
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The proposed Foundation Agreement in ‘The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus 
Problem’ was submitted to separate simultaneous referenda. It therefore did not enter into 
force. The rejection of the plan was regarded as a ‘missed opportunity’ to resolve the 
Cyprus question. While the G/Cypriots’ decision to veto the plan marked a ‘major 
setback’, the decision of the T/Cypriots was ‘welcomed’. In his report, the UN Secretary-
General clearly expressed his disappointment with this result and called upon the 
members of the Council to ‘give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally 
and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have 
the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development’240 and added 
that such a support must be interpreted as a positive contribution to the resolution of the 
Cyprus question and not a recognition of the TRNC as a state. 
 
As a result, the strong support of the T/Cypriots for reaching a settlement had no legal 
consequences other than ‘gaining a moral high ground’241 at international level. As to 
Turkey’s stance during the referendum period, the UN Secretary-General maintained that 
‘the effort to reach a settlement received an immeasurable boost’ with Turkey’s support 
and its new policy on Cyprus.242 As to the G/Cypriot position, particularly the G/Cypriot 
President Tassos Papadopoulos’ call for rejecting the plan three days before the referenda, 
enlargement commissioner Günter Verheugen declared that he was disappointed in this 
attitude of the G/Cypriot leadership and emphasised this in his speech held in the 
European Parliament: 
 
I feel personally cheated by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. I have done my utmost,…, 
in good faith and trusting in the promises made by the Greek Cypriot Government, to establish 
parameters which would enable the Greek Cypriots to endorse this plan. Sadly, this has not been 
achieved. … Never before in the history of the European Commission has a member of the European 
Commission been banned from making statements on a key European issue in a Member State on 
the grounds that it constitutes interference in its domestic affairs. I call upon President Papadopoulos 
to ensure that in his country, the basic freedoms of information and opinion are strictly guaranteed, 
and that from today onwards, free access is granted in the Cypriot media to all those who are able 
to provide a full explanation of this plan in line with the United Nations’ intentions. As before, I am 
willing to do so.243 
240 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 
(S/2004/437), 28 May 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/41176f4a4.html>, accessed 26 
November 2013. 
241 Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘Turkey and the Cyprus Dispute: Pitfalls and Opportunities’, Ankara Bar Review, (2010), 
p.74. 
242 UN Security Council, (S/2004/437), para.78. 
243 European Parliament, Debates, 21 April 2004, Strasbourg, EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen’s 
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As a consequence, the referenda ‘marked a watershed in the history of United Nations 
efforts in Cyprus’244 and the efforts to resolve the long-standing Cyprus problem failed. 
Although considerable steps were taken during the negotiations, none of these was ‘a 
substitute for a comprehensive settlement’. In spite of the non-compliance of the 
G/Cypriot side,245 Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided island and the T/Cypriots 
continued to be the people of an internationally unrecognised entity. It has been argued 
that with the accession of the divided island, the EU has imported ‘the long-lasting 
conflict into its institutions and bodies, and thus, paradoxically, has failed to comply with 
its own procedures.’246 
 
The short overview of the referendum period has attempted to show initial steps taken 
towards the formation of a bridge between the Court and the Annan Plan. Among others, 
one of the main reasons for the G/Cypriot rejection of the plan in the 2004 referendum 
was the property regime proposed under the settlement plan. Since it is far beyond the 
purpose of this thesis to consider all other key reasons for this rejection, there will be a 
brief look at the basic provisions of the property regime of the Annan Plan. The reason 
for this brief analysis, although the plan has no legal effect, is the Court’s explicit 
reference to the property regime of the Annan Plan in its most recent case of Demopoulos. 
As mentioned before, the Court in the case of Demopoulos extensively referenced the 
property provisions of the Annan Plan although it was rejected. In this context, an issue 
that can be raised here is whether the property mechanism under the plan can be taken as 
a basis for the formation of a new property system by the Cypriots. In essence, by 
following this approach, the Court seems to take the position that property complaints can 
well be treated through a domestic mechanism of the same nature as the one proposed 
under the Annan Plan.  
 
The Annan Plan is the latest and the most comprehensive settlement plan of the Cyprus 
problem. It envisaged the formation of a federal state, ‘The United Cyprus Republic’, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20040421&secondRef=ITEM-
001&format=XML&language=EN> accessed: 17 September 2013. 
244 UN Security Council, (S/2004/437). 
245 Stefan Engert, EU Enlargement and Socialization: Turkey and Cyprus, Oxon: Routledge, (2010), p. 65. 
246 James Ker-Lindsay, Hubert Faustmann, Fiona Mullen, An Island in Europe: The EU and the 
Transformation of Cyprus (International Library of Twentieth Century History), IB Tauris, p. 14.  
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consisting of two constituent states called ‘Turkish Cypriot Constituent State’ and ‘Greek 
Cypriot Constituent State’ based on the principles of bi-zonality and bi-communality. 
 
Annex VII of the Annan Plan provided detailed provisions to deal with properties that 
had been affected by events since 1963. A property regime was established in order to 
resolve the claims of persons who were dispossessed of their properties ‘in a 
comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for individual rights 
of dispossessed owners and current users and, the principle of bi-zonality’. An impartial 
and independent Property Board would be created to deal with property claims and 
implement the provisions of the property mechanism.247 
 
The plan proposed that properties in the areas subject to territorial adjustment would be 
reinstated to dispossessed owners. These areas are currently under the control of the 
TRNC but would become part of the Greek Constituent state. In areas that remain outside 
territorial adjustment, property rights would be exercised through reinstatement or 
compensation. Dispossessed owners who opted for compensation would receive ‘full and 
effective compensation for their property on the basis of value at the time of dispossession 
adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable locations’. All other 
dispossessed owners would have the right to reinstatement of one-third of their property 
(in value and land area of their property ownership) and to receive full and effective 
compensation for the remaining two-thirds.248 
 
In this respect, it was estimated that the T/Cypriot-administered territory would be 
reduced from around 36% to 29% of the territory of the 1960 RoC.249 The area that would 
be subject to territorial adjustment and would be reinstated to dispossessed owners was 
around 7% of the territory of Cyprus. This would have led 54% of G/Cypriots who were 
displaced in 1974 to be reinstated. The number of inhabitants who would have to be 
relocated would be a quarter of the current population of the north.250 
 
The plan provided a domestic remedy for the resolution of all issues related to affected 
247 Article 10 in the Main Articles of ‘The UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan of the Cyprus Problem’, 
(so-called the Annan Plan), 31 March 2004 (fifth version). 
248 ibid. 
249 UN Security Council, (S/2003/398), para. 112. 
250 ibid, para.116. 
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property pursuant to Article 37 of the ECHR. The United Cyprus Republic would be the 
sole responsible State Party and would request the Court to strike out any proceedings 
before it concerning affected property. Therefore these cases would be solved through the 
domestic mechanism provided in the plan. This provision is particularly relevant with the 
application of the subsidiarity principle to the Cypriot property cases brought before the 
Court after the rejection of the Annan Plan.  
 
As to the claims and applications, the plan proposed that a dispossessed owner would be 
entitled to claim compensation or reinstatement of his or her title to property. 
Additionally, the plan also provided protection to current occupants of affected properties 
who are dispossessed owners and to persons who made significant improvements to 
affected properties. These persons may apply to receive title to such properties. All such 
claims and applications would be made to the Property Board.251 
 
This short overview of the basic provisions of the property regime provided in the Annan 
Plan shows that Law no. 67/2005, which was determined as an effective domestic remedy 
for the property claims, is in line with the proposed strategy in the plan. In assessing the 
effectiveness and adequacy of the IPC, the Court in Demopoulos held that it constitutes 
an effective and available remedy by referring to those aforementioned provisions in the 
Annan Plan. This also explains why, in particular, those provisions in the plan have been 
chosen to be considered in this thesis. Although the resolution plan was rejected and thus 
its property mechanism, it is difficult to say that it is totally dead, at least within the 
context of the ECtHR case law. The fact that it has no legal effect does not lead the Court 
to ignore the relevant provisions concerning the property claims brought before it. This 
is evident when one considers the Court’s focus on this rejected property regime in 
Xenides-Arestis and Demopoulos. These are the major cases that reflect the impact of the 
Annan Plan over the Court’s Cyprus rulings and may even justify the gradual change of 
the Court towards the clone cases from Cypriots.  
 
Notably, the Court in Demopoulos emphasised that the Annan Plan provided a balance 
between the property rights of G/Cypriots and the rights of Turkish settlers as well as 
251 Annex VII, Article 6 of the Foundation Agreement in ‘The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus 
Problem’. 
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T/Cypriot refugees who are currently occupying the properties of G/Cypriots. In light of 
the Court’s approach in Demopoulos, it can be argued that compensation and restitution 
mechanisms concerning post-conflict societies, which are in line with the property 
strategy proposed in the Annan Plan, may also be regarded as effective remedies. In this 
sense, not only the property regulations under the plan but also the Cypriot property cases 
provide additional and considerable criteria for other states in similar situations to those 
in Cyprus. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The property cases of displaced Cypriots examined above articulate an interaction, spread 
throughout the fourteen-year timeline, between the ECtHR case law and the Cypriot 
property cases. On the basis of the case analysis made, it can validly be argued that the 
case law of the Court concerning Cypriot property complaints is a contribution to the 
Court’s jurisprudence in various respects, particularly in relation to post-conflict 
situations. Just one example which served to illustrate this in the above part is the case of 
Loizidou. This is the case in which the crucial issues, mainly concerning the Cyprus 
problem, were raised and discussed at the global level. For instance, the concept of 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention is only one of these issues that has been 
analysed in detail from different aspects. 
 
In assessing the Cypriot property complaints, numerous other cases, concerning the 
violation of property rights, against other Contracting Parties have been referred to by the 
parties as well as by the Court. For instance, the Court’s approach in the cases of Loizidou 
and Bankovićwere compared in order to illustrate how the notion of jurisdiction was 
interpreted and thus applied differently within the case law of the Strasbourg Court. While 
the Court in the case of Loizidou held that jurisdiction was not restricted to the national 
territory of the Contracting States and effective overall control over a territory was enough 
to bring it within a state’s jurisdiction, in the Banković case it maintained that the 
jurisdictional competence of a state is essentially territorial in nature while not excluding 
exceptional cases.  
 
Since 1996, with the advent of the Loizidou judgment, the Court’s case law on Cyprus 
has not only developed, but its attitude towards property claims has also gradually 
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changed with the influence of political, legal and factual realities on the island. Not 
surprisingly, the major as well as the most apparent change in the Court’s attitude took 
place following the failure of the comprehensive settlement plan for the Cyprus problem, 
which could have finalised the prolonged property conflict on the island.  
 
In the course of more than a decade, significant numbers of property claims have been 
lodged before the Court and crucial matters in many respects have been discussed. At the 
time of the writing of this thesis, the property dispute still remains unresolved today. It is 
notable that, although the most recent case is at a critical junction in the process of solving 
the property dispute on the island, it should be borne in mind that this judgment – besides 
being a turning point for Cypriot property cases – is also a way towards a temporary 
mechanism to temporarily remediate the property conflicts in Cyprus.  
Such a solution, which is temporary in nature, does not provide a durable settlement of 
the property problem. In fact, it has to be acknowledged by both T/Cypriots and 
G/Cypriots that the property crux on the island can only be resolved through the 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus question. It needs to be recognised that the 
establishment of a durable peace can be achieved by explicitly solving the conflicted 
matters with mutually flexibility, confidence and a compromise.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Requirements of the Right to Property Within the Meaning of the ECtHR Cyprus 
Rulings 
 
 Introductory Remarks 
 
Property is a highly sensitive and emotional issue particularly for persons who have been 
forcibly displaced from their own land and houses by civil strife or conflict. As a result 
of its level of significance, property represents one of the major issues of the areas of 
human rights. Besides the fact that the right to property is enshrined under Article 1, 
Protocol 1 (P1-1) of the ECHR (the Convention), this right is not absolute. The rationale 
behind this is the fact that states can interfere with property rights under specific 
circumstances. The ECHR is one of the principal tools for the protection of the right to 
property and it also identifies the conditions in which these rights may be restricted. 
 
Within the scope of the Convention mechanism, although the right to property is 
significant, no definition of ‘property’ is provided, as it does not have a single definition 
that is recognised internationally. This reason is clearly understandable. The lack of a 
definition of the word under the Convention is because the issue of property differs from 
country to country, based on and influenced by their political, legal and historical 
structure. Throughout this thesis, there has been an attempt to understand property rights 
under the P1-1 to the Convention and the requirements for a legitimate interference with 
the right to property. In order to achieve this purpose, an examination has been made of 
property rights of Cypriots within the scope of the ECtHR (the Court) case law, 
specifically in respect of the conflicted rights of displaced persons over the properties in 
question, by considering other rulings on property disputes in Europe.  
 
It should be noted that the purpose of this chapter is not to assert that the decisions and 
judgments of the ECtHR on Cyprus cases were faulty. The objective of this chapter is to 
analyse and understand the approach of the Court, which has gradually changed, in 
assessing property rights in Cyprus in the context of its wider rulings on property disputes 
in Europe and to determine whether crucial features and circumstances of these cases 
have adequately been examined in reaching its decisions.  
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4.1 State Obligations Within the Context of P1-1of the ECHR 
 
In accordance with Article 1 of the Convention, the Contracting Parties should secure the 
rights and freedoms were entrenched under the Convention. The wording in Article 1 has 
been interpreted as containing an imposition of both negative and positive obligations 
upon states when the text of later articles regarding rights is taken into account. In the 
matter of negative obligation, a state should respect human rights and is required to 
abstain from interference. An example of this is Article 3 of the Convention, which 
considers the issue of torture: states ‘should refrain from’. Such obligations are typical of 
those that applied to civil and political rights.1 As to positive obligations, these are raised 
when a state ‘must take action’ in order to secure human rights. Economic, cultural and 
social rights are generally determined under positive obligations. Additionally, these 
obligations can be imposed where they concern civil and political rights, for instance: to 
hold free elections (Article 3, First Protocol); obligation to protect the right to life by law 
(Article 2(1)); to provide prison conditions that are not inhuman (Article 3).2 Hence, while 
positive obligations require positive intervention by a state, negative obligations require 
a state to refrain from interference.3 
 
Turning to the issue of property, as mentioned earlier, property is a highly sensitive and 
emotional issue which involves both sentimental and material value. In this respect, 
another issue arises: although the Convention protects the right to property, to what extent 
– if at all – does P1-1 offer protection for violation of property rights that occurred in the 
past? Indeed, the issue of past violations represents, perhaps, the most complex issue 
within the Court’s jurisprudence if one considers the period after the end of the Second 
World War.  
 
In this regard, it is questionable ‘whether a state can be held responsible for lack of action 
to restore past injustices’.4 In essence, the question as to whether cases concerning 
1 David J. Harris, Michael O’Boyle and others, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009) pp. 18-19 
2 ibid. 
3 Jean Francois and Akandji-Kombe, ‘Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, Human Rights Handbooks (2007) no.7, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
<http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/50/50_HRHandbooks>, accessed: 8 November 2013, p. 11. 
4 Ali R. Coban, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human Rights, Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd (2004) pp. 163–164. 
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confiscation of private property without compensation during the socialist era can be 
brought before the Court5 is of great importance for former socialist states party to the 
Convention. Here, a note can be made that, since the largest population movements in 
European history, which brought about massive violation of property rights, arose prior 
to accession of the human rights treaties by states, unfortunately it seems unachievable 
for the Court to deal with all possible claims in this regard. 
 
Following the embodiment of the right to property under the Convention, the issue of past 
violations of this right gained a prominent place at the international level. Displaced 
persons who had been forced to leave their houses, land and lives behind, as well as 
having experienced war-related traumas, may have considered the formation of the 
protection of property rights as the ‘light at the end of tunnel’ in terms of remediating 
their losses at least to some extent. In a country that remained in conflict, the resolution 
of the property issue would become increasingly significant. Cyprus is probably the best 
example of this situation. 
 
The concept of protecting the rights of individuals under the Convention is itself evidence 
of the injustices of the past. In the matter of past violations, the land and property 
problems can be considered mainly as the consequences of the Second World War. As a 
result of the war, the properties of millions of people were destroyed or confiscated. 
Thirty-one million people were expelled from their home lands, displaced and left their 
valuables behind between the years 1945 and 1952.6 
 
In accordance with the Convention system, a Contracting Party cannot be held 
responsible for an act that took place before the date of entry into force of the Convention 
in respect of that state.7 The Convention does not impose any obligation on Contracting 
States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior that date. Therefore such 
claims will be out of the jurisdiction of the Court, ratione temporis. From the ratification 
of the Convention, when jurisdiction ratione temporis applies, all Contracting Parties’ 
5 ibid., 164. 
6 Icelandic Human Rights Centre, ‘Ratione Temporis’, <http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/comparativeanalysis/therighttoproperty/ratione/> accessed: 17 
December 2013. 
7 Blečić v. Croatia (2006) 43 EHRR 48; Šilih v. Slovenia (2009) ECHR 571, para. 140; Varnava and Others 
v. Turkey (2009) ECHR 1313, para. 130. 
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acts and omissions must conform to the Convention.8 In this respect, the significance of 
the issue of continuing violation becomes obvious, particularly for people of a state in 
which large numbers of houses and properties were confiscated without compensation 
during its history– such as people from the former socialist states9 and Cyprus – people 
who became victims of a violation of property rights. This issue of continuing violation 
represents the core consideration for such people within the context of property rights 
under the Convention. 
 
The existence of a vast number of such displaced persons in Europe, whose land has been 
arbitrarily confiscated, creates great concern as to the possible millions of future cases 
arising from such states. This begs the question as to whether confiscation of property 
without compensation, deriving from past injustices, can be brought before the Court. In 
this respect, it is useful to consider the Court’s wider rulings on property conflicts from 
European states while examining its cases law on Cyprus.10 
 
The 2004 Kopeckỳ 11 judgment is a clear example in the case law of the Court in this 
context. In its judgment, the Court stressed that ‘the Convention imposes no specific 
obligation on the Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior 
to their ratification of the Convention’. However, what is remarkable here is that in some 
situations it is not as simple as determining whether the facts of the complaint brought 
before the Court occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention with respect to 
the Contracting State in question. This is of great significance to claimants in terms of 
whether their applications are found admissible by the Court, particularly if the 
established case law means that the provisions of the Convention do not bind a 
Contracting Party in relation to any act or omission that took place or any situation which 
ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the Convention with respect to 
that Party (the critical date). In situations in which an act constitutes a violation of rights 
occurs by way of an instantaneous act that occurs prior to the critical date, an application 
is rejected for lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis and thus the Court adjourns the 
examination of the remainder of an application. 
8 European Court of Human Rights, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, Council of Europe-European 
Court of Human Rights, 2011, <www.echr.coe.int>accessed: 18 December 2013. 
9 Coban (n 4) p.164. 
10 ibid,p. 164. 
11 Kopeckỳ v. Slovakia (2004) 41 EHRR 944, para. 38. 
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In addition to the issue of instantaneous acts, the Court also considers the notion of a 
continuing violation by emphasising its significance for complaints brought under P1-1, 
particularly those from former communist states. In its judgments concerning deprivation 
of property under communist regimes, the Court has adopted a common approach. It has 
distinguished nationalisation and its continuing effects from any subsequent proceedings 
in relation to the restitution that was initiated after the ratification of the Convention.12 
This distinction has been made by taking continuity and instantaneity of act as a ground. 
In fact, such distinction is of great importance to consequences of those acts. It has been 
recognised by the Court that deprivation of ownership is, in principle, an instantaneous 
act and thus does not produce a continuing situation. In this connection, applications 
complaining solely of nationalisation by communist regimes are rejected on the basis of 
lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis.13 
 
The Court also supports the possibility that once a Contracting State produces legislation 
that provides for full or partial restoration of property confiscated under a previous 
regime, such a remedial mechanism may be regarded as generating a new property right 
protected by P1-1 of the Convention. It has also accepted that this may apply to 
regulations for restitution or compensation established under pre-ratification legislation, 
if such legislation remained in force after the ratification of Protocol 1 to the Convention 
by the Contracting State.14 A clear example of this is the judgment of Broniowski v. 
Poland15 in which the Court ordered the Polish government to secure the implementation 
of the property right in question through appropriate measures or to establish a remedy in 
accordance with the principles of protection of property rights under P1-1.  
 
In the case of Broniowski,16 the Strasbourg Court had to deal with a case concerning a 
Polish citizen, who belonged to a large category of persons who were subject to the same 
issue in question, and who had been deprived of his property after the Second World War. 
Polish law, ordering compensation to those persons who had to abandon their property 
located within the ‘territories beyond the Bug River’ before the year of 1945, was the 
12 Harris and others (n1) p.802. 
13 ibid, p.803. 
14 ibid. 
15 Broniowski v. Poland (2004) 40 EHRR 21. 
16 Broniowski v. Poland (decision on admissibility) [GC] no. 31443/96, 19 December2002, ECHR, X. 
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main point in question. As to the facts of the case, Poland had adopted an obligation to 
compensate owners who had to leave their properties behind in an international agreement 
concluded in 1944. On this basis, Polish law provided compensation to those persons who 
had been deprived of their properties. In the judgment on the admissibility of the case in 
2002,17 the applicant argued that his entitlement to his abandoned property had not been 
satisfied, and alleged that this situation constituted a violation of P1-1 to the Convention. 
According to the applicant, the state’s continuous failure to satisfy his entitlement had 
been caused by a series of acts and omissions on the part of the authorities and further 
argued that a failure amounted to an interference with his property rights. In his view, the 
interference complained of was a result of the state’s failure to fulfil its legislative duty 
to regulate claims in respect to the question of the Bug River and to establish conditions 
for the implementation of the claimants’ rights.  
 
In order to support its argument, the Polish government directed the Court to approach 
this issue regarding deprivation of ownership, in principle, as an instantaneous act that 
did not produce a continuing violation of a right. In respect of the present case concerned, 
Poland maintained that deprivation of property had occurred at the moment when the 
applicant had been repatriated from the territories beyond the Bug River, which had taken 
place prior to Poland’s ratification of Protocol No. 1. Since there had been no interference 
with the applicant’s rights under P1-1 at that time, the Polish government could not be 
held responsible and a continuing violation could not be found in the case.18 
 
Following the assessment of the arguments of the parties, the Court stressed that its 
jurisdiction-ratione temporis covers only the period after the ratification of the 
Convention or its Protocols by the respondent state. Accordingly, the Court, in respect of 
the present case, held that it was competent to examine the facts of the case because the 
acts had occurred after the date of ratification of Protocol No. 1 by Poland. As a response, 
the Polish government this time argued that the alleged acts that potentially affected the 
applicant’s situation had occurred prior to the ratification date and the act which could be 
considered as a deprivation of property had taken place at the moment when the property 
was abandoned. In this regard, the Court emphasised that the applicant neither 
complained of being deprived of the property nor complained about the denial of a 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid, paras. 68–69–77.  
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compensation claim based on laws or facts prior to the ratification date. Moreover, it 
pointed out that the applicant’s complaint was not directed against a single specific 
decision or measure taken before, or even after the relevant date. The Court further stated 
that the factual basis of the applicant’s claim was the alleged failure to satisfy an 
entitlement to the compensation that was vested in him under Polish law on the 
ratification date. Taking these considerations into account, the Court concluded that the 
application was compatible ratione temporis by virtue of the fact that the applicant’s 
complaints were based on the Polish state’s acts and omissions in respect of the 
implementation of an entitlement to a compensatory measure.19 
 
Turning to the issue of the Contracting States’ obligation to correct the past injustices 
under P1-1, the Court has adopted another approach, which is to allow those states to 
enact a new act concerning the properties formerly confiscated without compensation. 
The issue of whether a state can be held responsible for lack of ‘retroactive’ remedies in 
order to restore past violations is particularly relevant for Romanian cases. Case law on 
this particular type of case has been developed through the judgments of the Court. In 
particular, in a significant number of cases from Romania,20 applicants whose properties 
were unjustifiably confiscated brought their repossession claims before the domestic 
courts. Although in the Romanian cases, the Court of First Instance upheld the applicants’ 
rights of ownership, the Supreme Court of Justice quashed those judgments of the Court 
of First Instance and dismissed the application for confirmation of title. The Supreme 
Court explained that the courts did not have jurisdiction to examine the lawfulness of 
confiscations.21 After these cases were brought before the ECtHR, it was held that there 
had been a violation of P1-1 in all these cases, depending on the decisions of the Court of 
First Instance. These courts’ decisions in these cases were considered as a new act of 
public authorities, and was found sufficient to apply P1-1 to the Convention for past 
interferences with property by the Court.22 
 
19 Broniowski v. Poland (2004) 40 EHRR 21, paras.20–23, 60–77. 
20 Coban, (n 4), p.165; Brumărescu v. Romania (1999) 35 EHRR 887. 
21 Coban, (n 4), pp.164-165; Vasiliu v. Romania (2002) ECHR 459; Hodos and Others v. Romania (2002) 
ECHR 455. 
22 Coban, (n 4), p.165; Vasiliu v. Romania (2002) ECHR 459; Hodos and Others v. Romania (2002) ECHR 
455. 
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A salient example in this regard is the case of Brumărescu v. Romania,23 in which the 
Romanian government took possession of the applicant’s parents’ house in 1950 under 
Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation. In 1993, the applicant brought an action before 
the Court of First Instance and alleged that nationalisation was null and void. He argued 
that the property of employees could not be nationalised in accordance with Decree no. 
92/1950 and since his parents had been employed at the time of nationalisation, the act 
was null and void. Against this argument, the Court of First Instance held that the 
nationalisation under Decree no. 92/1950 had been a mistake since his parents were under 
the category of persons whose property the decree exempted from nationalisation. It 
further added that the state could not have acquired title to the house under Decree 
no. 218/1960 nor Decree no. 712/1966 since those instruments had been contrary to the 
Constitutions of 1952 and 1965 respectively.  
 
In this regard, the court ordered the administrative authorities to return the house to the 
applicant. However, the Supreme Court of Justice quashed this judgment in 1993 on the 
grounds that the Court of First Instance had exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the 
lawfulness of the application of Decree no. 92/1950.After the applicant lodged an 
application regarding his aforementioned case before the Strasbourg Court, he alleged 
that the judgment of the Supreme Court had had the effect of infringing his right to 
peaceful enjoyment of his possession. As a response, the ECtHR maintained that the 
Supreme Court of Justice did not intend to rule on the applicant’s claim to a property 
right; however, it held that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to 
property on the grounds of the fact that the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment quashed 
the final judgment in 1993 vesting the house in the applicant, even though the judgment 
had been exhausted.24 
 
In Brumărescu v. Romania,25 the ECtHR took into consideration the decision of the Court 
of First Instance, which ordered the administrative authorities to return the house to the 
applicant. However, all the rights of the applicant regained in the final judgment in his 
favour were removed by the Supreme Court of Justice and the state had demonstrated its 
23 Brumărescu v. Romania (1999) 35 EHRR 887, paras. 14–15. 
24 ibid, paras. 20, 66, 74. 
25 Brumărescu v. Romania (1999) 35 EHRR 887, para. 76; Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 
35, para. 63. 
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title to the house under the nationalisation decree. Following this, the applicant was 
informed that the house would again be classified as state property. As a result of the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice, the applicant was deprived of the rights of 
ownership of the house, which had been vested in him by virtue of the final judgement in 
his favour. Therefore, he was no longer able to sell, devise, donate or dispose of the 
property. After observing these developments, the Strasbourg Court held that the effect 
of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice was to deprive the applicant of his 
possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1.26 
Therefore an examination has been made by the ECtHR in order to determine within the 
meaning of which rule provided in P1-1 the interference in question fell.  
 
The Court noted that in order to determine whether an interference with property falls 
within the ambit of the second rule, it should be considered whether there has been a 
formal taking or expropriation of property and it must also look behind the appearances 
and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. As a result of the fact that the 
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective, it has to be 
ascertained whether the situation amounted to a de facto expropriation. In this respect, 
the Court explicitly indicated that a taking of property within this second rule can only be 
justified if it is in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law. 
Additionally, the requirement of proportionality must also be satisfied. Another crucial 
point is that a fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of 
the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental 
rights.27 
 
As a result of its examination, the Court finally held that no justification had been offered 
for the situation brought about by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice. 
Deprivation of property as being in the public interest was justified neither by the 
Supreme Court of Justice nor by the government. The applicant had been deprived of the 
ownership of the property for more than four years without being paid compensation 
equivalent to its real value.28 Finally, the Court emphasised that, even assuming that the 
26 Brumărescu v. Romania (1999) 35 EHRR 887, para. 77; The three rules under P1-1 to the Convention is 
analysed in detail in Chapter 2 of this Thesis. 
27 Brumărescu v. Romania (1999) 35 EHRR 887, paras. 76–78; Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 
EHRR 35, paras. 69–74. 
28Brumărescu v. Romania (1999) 35 EHRR 887, para. 79. 
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taking could be shown to serve some public interest, a fair balance was upset and that the 
applicant bore and continued to bear an individual and excessive burden. Accordingly, 
there had been and continued to be a violation of P1-1.29 
 
In light of all the above considerations, the case could be made that the Strasbourg Court 
established an approach in its case law in respect of the issue of the responsibility on 
behalf of the Contracting Parties to restore past injustices. To summarise, the Court’s 
approach requires waiting for an establishment of a new remedy pertaining to those 
properties that were formerly confiscated without compensation. In a large number of 
cases, the Court followed the same pattern, particularly in cases from former socialist 
states such as in the cases of Brumărescu v. Romania, Broniowski v. Poland and other 
Romanian cases.30 At this juncture, it is notable that although the facts of these cases are 
similar to those from Cyprus, the Court, interestingly, did not consider applying the same 
approach in property complaints brought before it by displaced Cypriots. In order to 
understand the rationale behind the Strasbourg Court’s attitude in this respect, it will be 
useful to consider the consistency of the Court’s case law concerning the protection of 
property rights within the scope of P1-1.  
 
4.2 Is the ECtHR Assessment on Interference with Property Rights Stable? 
 
As indicated and examined in Chapter 2 of the thesis, the right to property is a 
fundamental right and subject to restrictions in certain situations. As to the right to 
property, P1-1 to the Convention protects citizens of contracting states against the 
arbitrary deprivation of property, not against the deprivation of property in itself.31 The 
requirements imposed upon the Contracting Parties that amount to a justifiable 
interference with property are determined in P1-1. Accordingly, in cases in which a state 
does not comply with the principles identified as a justifiable interference and takes a 
person’s property arbitrarily, the ECtHR declares a violation of property rights guaranteed 
under the Convention, by the state in question. A pertinent example of this field is the 
29 ibid, para. 80. 
30 Vasiliu v. Romania (2002) ECHR 459; Hodos and Others v. Romania (2002) ECHR 455. 
31 Jacques Sluysmans & R.L. de Graaff, ‘Land reform in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights.  Lessons for South-Africa?’ (The Conference on ‘Land Divided: Land and South African Society 
in 2013, in Comparative Perspective’, University of Cape Town, 24 – 27 March 2013) 
<http://www.landdivided2013.org.za/sites/default/files/sluysmans%20european%20court%20of%20huma
n%20rights.pdf> accessed: 12 November 2013. 
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judgment of the Court in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden.32 This case is one of the 
authoritative cases within the context of property rights in P1-1 since it contains 
significant determinations that have been made with respect to the interpretation and 
application of P1-1 that have contributed to the Court’s case law. In its examination of 
Sporrong and Lönnroth, the ECtHR explicitly identified that P1-1 to the Convention 
comprises three distinct rules.33 The Court repeatedly applied this approach in almost all 
subsequent cases that were brought before it by Contracting States. This finding has 
become the Court’s traditional approach through its case law in this respect. 
 
Turning to the Court’s case law on Cypriot property claims of displaced persons, 
understanding the remit of P1-1 is of great importance not only to G/Cypriot claimants 
but also to current occupants of those properties owned by G/Cypriots. Taking into 
account its significance in relation to the issue of property disputes in Cyprus, P1-1 will 
be examined within the scope of property cases of G/Cypriot claimants. In order to 
determine whether the Court’s rulings on Cyprus are in line with similar judgments 
concerning other contracting States, different cases with similar facts will be considered. 
This approach aims to demonstrate the coherency (or otherwise) of the Court’s case law 
and will also help to illustrate the sui generis nature of the property cases from Cyprus. 
Accordingly, this analysis will be based on the question of whether the notion of the three 
rules in P1-1 to the Convention corresponds with the path the Court has followed in 
examining the facts and the features of cases concerning the property complaints of the 
displaced G/Cypriots.  
 
 
4.3 The Application of P1-1 of the ECHR to Cyprus Property Cases 
 
In order to achieve the scope of this thesis, concerning the sui generis character of Cypriot 
cases, which needs to be considered within the understanding of P1-1 using the case law 
of the Strasbourg Court, the rulings of the Court will be compared and examined. The 
Court’s traditional approach, in the examination of applications brought under P1-1, was 
to adopt a method of applying P1-1 to judgments. The Court’s usual formulation in 
applying P1-1 is to first consider whether the second or third rule applies. If neither of the 
32 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 61. 
33 Deborah Rook, Property Law and Human Rights, London: Blackstone Press Limited (2001) p.61. 
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rules is applicable to the case at issue, following this, the Court continues to examine 
whether the first rule is applicable. The examination of these rules will be in line with the 
Court’s own order for assessing the rules. Therefore, it helps to reiterate the second 
sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1of the Convention, which provides that: 
 
No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by general principles of international law. 
 
Interference with one’s property within the meaning of the second rule is regarded as 
‘deprivation’. As explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the term ‘deprivation’ under P1-1 
should be understood as ‘expropriation’ within the meaning attributed to it by the 
Strasbourg of the Strasbourg Court. Although the second rule provides for deprivation of 
property without guaranteeing compensation or a requirement of compensation, 
according to the established case law, deprivation will require, in principle, the payment 
of compensation in all but exceptional cases.34 Additionally, deprivation within the 
meaning of the second rule of P1-1 normally requires the transfer of ownership of the 
property. 
 
In general, deprivation will bring about a transfer of ownership and thus the rights of the 
owner are extinguished.35 In this respect, it should also be taken into account that there 
may be some cases in which illegal deprivation of property occurs in the form of de facto 
expropriation. In such cases, the status of ownership and the rights of an owner in property 
do not change and an owner retains the legal ownership of that property. What is 
remarkable here is that, in this situation, there is still a de facto expropriation. Formal 
expropriation and de facto expropriation fall into the same class when taking into 
consideration their effect. The common feature of de facto expropriation and formal 
expropriation is they both transfer property. The difference, on the other hand, is that de 
facto expropriation is not based on legal procedure as it is in formal expropriation.36 
 
Within the issue of expropriation, it is important to understand what de facto 
expropriation is. A clear example that reflects the issue of de facto expropriation is the 
34 Rook (n 33), p. 94. 
35 James v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123; Lithgow v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 329. 
36 Laurent Sermet, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights’, Human Rights Files, 
vol. 11 (revised edition), Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing (1990) p.24; Rook (n 33) p. 63; 
Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
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case of Papamichalopoulos v. Greece,37 which concerned the unlawful occupation of the 
applicants’ land by the Navy Fund since 1967. This is the case in which the term ‘de facto 
expropriation’ was used for the first time in the history of the ECtHR case law. In 
examining this case, the underlying reasons behind using the term de facto expropriation 
were contained in the Court’s assessment. The Court maintained that ‘the applicants were 
unable either to make use of their property or to sell, bequeath, mortgage or make a gift 
of it; Mr Petros Papamichalopoulos […] was even refused access to it.’ The Court’s 
analysis and its coining of the term may have flowed from the fact that there had been no 
attempt to regularise the Greek procedure, which prevented the owners from considering 
any remedies and had left them without redress for twenty-eight years.38 
 
Another clear example to illustrate the Court’s position in this regard is the case of 
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden.39 In this case, the main question at issue was whether 
the applicants were formally deprived of their possession or not. The Court examined the 
applicability of the second and third rules before determining the applicability of the first 
rule to the case. The applicants complained about the length of the period over which the 
expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction affecting the applicants’ property 
had been in force. According to the applicants, the length of the time-limits for the fixing 
of compensation for expropriation constituted an unlawful interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of their possession, which constituted a violation of P1-1. In its examination 
of the case under the second and third rules, the Court maintained that the Swedish 
authorities did not proceed to an expropriation of the applicants’ properties. Therefore 
there was no formal deprivation of applicants’ properties. This determination was 
established on the basis of the fact that the applicants were entitled to use, sell, devise, 
donate or mortgage their properties although it became difficult to utilise the properties 
in question.40 
 
The expropriation permits were not intended to limit or control use since they were an 
initial step in a procedure leading to deprivation of possession. Therefore they did not fall 
within the ambit of the second paragraph. The Strasbourg Court held that they must be 
37 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, para.43. 
38 Sermet, (n 36) p. 24; Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, para.43. 
39 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
40 ibid, para. 62. 
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examined under the first sentence of the first paragraph. Their right in question lost some 
of its substance as a result of limitations, but it did not disappear.41 Therefore this new 
type of interference with property was introduced by this judgment. As to the case law of 
the Court, if interference does not transfer the property to public authorities, nor does the 
interference aim to control the use of the property, then it constitutes interference with 
the substance of the property. Considering the Court’s case law, it is reasonable to state 
that the more flexible the context of the provisions are (the development of the level of 
interference in correlation with  the substance of property), the more differentiated the 
Court’s evaluation on cases can become, even where there is no difference between the 
facts of these cases. 
 
The Court, in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, adopted a significant 
approach that has repeatedly been approved in similar subsequent cases that have similar 
features of Sporrong and Lönnroth. Here, the Court further determined that in the case of 
an absence of a formal deprivation, it must consider the appearances and investigate the 
realities of the situation complained of. The rationale flows from the objective of the 
Convention, which is to guarantee the property rights in a practical and effective way. 
Accordingly, the determination of whether there has been a de facto expropriation can be 
considered by looking at the appearances and investigating the realities of the situation.42 
After taking these into account, the Court explained that the potential to dispose of the 
properties was reduced due to limitations imposed on the property rights in question. The 
core element present in order for the Court to reach this conclusion was the disappearance 
of the right. Although the right in question lost some of its substance, it did not disappear. 
On this basis, it was held that the effects of Swedish measures do not constitute a 
deprivation of possession and the alleged violation did not fall within the ambit of second 
rule of P1-1.43 This finding of the Court has been established with its case law and has 
been applied in a large number of property cases. 
 
In summary, there is a crucial difference between ‘formal expropriation’ and ‘de facto 
expropriation’ in P1-1 to the Convention. The cases that are subject to de facto 
expropriation, in fact, are not common. The examination of whether there has been a de 
41 ibid, para. 65; Coban, (n 4), p. 187. 
42 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 62. 
43 ibid, para. 63. 
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facto expropriation is treated cautiously by the Court.44 Whether the same level of 
sensitivity exists in considering the existence of de facto expropriation in the Court’s case 
law on Cyprus cases is questionable. Therefore, in order to answer this question, which 
is crucial in order to determine the position of the displaced persons in Cyprus, an 
examination and comparison of the Court’s stance in particular cases will be made.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the term de facto expropriation was first raised in the case of 
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece.45 In this case, the possession of the applicants’ land was 
taken over by the Navy Fund in 1967 by means of a law enacted by the military 
government of that time. A naval base and a holiday resort for officers were established 
on the land in question. The applicants alleged an unlawful occupation of their land by 
the Navy Fund since 1967 and complained of a violation of P1-1. After democracy had 
been restored, the authorities recognised the applicants’ title but they recommended 
exchange of the land for other land of equal value. However, the land given to the 
applicants for exchange was not able to be used for the proposed purpose. On this basis, 
the applicants alleged a violation of P1-1. The Court held that the occupation of the land 
by the Navy Fund constituted an interference with the applicants’ rights to the peaceful 
enjoyment of their possession, guaranteed under P1-1. After an examination was held on 
the question of whether the interference fell within the ambit of the second paragraph of 
P1-1 (third rule),46 the Court stated that the interference was not intended to control the 
use of property and thus it did not fall under the third rule. Considering the fact that the 
relevant domestic law did not transfer ownership of the land in question to the Navy Fund, 
the Court held that the applicants’ properties were not subject to deprivation.  
 
In Papamichalopoulos, like in the case of Loizidou, the applicants’ land had never been 
formally expropriated and accordingly the applicants remained owners of the land. It was 
maintained that since possession of the land in question was taken by the Navy Fund, the 
applicants were unable either to make use of their property or to sell, bequeath, mortgage 
or make a gift of it. Taking this into account, it was held that the loss of all ability to 
dispose of the land in question resulted in serious consequences for the applicants who 
44 Rook, (n 33) p.63.  
45 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, para. 44. 
46 ibid. 
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had de facto been expropriated.47 This constituted a violation of their right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of their possessions.  
 
In the cases of Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v. Turkey,48 in reaching its decision, that 
the G/Cypriot applicants could not be regarded as having lost their title to their properties, 
the Court mainly took into account the unrecognised status of the TRNC Constitution by 
the international community where by the Constitution purported to expropriate the 
G/Cypriot land. The Court held that there had been continuing interference with property 
rights since the G/Cypriots were not allowed to access their properties and had lost all 
control over them due to the division of the island. In Loizidou, unlike the case of 
Papamichalopoulos, although the applicants were regarded as remaining the legal owners 
of their land, interference with that land was not considered as either expropriation or de 
facto expropriation. The Court did not ‘title’ the interference with property rights over the 
G/Cypriot properties in question. It was merely determined that interference falls within 
the general rule of P1-1. Taking the Court’s judgment in Loizidou into account, it is 
questionable whether the absence of entitling the interference in Loizidou and subsequent 
cases brought by G/Cypriot applicants is political.  
 
This argument is grounded on the fact that if the Court had regarded interference with 
G/Cypriot properties as expropriation or de facto expropriation, significant consequences 
might have occurred at a global level. Two major consequences could arise here. First, if 
the Court had titled interference with G/Cypriot property rights as expropriation or de 
facto expropriation, this would have created massive political and legal debates in the 
international arena concerning the unrecognised character of the TRNC and the 
recognition of its acts stemming from its Constitution. Second, had those cases and those 
interferences been considered as de facto expropriation, the cases would have been out of 
the jurisdiction of the Court ratione temporis due to an instantaneous act. 
 
4.4 Continuing Nature of Alleged Violations 
 
The notion of continuing violation of property rights is another significant issue that needs 
to be examined in order to clearly understand the context of P1-1 to the Convention. As 
47 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, paras. 42–46. 
48 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731. 
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was indicated above, if a violation occurred before the respondent state’s ratification date 
of the Convention or its Protocols, the Court has no competence to examine the alleged 
complaints concerning the violations of rights guaranteed under P1-1.49 Although the 
concept of continuing violation is accepted in the Court’s case law, its meaning and scope 
have not explicitly been defined in the Convention. Therefore, the issue of continuing 
violation can be best understood through the examination of the Court’s case law in this 
respect. It is notable that the continuing violation is subject to controversial debates 
particularly in cases in which an instantaneous violation with lasting effects appears. In 
this regard, the Court’s rulings on the cases of Sporrong and Lönnroth, 
Papamichalopoulos and Loizidou represent clear examples. These cases are significant 
for the understanding of the notion of a continuing violation and require close 
consideration in order to illustrate the way in which the Court applied the issues of 
‘continuing violation’ and ‘de facto expropriation’ to its judgments on Cyprus. 
 
 As it will be apparent, the Court followed different approaches in applying these two 
issues in these three aforementioned judgments. In particular, the concept of continuing 
violation is of great importance to the displaced G/Cypriot claimants in respect of the 
ratione temporis competence of the ECtHR.50 The case of Loizidou is the first case in 
which the issue of continuing violation was discussed within the field of property disputes 
in Cyprus. In Loizidou, this issue had a strong impact on the Court’s decision. This is 
because, if it had been held that the applicant was still the legal owner of the land in 
question, then this would mean that the alleged violations were continuing in nature and 
the objection of ratione temporiswould fail. As a result of this finding concerning the 
continuing violation of P1-1 in Loizidou, thousands of similar applications from displaced 
G/Cypriots have been lodged before the ECtHR.  
 
The determination of a continuing violation in cases in which the alleged illegality 
originates from a historical event or situation is a result avoided. This logic flows from 
the fact that such cases are usually political in nature, so that the Strasbourg Court refrains 
49 Loukis G. Loucaides, ‘Current Legal Developments: Is the European Court of Human Rights Still a 
Principled Court of Human Rights After the Demopoulos Case?’, Legal Journal of International Law, vol. 
24 (2011) pp. 18–32. 
50 ibid.,p. 18, see footnote 3, “This is the first time in the history of the European Convention that the Court 
has found a High Contracting party responsible for continuing violations of so many rights affecting such 
a great number of persons for such a long period of time.”  
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from dealing with it, since the Court’s decision on such cases may invite thousands of 
clone cases deriving from the same problem.51 At this juncture, as to the Cypriot cases, 
although the judgment of Loizidou was burdened with political and historical complexity 
flowing from a problem of a historical event, the Court did not examine the nature of the 
alleged violations in detail.  
 
In reaching its decision in the case of Loizidou, the Court mainly took into account four 
issues: first, Turkey had de facto jurisdiction over the northern part of the island due to 
the existence of Turkish troops in that part of Cyprus; second, the establishment of the 
TRNC was not legally valid and thus the property regulation under the TRNC 
Constitution, which purported to expropriate the abandoned G/Cypriot properties, had no 
legal effect. On this basis, the applicant could not be deemed to have lost the title of the 
property; third, the applicant had been refused access to her land by Turkish troops since 
1974 and thus she had lost control over and the possibility of using and enjoying her 
property; fourth, the Turkish government’s arguments that property rights were subject 
to inter-communal talks and the taking of property arose as a result of the need to re-house 
displaced T/Cypriot refugees could not justify the continuing violation of P1-1.  
 
On the basis of these considerations, the Court in its Loizidou judgment held that there 
was and continued to be a breach of P1-1. It also determined that the interference with 
property rights of the applicant ‘clearly’52 fell within the meaning of the first sentence of 
P1-1. It should be emphasised that although the Court noted that it could clearly determine 
within which rule the violation in question fell, in fact, the Court did not explain how the 
interference fell within the meaning of the first rule of P1-1. 
 
It is reasonable to maintain that it may be difficult to determine within which rule a case 
falls. This situation occurs when in some cases the Court does not determine under which 
rule a case is being considered. In the matter of de facto takings it is obvious that there 
was a breach of the Convention since the takings have not been permitted by law.53In 
such cases, like Loizidou, which is highly political in nature and involves complex 
historical debates, the character of P1-1, concerning the difficulty of determining the 
51 Loucaides (n 49) p. 32.  
52 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 63. 
53 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 63. 
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violated rule, should be set aside. In the case of Loizidou, the factual circumstances should 
have been examined and explained in detail as it was a precedent case for the possible 
thousands or hundreds of thousands of G/Cypriot cases.  
 
Unlike the Loizidou judgment, in the cases of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden54 and 
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece55 the Court took the position that it has to be ascertained 
whether the situation complained of by the applicants amounted to a de facto 
expropriation. It has been held that if the property is not formally expropriated, the Court 
looks behind the appearances and investigates the realities56 of the situation complained 
of. The Court has to identify whether that situation amounted to a de facto expropriation 
on the grounds that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and 
effective.57 
 
Examination of the appearances and realities of the situation complained about in cases 
such as Loizidou should be made with prudence. In this regard, although the Court did 
not elaborate on those factual circumstances in detail, the case involved crucial facts that 
should have been considered. These facts, which could have had a determinative impact 
on the Court’s decision, were: the failure of the continuing situation of negotiations or 
proposals aiming to unify Cyprus; the fact that the case was burdened with a political, 
historical and factual complexity flowing from a historical situation: the absence of a 
designation of the interference with the property in question; the lack of determination of 
the starting date of the act which was in continuing nature. Although these were not 
regarded as factual circumstances behind the appearances and realities of the interference 
that was complained of, after fourteen years from the date of the Loizidou decision, the 
Court took those aforementioned situations as a basis for reaching its decision in the case 
of Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey.58 In its Demopoulos judgment in 2010, the Court 
held that it was faced with cases burdened with a political, historical and factual 
complexity stemming from a conflict that should have been settled by all parties assuming 
full responsibility for finding an achievable solution on a political level. The Court held 
54 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63. 
55 Papamichalopoulos v. Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, para. 42. 
56 Van Droogenbroeck v.Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 443, para. 38. 
57 Airey v. Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305, para. 24. 
58 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 85; this case will be considered within the 
concept of the issue in question in the following part of this chapter. 
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that the passage of time and the continuing progress of the political conflict should be 
considered within the Court’s interpretation and application of the Convention. This 
should be provided in light of the factual circumstances. 
 
Turning to the case of Loizidou,59 the Court, without giving reasons in detail, held that 
there was and continued to be breach of P1-1 due to the existence of Turkish troops in the 
northern part of Cyprus. With the absence of such an explanation, the Court, in essence, 
left its doors open to thousands of similar cases originating from the same problem that 
involves complex legal issues. Finally, the case of Loizidou resulted in the finding of a 
continued breach of P1-1 to the Convention. It is of great importance to emphasise that 
although the Court did not consider the political nature of the case, a case, burdened with 
highly political and legal dilemmas, must be lengthily and extensively examined, 
particularly if such a case could affect a large number of people in the same category.  
 
Consequently, although in the absence of a formal transfer of ownership, the existence of 
de facto expropriation is a question of fact and degree,60 the Court did examine the 
possibility of de facto expropriation in its Loizidou judgment. Bearing all this in mind, 
although the Strasbourg Court was faced with an exceedingly complex political and legal 
Gordian knot, with the advent of Loizidou, this situation still did not lead the Court to 
provide an extensive examination concerning the possibility of de facto expropriation. 
With the absence of such consideration, the Court left its doors open to thousands of 
similar cases involving complex legal matters. In essence, in practical terms, this may 
affect the way in which the Court deals with potential future cases from other Member 
States such as Russia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
As to the considerations in Loizidou, the applicant was not allowed access to her property 
and thus lost all control over it due to the division of the island. According to the Court, 
this situation constituted an interference with the substance of the property and not a de 
facto expropriation.61 As indicated earlier, interference with the substance of property 
59 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
60 Monika Carss Frisk, ‘The Right to Property, A Guide to Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
to the European Convention on Human Rights’, Human Rights Handbooks, no.4 (2003) Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe, p.23,< http://www.coe.int/t/dgi/publications/hrhandbooks/index_handbooks_en.asp>, 
accessed: 17 September 2013. 
61 Sermet (n 36) p.24. 
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was developed in the Court’s case law, which was first raised in the case of Sporrong and 
Lönnroth v. Sweden.62 This type of interference falls under the first rule of P1-1. It is clear 
from its wording that the first sentence of P1-1, which provides the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions, has a broad meaning. Since it is indeterminate in scope, 
it paved the way for numerous disputes. As to the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth, the 
Court maintained that in the case of interference with the substance of property, this type 
of interference did not completely prevent the applicants from using and disposing of it 
freely. However, it put restrictions on the applicants’ property. Accordingly, it held that 
this type of interference does not deprive an owner of his property. This system was to be 
applied in cases in the circumstances whereby applicants’ property was left in a prolonged 
and unacceptable state of uncertainty.63 
 
In the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth, the expropriation permits in question remained in 
force for a long time. All the complaints that were raised stemmed from the reduction of 
the possibility of disposing of the properties concerned. The Court took into account 
information that proved some sales of the properties were affected by such permits and 
held that the effects of the measures could not fall within the context of deprivation of 
possession. Although the right in question lost some of its substance, it did not disappear. 
According to the Court, the applicants could continue to utilise their possession. 
Moreover, considering the sale of some affected properties, it held that although it became 
more difficult to sell those properties, they were still potentially subject to sale.64 
 
Additionally, it was determined that those expropriation permits were not intended to 
limit or control use since they were an initial step in a procedure leading to the deprivation 
of possessions. Therefore they did not fall within the ambit of the second paragraph. The 
Court held that they must be examined under the first sentence of the first paragraph since 
the right in question lost some of its substance as a result of limitations, but it did not 
disappear.65 Accordingly, in this judgment, interference with the substance of property 
was determined.  
 
62 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63.  
63 Sermet (n 36) p.24; Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63.  
64 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 63. 
65 ibid,para. 65; Coban (n 4) p.187. 
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In summary, in accordance with the Court’s case law, if interference neither transfers 
property to public authorities, nor aims to control the use the property, then it constitutes 
interference with the substance of property. Taking this into account, it is reasonable to 
state that when the meaning and scope of a provision are not elaborated on or when 
relevant criteria are not set down, it is more likely that applicants will come up against 
indefinite approaches of the ECtHR and encounter grey areas within its case law. 
 
4.5 Fair Balance Test 
 
The search for a fair balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention. In consideration 
of the rule under which an alleged violation falls, if neither the second sentence of the 
first paragraph nor the second sentence of the second paragraph of P1-1 have been 
complied with, and the said right is violated, this does not mean that the interference falls 
within the ambit of the first sentence of the first paragraph. In order to determine whether 
the first rule has been complied with, the Court applies a ‘fair balance’ test. The 
consideration of this balance is reflected in the structure of P1-1. According to this test, a 
fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.66 
 
In the case of Sporrongand Lönnroth, the Court held that there had been a breach of the 
first rule of P1-1 due to the grant of the expropriation permits not having provided a fair 
balance between the public interest and private interest. The Court applies the fair balance 
test to all three rules when deciding under which the case might fall. Unlike Sporrong 
and Lönnroth, the Court in the Loizidou judgment did not apply the test after it held that 
the violation of property rights fell within the first rule of the P1-1. It only maintained 
that the Turkish government did not explain how the need to re-house displaced T/Cypriot 
refugees could justify the interference with the property rights of the applicant.67 
 
In light of all the above consideration, it is evidently true that Loizidou and subsequent 
cases on property disputes in Cyprus have a unique feature: a complex historical and 
political development that cannot be separated from the situation of the applicants. The 
addressee individuals of these judgments are not only Cypriots but also citizens of third 
66 Sporrong Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 69. 
67 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 64. 
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countries who purchase properties from disputed lands. It is questionable whether 
considering such cases without extensive examination of all possibilities within the scope 
of P1-1 is feasible in terms of the Court’s case law.  
 
At this point, it is important to clearly understand why the Court departed from its 
traditional approach concerning Eastern European cases in examining the case of 
Loizidou and subsequent property cases from Cyprus. Based on this, it is possible to 
suggest that the Court, perhaps, intended to refrain from becoming a political actor in this 
unique situation that is burdened with complex political issues. Bearing this in mind, it 
can be argued that the Court also refrained from considering the possibility of de facto 
expropriation because to act otherwise would result in these cases being classed as outside 
its jurisdiction.  
 
Another significant aspect that needs to be pointed out is the fact that the Court, in Cypriot 
property cases, neither titled the act that constituted interference with G/Cypriot 
properties nor explained the type of interference in which the violation in question fell. 
In the matter of providing an effective remedy in order to deal with such interference, it 
is crucial to know on which grounds the public authorities have failed, thus giving rise to 
the violation of P1-1. In the case of violation, the nature of the remedy differs depending 
upon the nature of the failure.68 
 
It is crucial to note that fourteen years after the decision of Loizidou, a major shift in the 
Court’s attitude occurred in the case of Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey. In this case, 
the Court adopted an entirely different approach from its previous Cyprus ruling. The 
facts in Loizidou, on which the Court did not consider it desirable to elaborate, turned into 
the grounds for its decision in the case of Demopoulos. It is questionable whether the 
reason for this gradual change in the Court’s approach towards its Cyprus rulings is the 
increased caseload of the Court, of cases that concern the same issues. In this respect, it 
should be noted that from 1959 to the end of September 1998 the Court delivered 837 
judgments and adopted 190 decisions in total.69 At the time of the Demopoulos ruling, 
68 Coban (n 4) p. 174. 
69 Council of Europe, ‘Activity Reports of European Court of Human Rights’ 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+surveys+of+activity/
> accessed: 17 September 2013; Council of Europe, ‘Reform of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
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there were 32 cases before the Court to decide. As of the date of the hearing in November 
2009, the number of cases brought before the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), 
which was considered as a domestic remedy of the TRNC authorities, was 433.70 These 
numbers explain the change in the Court’s attitude during the fourteen-year timeline. This 
change in attitude can be considered as an attempt to secure the efficiency of the Court 
and the Convention system. 
 
Bearing all this in mind, the Court’s decisions in its Cyprus rulings have had significant 
impact on the developments of the domestic remedies in the northern part of Cyprus and 
also have influenced the attitude of the parties to these cases. As a result, the fact that 
Cypriot property cases cannot be separated from complex political debates on the island 
has brought a new dimension to the Court’s cases with the passage of time. Political and 
legal developments within the fourteen-year timeline were not without consequences. All 
in all, not only the property regulations in Cyprus were affected by the case law of the 
Court, but the ECtHR also changed its position because of the effect of property claims 
from Cyprus. In order to comprehend the mutual interaction between the Court’s case law 
and the issue of property rights in Cyprus, it is necessary to consider the factors that 
introduce new dimensions within the Court’s and Cyprus’ case law. 
 
4.6 The Interaction Between the ECtHR Case Law and the Issue of the Cyprus 
Property Dispute  
 
As mentioned earlier, considerable numbers of Cypriots from both communities were 
displaced and abandoned their properties due to the civil strife from the beginning of 
1960s. Political conflict and everlasting failure to settle the conflicts between the two 
communities resulted in continuing violation of human rights on the island. In light of the 
political and legal history of Cyprus, it can be argued that the pertinent feature of these 
cases is that it is not possible to separate the cases from the political, legal and historical 
complexity in Cyprus that has been continuing for more than five decades. It is also worth 
noting that although this feature of Cypriot claims was not acknowledged by the Court 
<http://www.coe.int/web/coe-portal/what-we-do/human-rights/reform-of-the-european-court> accessed: 
17 September 2013. 
70 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide’, ICG Europe Report No. 210 
(2010) p. 12 see footnote 83. 
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until the end of 2004, after the failure of the comprehensive settlement plan of the UN, 
the Court manoeuvred in this respect and started to emphasise the inseparable character 
of these cases from their political and historical issues.  
 
Considering this, in line with the fact that the Cyprus property cases stemmed from a 
political and legal complexity, the impact of the consequences of these cases was 
established on three grounds: political, legal and financial, within the scope of property 
disputes in Cyprus. In the following part of this chapter, there will be a focus on the 
mutual interaction between the Court’s rulings and the Cypriot property cases within the 
ambit of the right to property as a human right. 
 
The late realisation and acceptance of the political, legal and historical features of Cypriot 
cases by the Court could flow from the ‘endless’ nature of the property conflict and 
unsuccessful negotiations to resolve the property dispute. Accordingly, it can also be 
argued that interactions between the ECtHR case law and Cyprus property regulations 
were unilateral until the failure of the settlement plan. This is based on the fact that, as a 
result of the ECtHR assessments, Turkish authorities enacted new property regulations 
such as Law no.49/2003 and Law no. 67/2005.71 After the unsuccessful attempt to resolve 
the property dispute through the comprehensive settlement plan of the UN, the interaction 
turned into a mutual interaction between the Court and the disputed property laws in 
Cyprus. The mutual interaction can be determined as evidence that Cypriot property cases 
should be considered while examining the right to property as a human right within the 
context of the ECHR. In order to comprehend the need to consider the Cyprus property 
rulings within the Convention system, it will be useful to examine the interaction between 
the Court’s cases law and the property cases on the island. 
 
4.6.1 Legal Impact of the Interaction Between the ECtHR Case Law and Cyprus 
Property Cases 
 
Although in all Cypriot cases concerning the property conflict in Cyprus the Court 
reiterated that Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution was not regarded as legally valid, in 
the case of Cyprus v. Turkey 72 the Court explicitly guided the Turkish government 
71 Property regulations of the Turkish authorities are examined in detail in Chapter 2.  
72 Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 731, para. 90.  
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towards establishing remedies that must serve the claimants in enabling them to secure 
redress for violations of their Convention rights, benchmarked by reference to the 
Namibia decision.73 This highlights the fact that, in some situations, the actions of an 
unrecognised local administration of a state could be legitimate.  
 
The Court’s assessment was taken into account by Turkish authorities and accordingly a 
new property mechanism, the first property commission, to deal with G/Cypriot 
properties was established. However, remedies provided by this system were found 
inadequate by virtue of the fact that it did not award non-pecuniary damages or restitution. 
In the case of Xenides-Arestis,74 the Court made a request for the formation of another 
property mechanism by the Turkish government, which could be considered as a domestic 
remedy for which G/Cypriots could apply in order to reclaim their property rights. As a 
response to the Court’s request, the new IPC was founded under the new Law no. 67/2005 
in the northern part of Cyprus. The number of G/Cypriots applying to the IPC for their 
properties left in the north, as of December 2010, was 784.75 The applications of 
G/Cypriots to the IPC were not welcomed by the Greek government, which discouraged 
its citizens from applying to it. According to the Greek government, applying to the IPC 
would give legitimacy to the unrecognised TRNC, ‘pseudo-state’, and its proceedings.76  
 
Although G/Cypriot applications to the IPC were not supported by the Greek government, 
satisfactory results were provided. For instance, friendly settlement was achieved through 
the IPC mechanism in the case of Michael Tymvios v. Turkey 77 in April 2008. The 
settlement involved a payment of USD 1 million and an exchange. This was considered 
a satisfactory result by the Court on the grounds of respect for human rights as defined in 
73 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] International Court of Justice 
Reports 16. 
74 ECtHR, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (admissibility decision of 14 March 2005 unpublished); Xenides-
Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
75 As of 5 December 2010, 784 applications have been lodged to the IPC and GBP 50.459.000 has been 
paid to the applicants as compensation and in some cases exchange and compensation was ruled. As of 19 
April 2013, this number dramatically increased to 4,809. Friendly settlements have been achieved in 351 
of cases and a normal hearing has been provided in 9 of them. The IPC has paid GBP 108,183,423 to the 
applicants as compensation. It has ruled for exchange and compensation in two cases, for restitution in one 
case and for restitution and compensation in five cases. It has also delivered a decision for restitution after 
the settlement of the Cyprus problem and in one case it has ruled for partial restitution. 
See:<http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/english/index.html> 
76 International Crisis Group (n 70) p.11. 
77 Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey (2003) 39 EHRR 772. 
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the Convention and its Protocols.78 This was followed with the achievement of another 
friendly settlement79 through the IPC in Alexandrou v. Turkey80 in 2009, which involved 
GBP 1.5 million and restitution of a plot of land. Both applications were struck out from 
the Court’s list of cases. 
 
Confirmation of those friendly settlements by the Court was followed with the benchmark 
case of Demopoulos and 7 other v. Turkey 81 in March 2010. This ruling is highly 
significant82 as the Court, for the first time, examined the effectiveness of a remedy that 
was set down by the TRNC authorities. Due to the fact that the Court departed from its 
previous approach in its Cyprus rulings with the rise of this case,83 it can be argued that 
the case of Demopoulos represents a step towards a new era for the property conflict in 
Cyprus. 
 
In the case of Demopoulos, the Court held that the IPC mechanism in the north of Cyprus 
was an accessible and effective domestic remedy under the terms of Article 35 of the 
Convention.84 This means the Court would only consider cases that had previously gone 
through the IPC. In a case that did not make the use of this mechanism, the applicants’ 
complaints would be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court also 
provided another option for applicants who did not wish to apply to the IPC: to choose to 
wait for a political solution. It can be maintained that the major shift in the Court’s stance 
in the Cyprus property cases occurred with this case on the basis of the fact that a 
commission that was established by the TRNC authorities was recognised by the Court. 
 
The case of Demopoulos is the most recent case that indicates the Court’s latest position 
towards the property conflict in Cyprus. The consideration of the IPC mechanism as an 
78 ibid., para. 15. 
79 The friendly settlement procedure under the ECHR provides the parties with an opportunity to resolve a 
dispute usually through payment of a specific amount of money to the applicant by the respondent state or 
through appropriate remedy of the disputed matter, or both. The friendly settlement procedure was set down 
under Article 38 of the ECHR; see: Ugur Erdal & Hasan Bakirci, Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, A Practitioner’s Handbook, World Organisation Against Torture (July 2006) 
<http://www.omct.org/files/2006/11/3633/handbook1_eng_08_part8.pdf>. 12 November 2013.  
80 Alexandrou v. Turkey (just satisfaction-striking out) no. 16162/90, 2009 ECHR 1222. 
81 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306.  
82 Loucaides (n 49) pp. 435–465; Rhodri C Williams and Ayla Gürel, The European Court Of Human 
Rights and the Cyprus Property Issue: Charting a Way Forward, Peace Research Institute Oslo, (2011), 
p.8, see: “Ankara Hopes Greek Cypriots Learn from the IPC Decision” Today’s Zaman, 8 March 2010. 
83Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306. 
84Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306. para. 127. 
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effective domestic remedy that needs to be exhausted before applying to the Court can be 
determined as evidence of the Court’s amended attitude in its Cyprus ruling. The 
judgment raised controversial debates, particularly as to its political nature and the issue 
of subsidiarity. The Court’s decision was interpreted on two dimensions. The judgment 
was simply determined as ‘wrong’ and it has also been argued that the decision in 
Demopoulos was taken under the influence of political considerations.85Additionally, for 
some, the decision was a result of the application of the doctrine of subsidiarity to the 
Cypriot property cases.86 
 
In Demopoulos, the Court highlighted the significance of its doctrine of subsidiarity under 
the Convention system, which ensures the protection of rights at domestic level. Although 
it is not explicitly stated in the Convention, the principle of subsidiarity was reflected 
within its provisions. The Court maintained that where domestic remedies are available, 
an applicant is required to exhaust them before invoking the Court’s international 
supervision on the grounds of the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule provided in 
Article 35 of the Convention and the obligation to provide effective national remedy 
under Article 13 of the Convention.87 This doctrine is a crucial component and is at the 
heart of the Convention’s system.88 The main purpose of this rule is to encourage states 
to guarantee basic rights and not to simply allow access to the Convention system.89 
 
The Court in Demopoulos recalled that the principle of subsidiarity is of paramount 
importance in order to protect rights at domestic level. The main concern in the case of 
Demopoulos was to avoid a vacuum that operated to the detriment of individuals who 
may allege violation of their rights. Continuing protection of individuals’ rights is 
significant and this should be provided for within the judicial system. The right of 
individual petition under the Convention mechanism cannot be considered as a substitute 
for this system. On this basis, the Court held that if there was an effective remedy for the 
applicants’ claims provided by the respondent government, the rule of exhaustion of 
85 Loukaides (n 49) pp. 441–464.  
86 Williams and Gürel (n 82) pp. 11–14.  
87 Alexia Solomou, ‘Demopoulos & Others v. Turkey’ (2010) vol. 104, No.4, The American Journal of 
International Law, p.631. 
88 Williams and Gürel (n 82) p.11.  
89 Bernard Robertson, ‘Exhaustion of Local Remedies in international Human Rights Litigation: The 
Burden of Proof Reconsidered’, International Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.39, no.1 (1990) pp. 191–
196. 
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domestic remedies should be applied regardless of the fact that the applicants were not 
living under the control of the TRNC. It was emphasised that this should not be 
understood as recognition of the TRNC. Accordingly, it was held that the applicant is 
required to exhaust these remedies before invoking the ECtHR.90 
 
The Convention’s machinery of protection is subsidiary to the national system for 
safeguarding human rights.91 In this regard, it can be argued that that this rule has gained 
a prominent place within the Cyprus rulings after the case of Loizidou, when the number 
of applications before the ECtHR regarding property rights dramatically increased. It 
should be noted that the growth in the caseload before the Court between the decisions of 
Loizidou and Demopoulos was considerable.92 While ninety-two pending cases were 
transmitted to the Grand Chamber at the time of the Loizidou decision, this number 
increased to 160,200 pending cases as of August 2011.93 
 
4.6.2 Social Impact of the Interaction Between the ECtHR Case Law and Cyprus 
Property Cases 
 
In addition to the establishment of domestic remedies by the respondent state as a legal 
impact of the ECtHR, another considerable issue that should be noted is the increase in 
the number of Cypriot applications before the Court. It is notable that, after the failure of 
the Annan Plan, the explosive growth of the caseload has had an influence on the Court’s 
latter decisions concerning property disputes in Cyprus. In Demopoulos, the applicants 
maintained that the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies could not be applied to 
them. However, according to the Court it was more beneficial for the applicants to make 
use of remedies available at the domestic law level before bringing their cases to the 
ECtHR. The underlying reason, here, is that an appropriate domestic body, with access 
to the properties, registries and records, is clearly the more appropriate forum for deciding 
90 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, paras. 96–101. 
91 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 143, para. 65; Handyside v. UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, 
para. 48. 
92 Council of Europe, ‘Activity Reports of European Court of Human 
Rights’<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+surveys+of+
activity/> accessed: 17 September 2013; Council of Europe, ‘Reform of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ <http://www.coe.int/web/coe-portal/what-we-do/human-rights/reform-of-the-european-court> 
accessed: 17 September 2013. 
93Press and Information Office of the RoC, ‘Turkish Mass Media Bulletin’ (6–8 March 2010) 
<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/24C351AE3A568355C22576E0004B72DF?OpenDocument
> accessed: 19 September 2013.  
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on complex matters of property ownership and valuation and assessing financial 
compensation.94 Considering the caseload, the Court does not have the capacity to deal 
with vast numbers of fact-finding cases requiring access to the States’ registries and 
records.95 
 
The correlation between the numbers of cases before the Court and the effectiveness of 
the Convention is a considerable issue within the Convention mechanism. For instance, 
in his speech, Sir Nicholas Bratza maintained that a number of decisive steps are being 
taken to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention system by pointing out the 
developments on the pilot judgment procedure in response to large numbers of 
applications from different countries. He addressed the claim that maintained that the 
Court and its Registry were in some way inefficient, which had established a backlog of 
significant number of cases. He refuted that suggestion and added that ‘…what may be 
considered to be inefficient is the system, which was not designed to cope with the 
massive case-load with which it is now confronted. Within the means available to it, the 
Court has done everything it can to rationalise and streamline its processes and with 
remarkable success, as has been confirmed by a number of outside observers and by a 
consistent increase in its overall productivity.’96 
 
Sir Nicholas Bratza recalled that the Convention is a shared responsibility, which was 
acknowledged at both the Interlaken and Izmir Conferences. It is not possible for the 
Court to handle the whole burden of its implementation. The Contracting States are 
primarily responsible for securing the Convention rights and freedoms that fall on them. 
If the states perform this seriously, if national courts apply the Convention and its case 
law convincingly, the Court’s task is made considerably easier.97 It can be argued that the 
consideration of this issue was reflected in the examination of the Demopoulos case by 
the Court while examining the matter of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the passage 
of time as well as its consequences.  
94 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para.97. 
95 Solomou (n 87) p.632. 
96 Sir Nicholas Bratza, ‘Solemn Hearing of the European Court of Human Rights on the Occasion of the 
Opening of the Judicial Year’, European Court of Human Rights, (27 January 2012) available at: 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/9F353912-1F71-4ABD-827F 
4CEBA52EDBD0/0/2012_AUDIENCE_SOLENNELLE_Discours_Bratza_EN.pdf>accessed: 17 
September 2013.  
97ibid.  
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In comparison with previous Cyprus cases98 and Demopoulos, it is true to say that the 
Court’s approach has radically changed regarding the evaluation of the facts and 
circumstances in Cyprus. On this basis, the new standpoint of the Court might stem from 
the existence of a vast number of cases that impair the Court’s effectiveness with a 
backlog of cases beyond the Court’s capacity.  
 
4.7 Legal Impact of Cyprus Property Cases on ECtHR Rulings 
 
One crucial point that needs to be pointed out is the legal impact of the Cyprus property 
cases on the ECtHR. With the examination of the Demopoulos case the Court departed 
from its previous approach and adopted a new dimension within the scope of its Cyprus 
ruling. The Court recognised that the passage of time and the continuing evolution of the 
broader political dispute can weaken the legal title to a property. It was maintained that 
there has always been a strong legal and factual link between ownership and possession. 
However, the holding of a title may be lost with the passage of time.99 In the matter of 
property cases from Cyprus the Court emphasised that thirty-six years has passed since 
the applicants left their property. Considering the passage of time, it would risk being 
arbitrary and injudicious for it to attempt to impose an obligation on the respondent state 
to provide restitution in all cases.  
 
It was not considered within the Court’s task to order a state to provide restitution in all 
cases as this was a remedy that would result in forcible eviction and re-housing of 
potentially large numbers of people despite the aim of vindicating the rights of victims of 
violations of the Convention.100 Accordingly, in the matter of examining the existence of 
practical and effective remedies, the Court highlighted the number of completed 
applications before the IPC within the short period of time, and considered the redress 
available via Law no. 67/2005 by emphasising the right of appeal lay to the TRNC High 
Administrative Court.101 
 
98 Cases concerning the property dispute in Cyprus are analysed in detail in Chapter 3. 
99 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, paras. 85, 111. 
100 ibid. para. 116. 
101 ibid, paras. 75,104,105,126.  
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In light of this consideration, it is reasonable to state the Court’s stance in Loizidou has 
changed with its judgment in Demopoulos. The Demopoulos case has changed the Court’s 
position concerning the TRNC Constitution and the rights of G/Cypriots.102 In Loizidou, 
the Court maintained that the international community did not regard the TRNC as a state 
under international law and thus the RoC remained the sole legitimate government of 
Cyprus. Accordingly, the Court did not attribute legal validity to Art. 159 of the TRNC 
Constitution by either examining whether TRNC courts could have provided judicial 
decisions nor by analysing the lawfulness of the legislative and administrative acts of the 
TRNC.103 Although the Court had attached importance to the protection of property rights 
of Cypriots at that time, it modified its position after a dramatic increase in the volume of 
its caseload.104 
 
In accordance with the Court’s request in Xenides-Arestis,105 the Turkish authorities 
established the IPC as a domestic remedy, relying on the issue of the Court’s subsidiary 
role. After Xenides-Arestis was regarded as a pilot case, approximately 1,400 of the same 
kind of cases before the Court were frozen. The Court determined the requirements of an 
effective remedy that needed to be established by the Turkish government106 and 
accordingly all similar cases were struck out from the Court’s list and diverted to the IPC 
for examination. This was followed by the test of the IPC mechanism as to whether it 
could be determined as a domestic remedy. Consequently, the Court in Demopoulos held 
that the IPC must be regarded as a domestic remedy.107 
 
Arguably, the caseload of the Court had an impact on its amended position. This logic 
flows from the fact that the effectiveness of the Court machinery was under threat with 
its caseload. Additionally, it can be argued that the political failure between the 
communities may have had an indirect effect on the Court’s change in attitude. The 
dramatic increase in the Court’s docket after the failure of the Annan Plan can be 
considered as a direct consequence of its failure. The unsuccessful outcome of the 
102 Solomou (n 87) p.632.  
103 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para.44.  
104 At the time of the decision of Loizidou, there were 94 pending cases. In August 2011, this number 
increased to160,200; Council of Europe, ‘Activity Reports of European Court of Human Rights’; Council 
of Europe, ‘Reform of the European Court of Human Rights’. 
105 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
106 ibid., para.40. 
107 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, paras. 34–38, 90. 
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comprehensive settlement plan was a total disappointment not only for the international 
community but also for the Court. The fact that the examination of the Xenides-Arestis 
case was frozen until the result of the Annan Plan may be determined as a proof of the 
Court’s expectation regarding the resolution of the property dispute through the 
comprehensive settlement plan.  
 
The strong correlation between Cyprus property cases and politics persisted on behalf of 
the Turkish government after the judgment of Loizidou. Although the political nature of 
these cases was reiterated by some judges in Loizidou,108 it took more than a decade for 
the Court to determine the character of these cases. In Loizidou, the political nature of 
these cases was highlighted in various ways. As was examined in Chapter 3 of the thesis, 
in the case of Loizidou, Judge Jambrek pointed out the ‘political nature’ of the case and 
pointed out the role of the Courts, which was to adjudicate in individual and concrete 
cases in accordance with prescribed legal standards. Accordingly, the Courts have 
different roles from the legislative and executive bodies. He also added that courts are 
‘ill-equipped to deal with large-scale and complex issues’.109 Additionally, the case that 
involves the whole problem of the two communities has more to do with ‘politics and 
diplomacy than with European judicial scrutiny’.110 Although these evaluations were held 
by judges in their dissenting opinions in the case of Loizidou and were not reflected in the 
decision of the Court, in Demopoulos, the Court emphasised the context of the case, which 
involved ‘long-standing and intense political dispute between the Republic of Cyprus and 
Turkey concerning the future of the island of Cyprus and the resolution of the property 
question’.111 
 
It was added that the cases involved highly political, historical and factual complexity 
stemming from a problem that should have been resolved by all the parties on a political 
level. By stating that, with its decision in Demopoulos, the Court did not leave the 
resolution of the property dispute to the parties in the political arena. With the influence 
of the long-standing unresolved problem of the property dispute and particularly with the 
108 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513. 
109 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, dissenting opinion of Judge J. Jambrek.  
110 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti. 
111 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 83.  
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effect of the great disappointment of the failure of the Annan Plan, the Court contributed 
to the process for the settlement of the property problem. 
 
The judgment of Loizidou raised a significant issue as to whether an international tribunal 
should restrain from a new category of cases. In his dissenting opinion Judge Jambrek 
emphasised that a violation decision on P1-1 might open the door to another one hundred 
thousand or so similar cases. Undoubtedly, a broad decision about a large-scale issue in 
the realm of public international law was taken by the Court with its decision in 
Loizidou.112 Considering the threat over the effectiveness of the Convention machinery 
with this caseload, the Court had two choices: either to leave the resolution of the problem 
entirely to the political sphere or to deal with the cases.  
 
Considering the fact that the Court held significant findings in the case of Loizidou, such 
as the imputability issue of the alleged violations to Turkey or the legally invalid status 
of the TRNC Constitution, the Court accepted it would deal with these cases and thus not 
leave the resolution entirely to the political sphere. By doing so, it highlighted that the 
refugees’ property rights are not negotiable and emphasised that human rights could not 
be subordinated to considerations of political expediency that stems from the fact that the 
Member States’ obligation to respect human rights is absolute.113 
 
Fourteen years after the decision of Loizidou, the same approach was followed by the 
Court. In a comparison between the Court’s pattern in Loizidou and Demopoulos, it can 
be noted that the Court in the latter applied a different method from the former in the 
matter of examination of whether the remedies are practical and effective. After the 
failure of the Annan Plan, the Turkish government established the IPC, which was found 
in principle adequate as a remedy. In Demopoulos, the Court in its ruling examined the 
remedies and the IPC in detail under four criteria. In examination of these matters, the 
Court for the first time looked at the passing of time by stating that ‘with the passage of 
time the holding of a title may be emptied of any practical consequences’.114 This 
consideration raises the loss of title by adverse possession which causes loss of title with 
112 Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, dissenting opinion of Judge Jambrek. 
113 Bernard H. Oxman and Beate Rudolf, ‘Loizidou v. Turkey’, American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 9 (1997) p.537; Solomou, (n 87), p.634. 
114 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para.111. 
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the satisfaction of three conditions: ‘not by force, nor stealth, nor licence’ (Nec vi, nec 
clam, nec precario).115 The Court added that this does not mean the applicants have lost 
their ownership in any formal sense and it ‘would eschew any notion that military 
occupation should be regarded as a form of adverse possession by which can be legally 
transferred to the invading power.’116 
 
Ordering Turkey to ensure that the applicants obtain access to and full possession of their 
properties irrespective of who is now living there was considered as an unrealistic 
resolution by the Court.117 Accordingly, providing restitution was found to be feasible, 
the Court emphasising that if the nature of the breach allows restitution, the respondent 
state should implement it. However, if restitution is not possible, the alternative 
requirement is imposed: compensation for the value of the property should be paid. On 
this specific point, the Court departed from its standpoint in previous cases regarding the 
payment of compensation as a remedy instead of restitution as a mere option.  
 
Bearing all this in mind, it can be argued that as distinct from previous cases, considering 
compensation as a remedy, the Court considered the interest of current occupants of the 
disputed properties besides the interests of G/Cypriot owners. With the Demopoulos case, 
the Court evaluated this with the Conventional perspective and highlighted that property 
is a material commodity that can be valued and compensated for in monetary terms.118 
Taking into account the previous Cyprus property cases, it is significant that, with this 
perspective, the Court opened the door to a new dimension for Cyprus cases. While the 
mere remedy was ‘restitutio in integrum’ in previous cases, after more than a decade 
compensation has started to be considered a remedy.  
 
At this juncture, my contention is that political and legal changes with the passage of time 
bring new dimensions to the examination and decision-making of the cases. At the point 
where political deadlock influences the maintenance of the protection of human rights, 
the ECtHR contributes to the resolution of the problem by not leaving the resolution 
115 Solomou, (n 87), p.635. 
116 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, paras.111–112. 
117 ibid, para. 112. 
118 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (2010) ECHR 306, para. 115. 
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entirely to the political arena. Cyprus property cases are the concrete examples of this 
situation.  
 
In Demopoulos, Law no. 67/2005 was considered an accessible and effective framework 
of redress concerning interference with property owned by G/Cypriot applicants. Since 
the applicants did not use the mechanism and exhaust domestic remedies, their complaints 
under P1-1 were rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court was 
satisfied that the Law no. 67/2005 makes ‘realistic provision’ for redress in ‘the current 
situation of occupation’ that is ‘beyond this Court’s competence’ to resolve. With its 
decision the Court brings a new dimension to Cyprus property cases. The Court impeded 
the direct flow of the caseload from Cyprus and diverted it to the IPC as a ‘filter 
mechanism’ in order to reduce the number of similar applications before the Court. It is 
reasonable to maintain that not only do changes at the domestic level, such as politics and 
legal changes, bring a different approach to the ECtHR arena, but external factors may 
also influence the Court’s jurisprudence.  
 
As of 19 April 2012, 3,155 applications have been lodged with the IPC and this number 
increased to 4,809 as of 19 April 2013. In 2012, 219 of these applications were concluded 
through friendly settlements and 7 through formal hearing. In 2013, 351 of them 
concluded through friendly settlement and 9 through formal hearing.119 Considering these 
numbers, it can be argued that with its new approach towards Cyprus rulings the Court 
has avoided a large future caseload of Cyprus property applications.  
 
The Court is concerned that the property rights violations in northern Cyprus are 
restrained. During the efforts to settle the dispute, it must be highlighted that the Court 
had a significant impact with its decision on negotiations for the comprehensive 
settlement. The Court considered its previous decisions concerning Turkey’s 
responsibility for violations and attempted to establish a redress for them. The Court 
welcomed the Turkish government’s efforts for the establishment of the IPC. In the 
meantime, the rejection of the Annan Plan by the majority of G/Cypriots was not 
119 Immovable Property Commission of the TRNC, <http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/> accessed: 17 December 
2013. 
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disregarded. Considering these two contrary situations, the IPC was welcomed by the 
Court, which might be considered as an attempt to re-establish the balance.120 
 
The property dispute is the crux of the unresolved Cyprus problem. It can be argued that 
with the passage of time this issue is becoming more complex and the legal consequences 
becoming more unstable. The deadlock of the property dispute constitutes trouble for 
Cypriots and other nationals who have purchased the abandoned properties of G/Cypriots 
from the T/Cypriots. The fact that the government of the RoC considered Law no. 
67/2005, which was established by the Turkish government to provide redress for the 
persons claiming rights to immovable or movable properties, as null and void, obviously 
does not assist there solution of the property conflict. In addition to the rejection of the 
Annan Plan, the dismissal of legal remedies is not helping either community to resolve 
the dispute. Therefore, the G/Cypriot leadership should stop discouraging G/Cypriots to 
apply to the IPC, as closing the doors to every resolution does not carry the continuing 
efforts any further towards resolving the Cyprus conflict. 
 
Additionally, the impartiality of the IPC is another significant matter that needs to be 
considered. The government of the RoC maintained that there was a lack of effectiveness 
of the remedy before the IPC on various grounds such as the lack of independence and 
impartiality and the inadequacy of the compensation. In order to remove the mistrust of 
the IPC, Turkish authorities should support the establishment of a new commission that 
should have an equal number of members from both communities. Moreover, 
compensation calculations and evaluation details should be provided in detail to reduce 
the doubts as to calculations and to provide transparency.  
 
Another issue that needs to be reconsidered for the sake of the property dispute is the 
Guardianship Law that was set down by the government of the RoC to administer 
abandoned T/Cypriot properties in the south. As was examined the previous Chapter 1 
the law prohibited the sale, exchange or transfer of T/Cypriot properties. The point that 
needs to be highlighted is that the law prohibits any payment to T/Cypriots during the 
‘unsettled situation’. In 2004, a T/Cypriot living in the UK brought a case before the 
120 Rhodri C. Williams, ‘Introductory Note to the European Court of Human Rights: Demopoulos v. 
Turkey’, International Legal Materials, vol. 49, no. 3 (2010) p.817. 
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ECtHR and pre-empted the judgment of the G/Cypriot government. The G/Cypriot 
government paid EUR 500,000 for the loss of use of one whole and one half share in two 
houses in which G/Cypriot displaced persons were living. Therefore, the Court’s decision 
forced the government to amend the law, and the T/Cypriots who reside in government-
controlled areas or abroad can claim their property.121 Although the amendment is an 
improvement, it cannot be considered as a profitable change since the section prohibits 
any payment to T/Cypriots while the “unsettled situation” remains in place. For a feasible 
property settlement, the G/Cypriot government should amend the law to establish new 
remedies that are more effective and accessible for all T/Cypriots who own abandoned 
properties in the south and who are residing in the north. This would provide equality 
between T/Cypriots who live abroad or in government-controlled areas and the ones 
residing in the north. There is no difference between the rights of these people, apart from 
their place of residence. It is not justifiable to punish T/Cypriots just because they reside 
in the north by blocking their way to seek remedy for their abandoned properties.  
 
In the matter of settling the disputes and moving towards the comprehensive settlement 
and of settling disagreements on specific areas of the property disputes, Turkey should 
sustain negotiations and adopt a proactive standpoint. It should adopt a stance within the 
UN parameters and sustain efforts in line with UN plans. This would bring Turkey onto 
the moral high ground in the international arena as well as boost Turkey’s EU 
membership process.122 
 
Although Turkish authorities established the Law no. 67/2005, which provides restitution, 
exchange and compensation, the T/Cypriot authorities should provide restitution of 
property to former owners of abandoned properties in the north as much as possible by 
considering and protecting the rights of the current users. Equally, the G/Cypriot 
authorities should accept and sustain the idea that restitution should not be the only 
redress for the displaced persons and in some circumstances the right to restitution should 
be restricted.123 Bearing all this in mind, any proposed plan for the final settlement would 
121 Nezire Ahmet Adnan Sofi v. Cyprus (18163/04) ECtHR, 14 January 2010; International Crisis Group 
(ICG), (n 70), p.4. 
122 Tarik Oguzlu, ‘Turkey and the Cyprus Dispute: Pitfalls and Opportunities’, vol. 3, no.1, (2010), Ankara 
Bar Review, p.80. 
123 International Crisis Group (ICG), (n 70) p.ii. 
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invoke the Annan Plan. The property dispute in Cyprus departed from the political arena 
to international courts. People are applying to the international courts to solve property 
disputes and thus Turkey is ordered to pay huge amounts of penalties. Property is an 
emotional issue that should be resolved as soon as possible on the grounds of the most 
efficient settlement plan with flexibility, transparency and equality. It is a well-known 
fact that the Cyprus problem involves political, historical and factual complications. This 
should be comprehensively settled by all parties who share the burden of finding a 
solution on a political level. All parties should be concentrating on the vital points for the 
settlement and should stop opposing each other in order to prevent or postpone the 
comprehensive settlement. The continuing factual changes flowing from the passage of 
time should be considered and the settlement plans should be proposed with the good 
faith and for the very best of both communities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The thrust of this chapter was to indicate the significance of the Cypriot property cases 
and the Court’s rulings on Cypriot claims within the issue of the right to property provided 
by P1-1 to the Convention. The resulting large number of clone cases, concerning the 
property complaints of displaced persons, which originate from the same problem, 
perhaps represents the best example of the implications of the right to property within the 
scope of post-conflict situations and within the field of unresolved disputes whose effects 
are still continuing.  
 
During the course of the fourteen years in which the Strasbourg Court has been involved 
with the prolonged property conflict on the island, considerable progress has been 
achieved in the field of the property complaints of displaced Cypriots. There is no doubt 
that the ECtHR has had a major role in this progress. To some extent, it achieved what 
the authorities of the both communities repeatedly failed to achieve by way of the 
development of local legislation that deals with the ancient property conflict and that is 
relevant to the majority of Cypriots. The Court’s judgments on the cases from Cyprus 
have gained a more prominent place in the seeking of a settlement of the Cyprus property 
problem than the representatives of the both communities have managed. In essence, the 
Strasbourg Court, through the findings and assessments that it provided during its 
examination of the Cypriot cases, illustrated to the international community and to those 
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related to and affected by the property conflict in Cyprus, that the issue of property is the 
major stumbling block to achieving a lasting settlement of the Cyprus question. 
 
Intense, prolonged but unfruitful negotiations surrounding the settlement of the Cyprus 
problem have not given rise to a solution of the property dispute. Therefore, since the 
emergence of the property problem on the island, this issue of property has stood at the 
heart of both the displaced Cypriots and the Cyprus conflict itself. As a result of the 
continuing failure of politics to reach an agreement sufficient to resolve the Cyprus 
problem, the property deadlock has become a Gordian Knot of this problem. Although no 
settlement has been achieved to date, it has to be accepted that learning from past mistakes 
can help prevent a repeat of those mistakes. The Strasbourg Court has played a principal 
role in shedding light on reasons as to why a resolution of the property problem has not 
been achieved. It has done this by examining and determining on specific and major 
conflicted issues that had never been discussed at the global level before. However, 
attempts to make progress on the long-lasting Cyprus property dispute have continuously 
failed to produce any great results. Political development should put its weight behind the 
property issue, in order to take a further step towards a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem, which would then also bring a permanent solution to the property 
matters on the island. All in all, although the Strasbourg Court has contributed at times to 
the confusion and conflict over the issue of property in Cyprus, its recent judgments mean 
that seeking remedy before the Court for past injustices cannot be considered as a 
permanent and durable method in the context of Cyprus. Both T/Cypriots and G/Cypriots 
should accept that both communities have become victims of and have suffered from the 
past mistakes. Regardless of the period of time during which Cypriots from both 
communities have been experiencing the consequences of the massive displacement, it 
should also be recognised that those injuries from the past can never be healed. A 
mutually recognised and sustainable settlement of the Cyprus problem is possible and 
achievable if both communities take further steps on the basis of the spirit of compromise 
and reconciliation. Concluding with a note of caution, those who refuse to learn from past 
mistakes are bound to repeat them. Therefore, in the case of the property dispute and the 
Cyprus problem as a whole, a lasting, durable and peaceful solution is achievable with 
mutual trust, flexibility and understanding. 
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General Conclusion 
 
The property issue is the Gordian knot of the Cyprus problem, constituting a 
significant impediment to reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus 
dispute. Although it is a highly political issue, its long-standing deadlock feature 
has transformed this debate into a legal war in the international arena. A significant 
number of G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots own properties, which are affected by the 
property conflict in Cyprus. Accordingly, thousands of Cypriots have become 
warriors and their properties used as weapons in this political and legal battle, 
which has not been finalised yet.  
 
Inter-communal negotiations to settle the Cyprus dispute between the two 
communities have been continuing for more than five decades without reaching any 
final resolution. The failure of politicians to achieve a comprehensive settlement 
has led individuals to search for a remedy at the international level in order to 
protect their property rights. Therefore, the ECtHR has become the main actor and 
its Courtroom has turned into a battlefield for property disputes on the island. It 
should be stated that the finding of a solution to the property debate will not only 
remove the fundamental obstacle to reaching a settlement in Cyprus, but will also 
obviate the Court from becoming an actor and will prevent its mechanism from 
being impaired by the huge caseload of clone cases. 
 
The significance of the thesis is based on the interaction between Cyprus property 
cases and the ECtHR protection mechanism of the right to property by highlighting 
the problems of displaced Cypriots from my own lessons learned from Cyprus. 
Additionally, its significance is to design an effective and optimal model to improve 
the strategies for the disputed lands that can help to provide internationally 
recognised domestic remedies as well as being the study of the efficiency of 
predictive conditions for the potential mechanism that could assist authorities as 
well as law-makers. 
 
The thesis aims to provide answers to the questions of: (i) whether cases of property 
disputes in Cyprus have had an impact on the Court’s established case law and to 
what extent those cases caused the ECtHR to depart from its traditional approach 
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concerning property rights; (2) whether Cyprus property claims brought before the 
ECtHR have brought a new aspect to the understanding of the protection of property 
rights in respect of the Convention system and the application of P1-1 to the 
Convention; and (3) whether a mutually agreed, effective and sustainable property 
mechanism is achievable at the domestic level within the context of resolving the 
Cyprus property dispute. 
 
The examination has been conducted through looking at the underlying reasons as 
to why the local remedies of disputed properties have been considered legally 
invalid, at the gradual evolution of these regulations in light of the ECtHR’s 
assessment and the increasing pressure on the local property mechanism to deal 
with property claims at the national level as well as at the recommendations for the 
establishment of a future effective property system in Cyprus. In addition, an 
outline has been made of how Turkish authorities seek to achieve internationally 
acceptable remedies for the displaced people and have settled regulations to deal 
with property claims. Furthermore, a solution is sought by comparing the domestic 
laws and the elements of the protection of the right to property within the 
Convention mechanism.  
 
Regarding the first question raised in the thesis, whether the property claims from 
Cyprus have had an impact on the Court’s case law or caused the Court to depart 
from its traditional approach on Cyprus, it has been suggested that the Court’s new 
dimension has been reflected within its own judgments. The examination of the 
Court’s earlier case law involving the Cyprus property cases and its most recent 
decision in Demopoulos v. Turkey1 in March 2010 have been useful in revealing 
how the ECtHR moved away from its adopted pattern and broke away its earlier 
group of judgments concerning the property disputes of Cypriots.  
 
In looking at the Court’s decisions in its Loizidou judgments2 and similar cases,3 it 
may be seen that those decisions were supporting the G/Cypriot aspect, which was 
1 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, (2010) ECHR 306. 
2 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99; Loizidou v. Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 513); Loizidou v. 
Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 511 GC. 
3 The ECtHR cases which have been examined throughout this thesis. 
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based on the reinstatement of all displaced properties to their original owners. 
Consequently, according to the G/Cypriot perspective, a remedy for the violation 
of property rights that stemmed from Turkey’s intervention of the island in 1974 
should provide a restitution of those properties in question. The only exception for 
the reinstatement of those properties was where reinstatement was materially 
impossible. However, this aspect of the G/Cypriot’s claim was rejected with the 
Court’s decision in Demopoulos4 after more than a decade. The Court’s traditional 
approach, which was based on the right to return and the reinstatement of 
properties, gave way to the Court’s new attitude that supports compensation and 
exchange rather than restitution. For the first time in the history of the T/Cypriot 
property struggle, an international court approved a measure, namely the 
Immovable Property Commission (IPC), which was established by the Turkish 
authorities. Against this background, what is notable here is: it is evident from the 
approval of the IPC that there is a considerable transition from a purely traditional 
approach to a brand-new one for the treatment of unrecognised entities in producing 
effective remedies for the claims of citizens of recognised states at international 
level. 
 
There is not much doubt that the ECtHR has directly come to play a law-making 
role in the establishment of domestic regulations in Cyprus. In this regard, it is 
perhaps worthwhile recalling that the IPC was founded in accordance with the 
Court’s ruling in the case of Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey.5 In this connection, the 
efforts of the Turkish authorities, by following the guidance of the ECtHR in order 
to establish an effective Commission to deal with G/Cypriot property claims, were 
reciprocated. 
 
As a result, in the case of Demopoulos, the Strasbourg Court held that Law 67/2005 
setting up the IPC, enacted by the TRNC, provides an accessible and effective 
framework of redress regarding G/Cypriot property claims. The Court was 
satisfied, by taking into account the current division of the island and determining 
4 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, (2010) ECHR 306; Rhodri C Williams and Ayla Gürel, ‘The 
European Court of Human Rights and the Cyprus Property Issue: Charting a Way Forward’ (Peace 
Research Institute Oslo, 2011) pp.5-6. 
5 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, (2005) 44 EHRR SE 185. 
                                                 
190 
 
that this was beyond its competence to resolve, that Law 67/2005 makes realistic 
provision for redress.6  
 
In this regard, the Court rejected the complaints of the applicants based on non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies, since they had not brought such claims prior to 
the IPC’s non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.7 The main objective of the IPC 
was to provide an effective domestic remedy for claims regarding the abandoned 
G/Cypriot properties in the north. On this basis, it can be stated that applying to the 
IPC and continuing development of its measures will do much to maintain the 
dispute resolution within both the legal and political spheres in Cyprus. 
 
Besides the Court’s direct impact on domestic laws, it also indirectly became a 
major actor within the politics of the Cyprus problem through its decision in 
Demopoulos. The decision considering the IPC as an effective domestic remedy 
raised repercussions.8 The ruling would mean that the Court would only consider 
property claims that had already gone through the IPC. This is of considerable 
benefit given that the highly political and complex property dispute should be 
resolved at the domestic level by the negotiators of the communities. Nevertheless, 
it was not compulsory for the applicants to apply to the IPC, and an option was 
provided for those who did not want to use the T/Cypriot body, namely to await a 
political settlement. By propounding the latter option the Court added a political 
flavour to its decision. There are invisible pressures on the officials to produce a 
prompt resolution for the property issue. 
 
The rulings in Demopoulos were considered negative and as incorrect 
developments by the government of the RoC. The principal concern was the 
approval of an illegal commission which was established as a result of Turkey’s 
unlawful acts. This has resulted in many G/Cypriot officials looking pessimistically 
at the emergence of the IPC as a political decision of a political court. The caseload 
of the ECtHR was taken into account as the basis of its decision and in order to 
eliminate those clone cases from Cyprus, the Court made a logistical decision. 
6 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, (2010) ECHR 306, pp.127-129. 
7 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, (2010) ECHR 306, pp. 128-129. 
8 See Chapter 3 for the arguments on the approval of the IPC. 
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Contrary to the G/Cypriot reaction, T/Cypriot officials considered the decision a 
victory. The judgment was interpreted to mean that the acts of the TRNC were 
compatible with international law and European standards. 
 
It is perhaps worthwhile recalling that the G/Cypriot aspect of the Court’s 
politically motivated decision raised a contrary remark by one of the commentators 
who considered the ruling as falling within the context of the law of subsidiarity. 
As has been said, the IPC as a domestic remedy was conceived of as a strategy of 
the Court in order that it itself could refrain from dealing with repetitive cases. In 
the event, this strategy was assessed as a method to deal with the same line of cases 
under the pilot judgment procedure. In most instances, after the Court finds a 
violation in a particular case it determines the core of the violation and guides the 
responsible state to deal with the problem using an effective domestic remedy. 
 
The Court’s ruling in the case of Demopoulos raised two considerable and 
controversial contentions: First, the ECtHR ‘politicalised’9 the property issue in 
Cyprus and thus its decision was political. Second, the Court applied the principle 
of subsidiarity in Demopoulos and its ruling was a consequence of the application 
of the subsidiarity procedure.10 It is perhaps worthwhile considering these two 
aspects from an objective point of view in order to add a note of caution. Regarding 
the first view, it may be said that the fundamental mainstay of this perspective, 
which is the caseload before the ECtHR, is a well-known fact. The docket of the 
Court at the time of the Demopoulos decision contained more than 100,000 cases 
and the number of repetitive cases from Cyprus was more than 8,000.11 Against 
this background, it is likely that the Court’s decision was a consequence of its 
backlog of cases. Nevertheless, it is an avoidable fact that the large number of cases 
was a serious threat to the efficiency of the Court. Furthermore, in respect of the 
9 Loukis G. Loucaides, ‘Current Legal Developments: Is the European Court of Human Rights Still 
a Principled Court of Human Rights After the Demopoulos Case?’ (2011) Legal Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 24. 
10 Rhodri C Williams and Ayla Gürel, ‘The European Court Of Human Rights and the Cyprus 
Property Issue: Charting a Way Forward’ (Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2011). 
11 Press and Information Office of the RoC, ‘Commentaries, Editorials and Analysis’ (8 August 
2010), 
<www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/24C351AE3A568355C22576E0004B72DF?OpenDocume
nt> accessed: 19 September 2013.  
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contention that the decision was political, the root of the alleged violations in these 
cases may well have a political foundation. Although this feature of the cases was 
put forward by the Turkish authorities in almost all of the cases, the G/Cypriots 
raised the political nature of the property issue after the Court’s decision in 
Demopoulos, and this was used as a means of their disapproval of the Court.  
 
In respect of the second contention concerning the issue of subsidiarity, the 
decision in Demopoulos was perhaps a result of the method adopted by the Court 
to deal with clone cases. The principle of subsidiarity is a cornerstone of and a 
significant concept within the framework of the Convention system. Nevertheless, 
considering the timeline of the Cyprus property cases, it is conspicuous that the 
Court did not apply this principle until 2010. Although the domestic remedies 
provided by the TRNC regulations were neither considered adequate nor effective 
enough to satisfy the Court, it did not lead the Turkish authorities to establish 
remedies based on respect for human rights as defined in the Convention or its 
Protocols until the case of Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey. 
 
Turning to the second question of whether the Cyprus property cases have brought 
a new dimension to the concept of property rights within the Convention 
mechanism and the application of P1-1, the Court’s Demopoulos decision could be 
taken as a fundamental illustration of the new role that was carried to the ECtHR 
arena. Here, the development process of the ECtHR’s case law on Cyprus has seen 
the Court’s major shift from its Cyprus ruling in the March 2010 decision. It is 
worthwhile recalling that for the first time within the Cyprus property case-line, 
the Court recognised the passage of time and political developments as factors 
attenuating legal title to a property. In this respect, the Court took into account the 
passage of thirty-five years since the displaced people left their properties and the 
failure of the UN plan for the reunification of the island as a basis in order to 
prevent the Court being arbitrary and injudicious through imposing restitution in 
all cases.  
 
In this respect, although restitution mitigates the consequences of violation of the 
property rights, the Court considered that it may also pave the way for the creation 
of disproportionate new wrongs. In any event, if restitution is imposed on a 
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property in which its legal title is weakened by the passage of time, this may raise 
greater claims by the current T/Cypriot occupants under Article 8 of the 
Convention. It is crucial to acknowledge that a considerable conflict between 
Article 8 and P1-1 of the Convention was created in this ruling. The protection of 
G/Cypriots’ rights to their property under P1-1 and the protection of their rights to 
the home under Article 8 of the Convention are in conflict with the rights of 
T/Cypriot occupants under Article 8 of the Convention. Although the Court did not 
directly state its position, it illustrated that the protection of the current occupants’ 
rights to the home under Article 8 of the Convention predominated. It may be said 
that the determinative factor of the competing rights of claimants of properties and 
the current occupants of such properties was the creation of ‘disproportionate new 
wrongs’ with the implementation of restitution. The overall result is that the 
Court’s position, illustrated by its decision, represents a rejection of the G/Cypriot 
position that ‘in cases of interference with property, restitution should be automatic 
in the absence of material impossibility’.12 In this respect, the Court’s decision 
itself explains the G/Cypriot assessment of the decision as ‘wrong’ or political.13 
 
In respect of the third question of whether a mutually agreed property mechanism 
between the two communities is achievable, it may be said with some conviction 
that the property issue is the paramount knot in and impediment to the settlement 
of the Cyprus problem. Although the ECtHR has been tackling and contributing to 
this debate through its assessments, it is arguably irrefutable that without reaching 
a comprehensive settlement in the political sphere, property rights as human rights 
will not be totally achieved in Cyprus. In this respect, a mutually agreed property 
system is a necessity and should be considered an achievable ambition. This may 
require an increased focus on the Court’s assessment rather than continuing to 
consider its stance in its Cyprus ruling as ‘prejudicing’. 
 
Two points need to be primarily accepted by the two communities in Cyprus. First, 
the effects of massive displacement have not disappeared, since the displaced 
people and their offspring still constitute a considerable percentage of the 
population of the island. Since property is an extremely sensitive and emotional 
12 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, (2010) ECHR 306, p.59. 
13 Williams & Gürel (n 10) p.11. 
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issue, particularly for displaced people, the future settlement proposal should not 
merely be based on figures of disputed lands. In this respect, although the passage 
of time and the number of property claims are the main concerns in achieving the 
property settlement, the future proposals concerning a property dispute should be a 
compromise.  
 
Second, besides the importance of considering the social impact of displacement, 
the factual changes that were brought about by the passage of time should be 
considered such as new generations, the resettlement of displaced people, and the 
developments over properties. Accordingly, the future settlement plan should 
provide a balance between the rights of the original owners and the current users 
the former and latter to achieve the most feasible strategy regarding the issue of 
property in Cyprus.  
 
The establishment of a bi-communal property commission or a Court would be a 
monumental development which would deal with property claims by considering 
the basic facts and by providing a calculation of monetary compensation. The 
formation of such a domestic body with an equal number of members from both 
communities may provide a reliable assessment of factual circumstances and 
decisions by having access to the records and registries of disputed properties at a 
domestic level. This may well lead to a more efficient mechanism as it would serve 
a larger audience, and would be less expensive, quicker and an accessible remedy.  
 
Additionally, a new property mechanism should involve restitution, compensation 
and exchange of property options and provide flexible conditions for the restrictions 
placed on properties, which current users do not have within the category of 
displaced people. The physical condition of properties, whether they have been 
allocated for public interest or whether there have been significant increases in the 
value of the property due to improvements made on such property, should also be 
taken into account. Furthermore, the number of properties that have been granted 
to displaced persons through the system of ‘equal value points’ should be 
considered. The current users of disputed properties may be categorised as to 
whether they are displaced or if they have arrived in the northern part of Cyprus 
from Turkey as ‘settlers’. Accordingly, the reinstatement of property ownership 
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should, as much as possible, be provided with flexible conditions if the disputed 
property is not possessed by displaced people.  
 
Although the formation of domestic regulation is an important part of a future 
settlement plan, the leaders of both communities should discharge their 
responsibilities in order to achieve a comprehensible solution at a political level. 
Primarily, the authorities should not discourage people from seeking remedies from 
domestic bodies and should stop putting pressure on them to reject, exchange or 
request/obtain compensation for the property as a remedy. Additionally, since the 
social memory of displacement still exists, the remedies for the offspring of 
displaced people should not be restricted. In this regard, inter-communal talks 
should be sustained with the intention of achieving settlement, which requires trust 
and flexibility. 
 
Finally, my contention is that in the context of the quest for domestic remedy, the 
adoption of a property mechanism with features that have been mentioned above 
may represent for many of the displaced Cypriots an important accomplishment in 
the emergence of a local framework for a mutually agreed property system. A note 
of caution may be struck here is that, in order to achieve this, neither of the 
communities will be entirely satisfied with the future property strategy since their 
expectations stand on extreme points: the reinstatement of the properties to their 
former owners and  the flexibility of compensation or  exchange of the disputed 
properties. This may well lead to the acceptance of a resolution that sustains the 
very best of the people and provides the most balanced protection mechanism for 
the rights of displaced people. 
 
The overall impression is that during the fourteen-year time-line, the ECtHR has 
understood the property dispute in Cyprus by observing and examining the facts, 
submissions and the attitudes of the parties. The Court may have conceived that this 
problem is mainly correlated with the politics of Cyprus and decided that the 
property claims should be dealt with by local bodies. Accordingly, the Court has 
contributed to the settlement of the property issue at the domestic level by the 
officials of the two communities. Although there is continuing pressure on the 
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authorities in Cyprus to provide and develop regional regulations, the existence and 
progress of these measures will maintain the settlement of property issue. 
 
Turning to the most recent developments, the latest position of the ECtHR was 
illustrated by its decision in Demopoulos, which represents a transition from a 
purely international approach seeking to produce a remedy for a dispute stemming 
from a complex problem burdened with historical, political and factual complexity 
to a position seeking to maintain the establishment and benefit of domestic 
remedies for a largely domestic audience. In this respect, one has to bear in mind 
that, although the Court is willing to provide a limited supervisory role and allow 
domestic law-makers to administer the property claims, it did not close its doors on 
the property cases of Cypriots. Insofar as the pursuit of domestic remedies is 
supported by the Court’s decisions, this approach may also be beneficial on the 
legal and political sphere by promoting the most feasible property mechanism for 
the applicants. Its decision maintained that the courtrooms should not be considered 
as a settlement arena concerning the property issue, and the solution-producers 
should be Cypriot negotiators, not the Court, in order to achieve a sustainable 
property mechanism.  
 
The fact that property is a fundamental, sensitive and emotional subject for human 
beings means that the controversy over property rights is reflected in every aspect 
of life in Cyprus. Having said that, there are not enough adequate sources focusing 
specifically on the property dispute in Cyprus within the context of the Convention 
mechanism, which impelled me to examine this issue in my thesis. The long-
standing nature of property disputes and the Cyprus problem orientates the victims 
of the property rights’ violations towards finding a solution in the international 
arena. However, temporary remedies for property conflicts through international 
courts cannot be considered as a permanent solution either for Cypriots or for the 
achievement of a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem. In light of these 
conclusions, the thesis has examined, comprehended and put forward the most 
feasible property regime that may well satisfy and provide a balance between the 
rights of both communities in Cyprus, not only within the context of property rights 
but also for a permanent and comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.  
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Finally, the establishment of the IPC in the north represents a significant milestone 
within the history of Cypriot case law. Since 2010 the IPC’s principal role has been 
to deal with property claims. In order to achieve good results for both communities, 
its effective functioning should be sustained and conducted with transparency and 
consideration of the common interest of Cypriots. The IPC has to take account of 
the applications with great concern and conclude them in accordance with the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence and international law. Although the well-known theory 
maintains that the property dispute can only be resolved through a political 
settlement, the impact of international authorities should not be disregarded.  
 
In this, the examination of the Annan Plan in detail and the determination of the 
Cyprus property cases as highly political and historical by the Court in the 
Demopoulos judgment may illustrate the ‘late realisation’ of the full responsibility 
of all parties for finding a solution at a political level. The property problem can be 
entirely settled only with the intention of both sides to resolve it through a political 
settlement. 
 
Furthermore, the future property proposal is likely to include similar regulations to 
those provided in the UN Settlement Plan as the Court considered this failed 
mechanism in great detail in its judgment. This attitude may indicate the Court’s 
indirect affirmation of the property system, which was settled in this plan. The 
Court’s attitude was that, although the plan was not successful, it is not dead and 
thus the Court gave the green light to Cypriot officials to take it as a basis for future 
proposals for the property settlement. 
 
In terms of the impact of the Demopoulos decision on the ECtHR, the backlog of 
around 1500 cases was sent to local authorities.14 In this regard, by adopting this 
attitude, the Court indicated that property disputes between the two communities 
should be resolved primarily at the political level. This approach of the Court will 
have a profound effect on the motivation of both sides concerning the Cyprus 
14 At the time of the Demopoulos decision some 100,000 cases were pending before the ECtHR, 
See: <http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/themes/protocole 14bis/default_EN.asp and as of 14 June 2013, 
5031 applications have been lodged with the IPC <http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/> accessed: 10 August 
2013.  
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settlement. The property problem is a political issue, which can only be resolved 
with good faith, the intention to resolve the dispute and the realisation of the 
necessity to provide a balance between people from both communities who are 
subject to the property dispute.  
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